Epstein Secrets

t Bank might permit the same sort of terrorist takeover that withdrawal had allowed in Gaza and in south Lebanon. Now that former Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz -- who had previously presented a peace plan that would result in the creation of a Palestinian state in 60 percent of the West Bank's land -- has

10. For it was on that day in 1967 that a cease-fire in the Six-Day War was declared, leaving Israel in possession of the West Bank, Gaza, Sinai, the Golan Heights, and Jerusalem but divided over what to do with its newfound gains. Israel withdrew from the Sinai in 1982 and from Gaza in 2007, and no one is di

tebbe, he said that if we couldn’t be reasonably confident of success, we would negotiate. Now that we knew where Waschsman was being held, I ordered Shaul Mofaz, the commander with responsibility for the West Bank, to prepare for a possible rescue. Before going to brief Rabin, I arranged for another commando

ade with him. The substance in any agreement, though politically difficult, was also more straightforward. We knew what Assad wanted: the recovery of the Golan Heights, in return for the absolute minimum level of political normalization with Israel. We knew what we wanted: security guarantees and assurances regardin

s difficult as possible. They were also targeting our local surrogates, the Maronite-led South Lebanese Army militia. I’d been meeting regularly with Shaul Mofaz, the former paratroop officer who 337 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011808 / BARAK / 52 was now chief of staff, to ensure we had a plan to get our troops out as

so wanted my assessment about whether the army could work out arrangements to safeguard the country’s security if we handed back most, if not all, of the Golan Heights. If so, what kind of security arrangements, with what timeline? We met through the summer, as the 301 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011772 / BARAK / 16 talks wi

tebbe, he said that if we couldn't be reasonably confident of success, we would negotiate. Now that we knew where Waschsman was being held, I ordered Shaul Mofaz, the commander with responsibility for the West Bank, to prepare for a possible rescue. Before going to brief Rabin, I arranged for another commando

ade with him. The substance in any agreement, though politically difficult, was also more straightforward. We knew what Assad wanted: the recovery of the Golan Heights, in return for the absolute minimum level of political normalization with Israel. We knew what we wanted: security guarantees and assurances regardin

s difficult as possible. They were also targeting our local surrogates, the Maronite-led South Lebanese Army militia. I'd been meeting regularly with Shaul Mofaz, the former paratroop officer who 337 HOUSE _OVERSIGHT_028185 / BARAK / 52 was now chief of staff, to ensure we had a plan to get our troops out as

so wanted my assessment about whether the army could work out arrangements to safeguard the country's security if we handed back most, if not all, of the Golan Heights. If so, what kind of security arrangements, with what timeline? We met through the summer, as the 301 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_028149 / BARAK / 16 talks with