Epstein Secrets

afat was willing to move toward us on core issues, I would consider limited, symbolic moves on both land swaps and Palestinian sovereignty in part of East Jerusalem. Clinton replied: the summit was on. It would begin at Camp David in one week’s time, on July 11. Two days before leaving for the US, I brought my

test prospect of movement on Oslo. In October, Bibi did finally try to seize the initiative. He wrapping up the redeployment details in a summit with Arafat and Clinton and Arafat in Wye River. But as soon as he got back home, he started backtracking, rather than risk facing down his right-wing critics in

attraction in getting a deal with Syria first: it would increase our negotiating leverage with the Palestinians. That would certainly not be lost on Yasir Arafat — one reason that I realized the importance of an early meeting with him, to convey my commitment to keeping the Oslo process alive, and, if possible

afat was willing to move toward us on core issues, I would consider limited, symbolic moves on both land swaps and Palestinian sovereignty in part of East Jerusalem. Clinton replied: the summit was on. It would begin at Camp David in one week's time, on July 11. *** Two days before leaving for the US, I brought m

test prospect of movement on Oslo. In October, Bibi did finally try to seize the initiative. He wrapping up the redeployment details in a summit with Arafat and Clinton and Arafat in Wye River. But as soon as he got back home, he started backtracking, rather than risk facing down his right-wing critics in

54 Chapter Twenty-One President Clinton and I met the next morning. My aim was to persuade him that the time had come for a make-or-break summit with Yasir Arafat. I suspected it would not be easy to convince him, and it wasn't. But I made the argument that if we were to have any hope of moving Oslo forward, we

_01351106 EFTA02360440 10 were instrumental in this connection), was precisely to establish a Palestinian Arab state encompassing the West Bank, East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip, but without recognizing Israel or making peace with it. Which is why Arafat never accepted a signed and sealed two- state settl

president and prime minister, as an innovative breakthrough, a reversal of the strategy of their unwholesome predecessor, PLO chairman (1969-2004) Yasser Arafat. This is incorrect. Indeed, Arafat's strategy from the late 1980s, after he realized that he wasn't going to orchestrate the destruction of Israel

tive breakthrough, a reversal of the strategy of their unwholesome predecessor, PLO chairman (1969-2004) Yasser Arafat. This is incorrect. Indeed, Arafat's strategy from the late 1980s, after he realized that he wasn't going to orchestrate the destruction of Israel (Black September 1970 in Jordan and

es on Interim Self-Government Arrangements (13 September 1993) 6 Letter from Israel’s Foreign Minister to Norway’s Foreign Minister on the Status of East Jerusalem (11 October 1993) 18 Establishment of the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee (AHLC) (5 November 1993) 19 Protocol on Economic Relations between the Governmen

ement) (28 September 1995) 145 Temporary International Presence in Hebron (TIPH Agreement) (9 May 1996) 324 Declaration by PM Netanyahu and Chairman Arafat following their first meeting (4 September 1996) 327 Hebron Protocol (17 January 1997) 329 Note for the Record (17 January 1997) 336 HOUSE_OVERSIGH

nyahu. Free and democratic Arab countries won't shrink from supporting this Palestinian right under any circumstances. Muslims will not give up on East Jerusalem, either. Arab regimes have been weak in the past. Democracy will strengthen them, but also add reason to Arab governance. Most Arabs have accepted

as in particular. It will also bring Hamas—next year and for the first time—into the PLO, the body charged with negotiating peace with Israel. Even Yasser Arafat resisted that development when he headed the PLO, and it seems obvious that Israel cannot negotiate peace with an anti-Semitic terrorist group ben

ruction in the West Bank for 10 months. The settlement freeze lasted, but Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas refused to accept growing settlements in East Jerusalem. When the two parties finally met in Washington in September 2010, the 10- month freeze was up and settlement construction began again. The talks e

vely implementing the peace agreements. In 1998, US President Bill Clinton invited Israeli Prime Minister Banjamin Netanyahu and Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat to sign an agreement to implement the procedures outlined in the Oslo Accords. After days of intense debate, the agreement was signed. However, li

s relating to HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_029694 --- PAGE BREAK --- the Palestinians, including Israel's continued settlement construction in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. Israel's military occupied those territories, along with Gaza, in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. Palestinians view them as the key territorial elements

, analytical chops, and capacity to write in English that would make him so indispensable to the only Palestinian who really counted in those days -- Yasir Arafat. Erekat was a unique figure -- neither a fighter (no nom de guerre for him), nor a PLO insider, nor an organization man from Tunis. Rather, he was a

ortunity? Saeb Erekat: Though I was not the chief negotiator at that moment, the connection between [then Prime Minister Yitzhak] Rabin and President Arafat made everyone around them, including myself, feel that peace was possible. There was significant progress in all tracks until Rabin's assassination b

s relating to HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_029781 --- PAGE BREAK --- the Palestinians, including Israel's continued settlement construction in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. Israel's military occupied those territories, along with Gaza, in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. Palestinians view them as the key territorial elements

, analytical chops, and capacity to write in English that would make him so indispensable to the only Palestinian who really counted in those days -- Yasir Arafat. Erekat was a unique figure -- neither a fighter (no nom de guerre for him), nor a PLO insider, nor an organization man from Tunis. Rather, he was a

ortunity? Saeb Erekat: Though I was not the chief negotiator at that moment, the connection between [then Prime Minister Yitzhak] Rabin and President Arafat made everyone around them, including myself, feel that peace was possible. There was significant progress in all tracks until Rabin's assassination b

mas in particular. It will also bring Hamas—next year and for the first time— into the PLO, the body charged with negotiating peace with Israel. Even Yasser Arafat resisted that development when he headed the PLO, and it seems obvious that Israel cannot negotiate peace with an anti-Semitic terrorist group bent o

etanyahu. Free and democratic Arab countries won't shrink from supporting this Palestinian right under any circumstances. Muslims will not give up on East Jerusalem, either. Arab regimes have been weak in the past. Democracy will strengthen them, but also add reason to Arab governance. Most Arabs have accepted Is