Epstein Secrets

19). Though it has not authoritatively settled the question, the Second Circuit has strongly suggested that Maxwell's approach is the wrong one. In Weingarten v. United States, 865 F.3d 48, 58-60 (2d Cir. 2017), the Second Circuit discussed at length how the text, context, and history of § 3283 show that

truthful answer might reasonably lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995); United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 753-54 (2d Cir. 1994). Like knowing falsity, materiality is an element of the offense and thus ordinarily must be "decided by the jury

19). Though it has not authoritatively settled the question, the Second Circuit has strongly suggested that Maxwell's approach is the wrong one. In Weingarten v. United States, 865 F.3d 48, 58-60 (2d Cir. 2017), the Second Circuit discussed at length how the text, context, and history of § 3283 show that

truthful answer might reasonably lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995); United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 753-54 (2d Cir. 1994). Like knowing falsity, materiality is an element of the offense and thus ordinarily must be "decided by the jury

19). Though it has not authoritatively settled the question, the Second Circuit has strongly suggested that Maxwell's approach is the wrong one. In Weingarten v. United States, 865 F.3d 48, 58-60 (2d Cir. 2017), the Second Circuit discussed at length how the text, context, and history of § 3283 show that

truthful answer might reasonably lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995); United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 753-54 (2d Cir. 1994). Like knowing falsity, materiality is an element of the offense and thus ordinarily must be "decided by the jury