Epstein Secrets

3 (4th Cir. 1991) (Fifth Amendment does not protect the contents of voluntarily prepared documents, whether business or personal); United States I Hubbell , 167 F.3d 552, 567 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (same), aff'd on other grounds , 530 U.S. 27 (2000); In re Grand Jury Proceedings , 759 F.2d 1418, 1419 (9th Ci

ction with prosecution by one sovereign do not carry over to prosecution by another sovereign. In Cobb , the Supreme Court clarified its holding in McNeil. Wisconsin , 501 U.S. 171 (1991) that the "Sixth Amendment right to counsel is offense specific. It cannot be invoked once for all future prosecutio

(1991) that the "Sixth Amendment right to counsel is offense specific. It cannot be invoked once for all future prosecutions." Id. at 167 (quoting McNeil at 175). The Cobb Court noted that some other courts: have read into McNeil 's offense-specific definition an exception for crimes that are `factual

t patterns have asked whether the government was aware of the documents’ existence apart from any actions of the defendant. Thus, United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27 (2000), rejected the Government’s argument that it was a foregone conclusion that the defendant possessed “ordinary business records.”

dress rehearser if a party were allowed to feint and weave at the initial hearing, and save its knockout punch for the second round.” Williams v. McNeil, 557 F.3d 1287, 1292 (11th Cir. 2009). Four, in any event, far from being a knockout punch, Epstein’s argument is meritless. As is readily app

(4th Cir. 1991) (Fifth Amendment does not protect the contents of voluntarily prepared documents, whether business or personal); United States v. Hubbell , 167 F.3d 552, 567 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (same), aff'd on other grounds , 530 U.S. 27 (2000); In re Grand Jury Proceedings , 759 F.2d 1418, 1419 (9th Ci

(1991) that the "Sixth Amendment right to counsel is offense specific. It cannot be invoked once for all future prosecutions." Id. at 167 (quoting McNeil at 175). The Cobb Court noted that some other courts: have read into McNeil 's offense-specific definition an exception for crimes that are `factual

TA00179122 1991) (Fifth Amendment does not protect the contents of voluntarily prepared documents, whether business or personal); United States v. Hubbell, 167 F.3d 552, 567 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (same), aff'd on other grounds, 530 U.S. 27 (2000); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 759 F.2d 1418, 1419 (9th Cir.

(1991) that the "Sixth Amendment right to counsel is offense specific. It cannot be invoked once for all future prosecutions." Id. at 167 (quoting McNeil at 175). The Cobb Court noted that some -34- EFTA00179133 other courts: have read into McNeil's offense-specific definition an exception for crim