Epstein Secrets

sufficient—cannot survive either a "plain language" test or the rule of lenity as they have been authoritatively construed in the recent Santos and Cuellar cases. The statute cannot be read otherwise. As the Cuellar decision makes clear, a proper interpretation of a federal criminal statute is guided "

upreme Court decisions addressing that element. See Hansen v. Huff, 291 U.S. 559 (1934); Mortensen v. United States, 322 U.S. 369 (1944). Santos and Cuellar speak loudly and clearly against prosecutors seeing such elasticity in federal criminal statutes, including those enacted to protect important fede

nt can be found guilty of that offense only if...the defendant believed that such individual was less than (18) years of age..."); United States v. Murrell, 368 F.3d 1283, 1286 (11th Cir. 2004) (§ 2422(b) requires that the defendant knowingly target a minor). Importantly, then, all the elements must be

statute makes clear, the essence of this crime is the communication itself—not the resulting act. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, in Murrell, underscores the point: The defendant in Bailey contended that attempt under § 2422(b) `requires the specific intent to commit illegal sexual acts

it is not in accord with the principles of justice. Indeed, as noted, just a few weeks ago, the Supreme Court underscored this point in Santos and Cuellar. The Court made clear that prosecutorial discretion does not provide the USAO cart blanche to expand criminal statutes as they seek to do here with

upreme Court decisions addressing that element. See Hansen v. Huff, 291 U.S. 559 (1934); Mortensen v. United States, 322 U.S. 369 (1944). Santos and Cuellar speak loudly and clearly against prosecutors seeing such elasticity in federal criminal statutes, including those enacted to protect important fede

nt can be found guilty of that offense only if...the defendant believed that such individual was less than (18) years of age..."); United States v. Murrell, 368 F.3d 1283, 1286 (I I1° Cir. 2004) (§ 2422(b) requires that the defendant knowingly target a minor). Importantly, then, all the elements must be

der to sustain a conviction. In particular, § 2422(b) requires that the defendant specifically intended to target a minor. ke,ligh, United States v. Murrell, 368 F.3d 1286 (11th Cir. 2004) ("[T]o prove an attempt the government must first prove that [defendant], using the Internet, acted with a specific

A00209852 KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP Congress to speak more clearly and keeps courts from making criminal law in Congress's stead." Slip op. at 6.I In Cuellar, the Court examined the link between the money-laundering statute's mens rea requirement and the underlying elements of the offense. After a careful

o Suprems Court decisions addressing that element. See Hansen'. Huff, 291 U.S. 559 (1934); Mortensen. United States, 322 U.S. 369 (1944). Santos and Cuellar speak loudly and clearly against prosecutors seeing such elasticity in federal criminal statutes, including those enacted to protect important fede

statute makes clear, the essence of this crime is the communication itself—not the resulting act. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, in Murrell, underscores the point: The defendant in Bailey contended that attempt under § 2422(6) 'requires the specific intent to commit illegal sexual acts

it is not in accord with the principles of justice. Indeed, as noted, just a few weeks ago, the Supreme Court underscored this point in Santos and Cuellar. The Court made clear that prosecutorial discretion does not provide the USAO cart blanche to expand criminal statutes as they seek to do here with

rder to sustain a conviction. In particular, § 2422(b) requires that the defendant specifically intended to target a minor. age, a, United States v. Murrell, 368 F.3d 1286 (11th Cir. 2004) ("[T]o prove an attempt the government must first prove that [defendant], using the intemet, acted with a specific

to the facts in this case. Importantly, we note that the CEOS review was conducted prior to the Supreme Court’s very recent decisions in Santos and Cuellar, which we believe—illuminating as they do the Court’s interpretive methodology when it comes to federal criminal law—powerfully demonstrate the subst

ce, a conviction under the statute only requires a finding that the defendant had an intent to persuade or to attempt to persuade.’ United States v. Murrell 368 F.3d 1283, 1287 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing United States v. Bailey, 228 F.3d 637, 638-39 (6th Cir.2000)). Thus, the targeted criminal conduct must

e statute makes clear, the essence of this crime is the communication itself—not the resulting act. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, in Murrell, underscores the point: The defendant in Bailey contended that attempt under § 2422(b) ‘requires the specific intent to commit illegal sexual acts r

support both a narrow or broad application of the federal criminal law, "the tie must go to the defendant." United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. and Cuellar v. United States, 553 U.S (June 2, 2008), Slip Op. at 6. 2 February 25, 2003 Trafficking in Persons National Security Presidential Directive. EFTA

rder to sustain a conviction. In particular, § 2422(b) requires that the defendant specifically intended to target a minor. age, a, United States v. Murrell, 368 F.3d 1286 (11th Cir. 2004) ("[T]o prove an attempt the government must first prove that [defendant], using the intemet, acted with a specific

previously set forth herein, and as more fully explained in other submissions related to this case, the recent Supreme Court decisions in Santo and Cuellar make this attempted stretch of the law improper. EFTA00013796 --- PAGE BREAK --- ALLEN GUTHRIE MCHUGH & THOMAS, PLLC Mr. John Roth June 19, 200

e shown that Mr. Epstein violated any of the three federal statutes identified by prosecutors. As the Supreme Court's recent decisions in Santos and Cuellar make clear, federal law may not be stretched in that manner, and the current federal investigation relies, as its foundation, on impermissibly elas

e, a conviction under the statute only requires a finding that the defendant had an intent to persuade or to attempt to persuade.' United States v. Murrell 368 F.3d 1283, 1287 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing United States v. Bailey, 228 F.3d 637, 638-39 (6th Cir.2000)). Thus, the targeted criminal conduct must

statute makes clear, the essence of this crime is the communication itself—not the resulting act. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, in Murrell, underscores the point: The defendant in Bailey contended that attempt under § 2422(b) `requires the specific intent to commit illegal sexual acts