Epstein Secrets

the Sexual or Physical Abuse or Kidnapping of a Child 14 CONCLUSION 16 EFTA00028904 --- PAGE BREAK --- TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Page(s) Cases Bridges v. United States, 346 U.S. 209 (1953) 11, 13, 14 Burrage v. United States, 571 U.S. 204 (2014) 14 Cisneros v. Alpine Ridge Group, 508 U.S. 1

andgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244 (1994) Leocal v. Ashcroft, 11 passim 543 U.S. 1 (2004) 11 Martin v. Hadix, 527 U.S. 343 (1999) 6 Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29 (2009) 12, 13 Shular v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 779 (2020) 11, 14 Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112 (1970) 8, 9

the government cites in which the Court applied a fact-based approach to an "offense involving" statute—does not break this line of cases at all. In Nijhawan, the statutory provision at issue referred to "an offense that . . . involves fraud or deceit in which the loss to the victim or victims exceeds $1

elements of § 2422(a) and § 2423(a), and to disregard allegations of conduct beyond those elements. Finally, the government attempts to distinguish Bridges, in which the Supreme Court used the equivalent of a "necessarily entails" approach specifically with respect to a statute of limitations, and argu

on in Bridges v. United States, 346 U.S. 209 (1953), which concerned the Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act ("WSLA"). (Def. Mot. 2 at 12-14). But Bridges is inapposite, since it concerned a statute "[t]he legislative history of [which] emphasize[d] the propriety of its conservative interpretation"and

he categorical approach. 39 EFTA00100006 `Involving' . . is equally consistent with applying a fact-based approach." 865 F.3d at 60 n.11 (citing Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29,38 (2009) (applying the circumstances-specific approach to a statute containing the word "involves")). Moreover, as the Weing

on in Bridges v. United States, 346 U.S. 209 (1953), which concerned the Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act ("WSLA"). (Def. Mot. 2 at 12-14). But Bridges is inapposite, since it concerned a statute "[t]he legislative history of [which] emphasize[d] the propriety of its conservative interpretation" an

the categorical approach. 'Involving' . is equally consistent with applying a fact-based approach." 865 F.3d at 60 n.11 39 EFTA00077671 (citing Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 38 (2009) (applying the circumstances-specific approach to a statute containing the word "involves")). Moreover, as the Wein

on in Bridges v. United States, 346 U.S. 209 (1953), which concerned the Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act ("WSLA"). (Def. Mot. 2 at 12-14). But Bridges is inapposite, since it concerned a statute "[t]he legislative history of [which] emphasize[d] the propriety of its conservative interpretation" an

the categorical approach. 'Involving' . is equally consistent with applying a fact-based approach." 865 F.3d at 60 n.11 39 EFTA00039486 (citing Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 38 (2009) (applying the circumstances-specific approach to a statute containing the word "involves")). Moreover, as the Wein

745 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 1998) 102 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886) 101 iv EFTA00095071 Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) 78 Bridges v. United States, 346 U.S. 209 (1953) 38 Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352 (1973) 121 Bryson v. United States, 396 U.S. 64 (1969) 101

r the categorical approach. `Involving' . is equally consistent with applying a fact-based approach." 865 F.3d at 60 n.I 39 EFTA00095131 (citing Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 38 (2009) (applying the circumstances-specific approach to a statute containing the word "involves")). Moreover, as the Wein

on in Bridges v. United States, 346 U.S. 209 (1953), which concerned the Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act ("WSLA"). (Def. Mot. 2 at 12-14). But Bridges is inapposite, since it concerned a statute "[t]he legislative history of [which] emphasize[d] the propriety of its conservative interpretation" an

the categorical approach. 39 EFTA00103064 `Involving' . is equally consistent with applying a fact-based approach." 865 F.3d at 60 n.11 (citing Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 38 (2009) (applying the circumstances-specific approach to a statute containing the word "involves")). Moreover, as the Wein

do not qualify as offenses involving the sexual abuse of minors because sexual abuse is not an essential ingredient of each statutory offense. See Bridges v. United States, 346 U.S. 209, 221 (1953). In Maxwell's view, 9 EFTA00020269 --- PAGE BREAK --- Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 207 Filed 04/16

t . . . involves fraud or deceit in which the loss to the victim or victims exceeds $10,000" is "consistent with a circumstance-specific approach." Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 32, 38 (2009) (emphasis added). Thus, the word "involves" generally means that courts should look to the circumstances of an

do not qualify as offenses involving the sexual abuse of minors because sexual abuse is not an essential ingredient of each statutory offense. See Bridges v. United States, 346 U.S. 209, 221 (1953). In Maxwell's view, 9 EFTA00022099 --- PAGE BREAK --- Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 207 Filed 04/16

t . . . involves fraud or deceit in which the loss to the victim or victims exceeds $10,000" is "consistent with a circumstance-specific approach." Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 32, 38 (2009) (emphasis added). Thus, the word "involves" generally means that courts should look to the circumstances of an

do not qualify as offenses involving the sexual abuse of minors because sexual abuse is not an essential ingredient of each statutory offense. See Bridges v. United States, 346 U.S. 209, 221 (1953). In Maxwell's view, 9 EFTA00029548 --- PAGE BREAK --- Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 208 Filed 04/16

t . . . involves fraud or deceit in which the loss to the victim or victims exceeds $10,000" is "consistent with a circumstance-specific approach." Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 32, 38 (2009) (emphasis added). Thus, the word "involves" generally means that courts should look to the circumstances of an