Epstein Secrets

on in Bridges v. United States, 346 U.S. 209 (1953), which concerned the Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act ("WSLA"). (Def. Mot. 2 at 12-14). But Bridges is inapposite, since it concerned a statute "[t]he legislative history of [which] emphasize[d] the propriety of its conservative interpretation" an

Judge McMahon found that because Maxwell's reliance on the protective order in that case as a "shield [. . .] from the court-ordered disclosure of Confidential Materials pursuant to a grand jury subpoena was unreasonable, the Court may exercise its discretion to grant the Government's application." (Id. at 22). The C

on in Bridges v. United States, 346 U.S. 209 (1953), which concerned the Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act ("WSLA"). (Def. Mot. 2 at 12-14). But Bridges is inapposite, since it concerned a statute "[t]he legislative history of [which] emphasize[d] the propriety of its conservative interpretation" an

Judge McMahon found that because Maxwell's reliance on the protective order in that case as a "shield [. . .] from the court-ordered disclosure of Confidential Materials pursuant to a grand jury subpoena was unreasonable, the Court may exercise its discretion to grant the Government's application." (Id. at 22). The C

745 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 1998) 102 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886) 101 iv EFTA00095071 Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) 78 Bridges v. United States, 346 U.S. 209 (1953) 38 Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352 (1973) 121 Bryson v. United States, 396 U.S. 64 (1969) 101

Judge McMahon found that because Maxwell's relianTI on the protective order in that case as a "shield [. . .] from the court-ordered disclosure of Confidential Materials pursuant to a grand jury subpoena was unreasonable, the Court may exercise its discretion to grant the Government's application." (Id. at 22). The C

on in Bridges v. United States, 346 U.S. 209 (1953), which concerned the Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act ("WSLA"). (Def. Mot. 2 at 12-14). But Bridges is inapposite, since it concerned a statute "[t]he legislative history of [which] emphasize[d] the propriety of its conservative interpretation" an

Judge McMahon found that because Maxwell's reliance on the protective order in that case as a "shield [. . .] from the court-ordered disclosure of Confidential Materials pursuant to a grand jury subpoena was unreasonable, the Court may exercise its discretion to grant the Government's application." (Id. at 22). The C