Epstein Secrets

do not qualify as offenses involving the sexual abuse of minors because sexual abuse is not an essential ingredient of each statutory offense. See Bridges v. United States, 346 U.S. 209, 221 (1953). In Maxwell's view, 9 EFTA00103281 Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 207 Filed 04/16/21 Page 10 of 34 f

207 Filed 04/16/21 Page 16 of 34 However, it also concludes that even if the statute were ambiguous, it would properly apply to these charges. At Lanfgraf s second step, the Court asks whether application of the statute to past conduct would have impermissible retroactive effects. "[A] statute has pres

do not qualify as offenses involving the sexual abuse of minors because sexual abuse is not an essential ingredient of each statutory offense. See Bridges v. United States, 346 U.S. 209, 221 (1953). In Maxwell's view, 9 EFTA00103351 Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 207 Filed 04/16/21 Page 10 of 34 f

207 Filed 04/16/21 Page 16 of 34 However, it also concludes that even if the statute were ambiguous, it would properly apply to these charges. At Lanfgraf s second step, the Court asks whether application of the statute to past conduct would have impermissible retroactive effects. "[A] statute has pres

do not qualify as offenses involving the sexual abuse of minors because sexual abuse is not an essential ingredient of each statutory offense. See Bridges v. United States, 346 U.S. 209, 221 (1953). In Maxwell's view, 9 EFTA00103316 Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 207 Filed 04/16/21 Page 10 of 34 f

207 Filed 04/16/21 Page 16 of 34 However, it also concludes that even if the statute were ambiguous, it would properly apply to these charges. At Lanfgraf s second step, the Court asks whether application of the statute to past conduct would have impermissible retroactive effects. "[A] statute has pres

do not qualify as offenses involving the sexual abuse of minors because sexual abuse is not an essential ingredient of each statutory offense. See Bridges v. United States, 346 U.S. 209, 221 (1953). In Maxwell's view, 9 EFTA00103246 Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 207 Filed 04/16/21 Page 10 of 34 f

207 Filed 04/16/21 Page 16 of 34 However, it also concludes that even if the statute were ambiguous, it would properly apply to these charges. At Lanfgraf s second step, the Court asks whether application of the statute to past conduct would have impermissible retroactive effects. "[A] statute has pres

do not qualify as offenses involving the sexual abuse of minors because sexual abuse is not an essential ingredient of each statutory offense. See Bridges v. United States, 346 U.S. 209, 221 (1953). In Maxwell's view, 9 EFTA00104660 Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 207 Filed 04/16/21 Page 10 of 34 f

207 Filed 04/16/21 Page 16 of 34 However, it also concludes that even if the statute were ambiguous, it would properly apply to these charges. At Lanfgraf s second step, the Court asks whether application of the statute to past conduct would have impermissible retroactive effects. "[A] statute has pres

do not qualify as offenses involving the sexual abuse of minors because sexual abuse is not an essential ingredient of each statutory offense. See Bridges v. United States, 346 U.S. 209, 221 (1953). In Maxwell's view, 9 EFTA00105671 Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 207 Filed 04/16/21 Page 10 of 34 f

207 Filed 04/16/21 Page 16 of 34 However, it also concludes that even if the statute were ambiguous, it would properly apply to these charges. At Lanfgraf s second step, the Court asks whether application of the statute to past conduct would have impermissible retroactive effects. "[A] statute has pres

do not qualify as offenses involving the sexual abuse of minors because sexual abuse is not an essential ingredient of each statutory offense. See Bridges v. United States, 346 U.S. 209, 221 (1953). In Maxwell's view, 9 EFTA00154648 Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 207 Filed 04/16/21 Page 10 of 34 f

207 Filed 04/16/21 Page 16 of 34 However, it also concludes that even if the statute were ambiguous, it would properly apply to these charges. At Lanfgraf s second step, the Court asks whether application of the statute to past conduct would have impermissible retroactive effects. "[A] statute has pres

do not qualify as offenses involving the sexual abuse of minors because sexual abuse is not an essential ingredient of each statutory offense. See Bridges v. United States, 346 U.S. 209, 221 (1953). In Maxwell's view, 9 EFTA00085233 Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 207 Filed 04/16/21 Page 10 of 34 f

207 Filed 04/16/21 Page 16 of 34 However, it also concludes that even if the statute were ambiguous, it would properly apply to these charges. At Lanfgraf s second step, the Court asks whether application of the statute to past conduct would have impermissible retroactive effects. "[A] statute has pres

do not qualify as offenses involving the sexual abuse of minors because sexual abuse is not an essential ingredient of each statutory offense. See Bridges v. United States, 346 U.S. 209, 221 (1953). In Maxwell's view, 9 EFTA00090502 Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 207 Filed 04/16/21 Page 10 of 34 f

207 Filed 04/16/21 Page 16 of 34 However, it also concludes that even if the statute were ambiguous, it would properly apply to these charges. At Lanfgraf s second step, the Court asks whether application of the statute to past conduct would have impermissible retroactive effects. "[A] statute has pres

do not qualify as offenses involving the sexual abuse of minors because sexual abuse is not an essential ingredient of each statutory offense. See Bridges v. United States, 346 U.S. 209, 221 (1953). In Maxwell's view, 9 EFTA00092763 Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 207 Filed 04/16/21 Page 10 of 34 f

207 Filed 04/16/21 Page 16 of 34 However, it also concludes that even if the statute were ambiguous, it would properly apply to these charges. At Lanfgraf s second step, the Court asks whether application of the statute to past conduct would have impermissible retroactive effects. "[A] statute has pres