Epstein Secrets

ot pertinent here, the presence of third parties is sufficient to undermine the needed confidentiality.") (citation omitted); Liggett Group Inc., v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. , 116 F.R.D. 205, 210 (M.D.N.C. 1986) (citations omitted) ( "For communications between an attorney and client . . . to be privileged, they must be

ents , are separate offenses for purposes of the Sixth Amendment because they were violations of the laws of two separate sovereigns - specifically the State of Mississippi and the United States. Therefore, because the Sixth Amendment is offense-specific, Avants's statements during the 1967 interview, when he was repre

not pertinent here, the presence of third parties is sufficient to undermine the needed confidentiality.") (citation omitted); Liggett Group Inc., I Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. , 116 F.R.D. 205, 210 (M.D.N.C. 1986) (citations omitted) ( "For communications between an attorney and client . . . to be privileged, they must be

ents , are separate offenses for purposes of the Sixth Amendment because they were violations of the laws of two separate sovereigns - specifically the State of Mississippi and the United States. Therefore, because the Sixth Amendment is offense-specific, Avants's statements during the 1967 interview, when he was repre

t pertinent here, the presence of third parties is sufficient to undermine the needed confidentiality.") (citation omitted); Liggett Group Inc., v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 116 F.R.D. 205, 210 (M.D.N.C. 1986) (citations omitted) ("For communications between an attorney and client . . . to be privileged, they must be c

lements, are separate offenses for purposes of the Sixth Amendment because they were violations of the laws of two separate sovereigns—specifically the State of Mississippi and the United States. Therefore, because the Sixth Amendment is offense- specific, Avants's statements during the 1967 interview, when he was repres