Epstein Secrets

Lefcourt and Lilly Ann Sanchez, both counsel to Jeffrey Epstein, that as a result of a telephone conversation had amongst you, Mr. Lefcourt and Ms. Sanchez, you are now seeking documents reflecting: 1. Ownership of JEGE and Hyperion; 2. Assets of JEGE and Hyperion; and 3. Employees of JEGE and Hyperio

ted expansion of federal law to cover conduct that has always been exclusively within the core of state powers. At this point in time, the need for Departmental oversight is critical. We appreciate this opportunity to submit our assessment of the key facts in this case and review of the pertinent federal st

ll of the terms and conditions of the [Deferred Prosecution] Agreement, as modified by the United States Attorney's December 19, 2007 letter to Ms. Sanchez by close of business on Monday, June 2, 2008, the SDFL will elect to terminate the Agreement." Id., p.1 The Truth: • The Deferred Prosecution Agre

ted expansion of federal law to cover conduct that has always been exclusively within the core of state powers. At this point in time, the need for Departmental oversight is critical. We appreciate this opportunity to submit our assessment of the key facts in this case and review of the pertinent federal st

................60 3. September 7, 2007: Acosta, Other USAO Attorneys, and FBI Supervisors Meet with Epstein Attorneys Starr, Lefkowitz, and Sanchez ...............................................................................................62 VI. SEPTEMBER 2007: THE PLEA NEGOTIATIONS INTENS

Chief] Oosterba[an] to participate by teleconference, thereby intercepting the DC meeting. Thoughts? Acosta told OPR that he had no concern about Departmental “scrutiny of the NPA scheme” and that “[i]f anything,” he was concerned whether the Department might direct the USAO to “drop this case.”96 2. Le

d that she would confer with Krischer and Belohlavek “to make sure the defense doesn’t try to do an end run.” That same morning, Epstein attorney Sanchez, who had not been involved in negotiations for several weeks, emailed Sloman, advising, “[I] want to finalize the plea deal and there is only one i

rosecution should Epstein renege on his agreement, and she outlined for Acosta and Sloman the steps she proposed to take while Epstein was pursuing Departmental review. Those steps included re-establishing contact with victims, interviewing victims in New York and one victim who lived in a foreign country,

computer equipment. Epstein’s team sought to postpone compliance with the USAO’s demand for the equipment. In late June 2007, defense attorney Sanchez requested an extension of time to comply; in informing Sloman, Menchel, and Lourie of the request, Villafaña stressed that “we want to get the comp

ent had the “right” to address Epstein’s concerns. He told OPR that because the USAO is part of the Department of Justice, if a defendant asks for Departmental review, it would be “unseemly” to object. During his OPR interview, Sloman described Acosta as very process-oriented, which he attributed to Acosta

nted expansion of federal law to cover conduct that has always been exclusively within the core of state powers. At this point in time, the need for Departmental oversight is critical. We appreciate this opportunity to submit our assessment of the key facts in this case and review of the pertinent federal stat

an “mere solicitation;” it must be more than an offer or the providing of an opportunity to engage in prohibited conduct. See, e.g,. United States v. Sanchez-Berrios, 424 F.3d 65, 76-77 (1* Cir. 2005); United States v. Brown, 43 F.3d 618, 625 (11™ Cir. 1995). The government cannot fairly, or consistent wit

ted expansion of federal law to cover conduct that has always been exclusively within the core of state powers. At this point in time, the need for Departmental oversight is critical. We appreciate this opportunity to submit our assessment of the key facts in this case and review of the pertinent federal st

"mere solicitation;" it must be more than an offer or the providing of an opportunity to engage in prohibited conduct. See, e.g,. United States v. Sanchez-Berrios, 424 F.3d 65, 76-77 (ls' Cir. 2005); United States v. Brown, 43 F.3d 618, 625 (11th Cir. 1995). The government cannot fairly, or consistent