Epstein Secrets

ecution is to the facts in this case. Importantly, we note that the CEOS review was conducted prior to the Supreme Court's very recent decisions in Santos and Cuellar, which we believe—illuminating as they do the Court's interpretive methodology when it comes to federal criminal law—powerfully demonst

AO to do so, it is not in accord with the principles of justice. Indeed, as noted, just a few weeks ago, the Supreme Court underscored this point in Santos and Cuellar. The Court made clear that prosecutorial discretion does not provide the USAO cart blanche to expand criminal statutes as they seek to

support both a narrow or broad application of the federal criminal law, "the tie must go to the defendant." United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. and Cuellar v. United States 553 U.S (June 2, 2008), Slip Op. at 6. 2 February 25, 2003 Trafficking in Persons National Security Presidential Directive. 3505-019 Page 10 of 6

criminal statute could support both a narrow or broad application of the federal criminal law, "the tie must go to the defendant." United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. and Cuellar v. United States, 553 U.S (June 2, 2008), Slip Op. at 6. 2 February 25, 2003 Trafficking in Persons National Security Presi

AO to do so, it is not in accord with the principles of justice. Indeed, as noted, just a few weeks ago, the Supreme Court underscored this point in Santos and Cuellar. The Court made clear that prosecutorial discretion does not provide the USAO cart blanche to expand criminal statutes as they seek to

support both a narrow or broad application of the federal criminal law, "the tie must go to the defendant." United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. and Cuellar v. United States, 553 U.S (June 2, 2008), Slip Op. at 6. 2 February 25, 2003 Trafficking in Persons National Security Presidential Directive. EFTA00210042 ALLEN

t cannot be shown that Mr. Epstein violated any of the three federal statutes identified by prosecutors. As the Supreme Court's recent decisions in Santos and Cuellar make clear, federal law may not be stretched in that manner, and the current federal investigation relies, as its foundation, on imperm

why federal prosecution in this case would be improper as a matter of both law and policy. See United States v. Santos, No. 06-1005 (June 2, 2008); Cuellar v. United States, No. 06-1456 (June 2, 2008). Though they both address the interpretation and application of the federal money laundering statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1956,