Epstein Secrets

cent of the Golan Heights, it still fell short of Assad’s demand for a return to the 4 June 1967 lines, a

Resolu- tions 425 and 426. 18 June 2000 The UN Security Council confirms Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon in a Presidential Statement. 10 July 2000 Bashar al-Assad is elected President of Syria in a nationwide referendum. 11-25 July 2000 Camp David II negotiations between Ehud Barak and Yasir Arafat. 25 July 2

s I was told that the reason was to avoid the media who were waiting for the arrival of the UN team in Damascus. I was picked up at Aleppo airport by Walid Muallem, who was then Deputy Foreign Minister. He brought me to Assad’s villa, where a few hours of negotiations resulted in the Aleppo understanding, which

rian peace deal that was not to come. Despite Barak offering Syrian President Hafez al-Assad 99 per cent of the Golan Heights, it still fell short of Assad’s demand for a return to the 4 June 1967 lines, and the Syria track subsequently crumbled. This put Arafat on the spot: how could he now, in front of

the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps' elite Qods Force, who have been advising and supporting the Assad regime. Zarif and Syrian foreign minister Walid Mouallem's recent collective visits to Moscow indicate that Tehran's diplomatic maneuver was a coordinated attempt to change the framework of the Geneva Commu

to this week's Syria peace talks in Montreux, Switzerland, does little if anything to change the Assad regime's approach to those talks. President Bashar al- Assad's statements in recent days indicate that he and his backers are attempting to pressure the United States and the rest of the "London 11"

Syria Peace Conference Editorial Article 2. NYT WikiLeaks, Drought and Syria Thomas L. Friedman Article 3. The Washington Institute Avoiding Assad's Forced Solution to the Syria Crisis Andrew J. Tabler Article 4. Now Lebanon Does the US seek an Arab-Iranian "equilibrium?" Hussein Ibish Art

sitional administration by "mutual consent" of the Assad government and the opposition. In the view of the United States, this means that President Bashar al-Assad would be replaced, although Assad government officials and his Alawite sect could be part of the new structure. Iran has refused to accept any pre

entral Asia to institute moderate reforms was utterly disregarded yet it upholds these regimes even though they depend, as Syria's Foreign Minister Walid Muallem, said, on Russia. Their propensity to murder their citizens has apparently not suggested to Moscow that it has again backed the wrong horses. Meanw

rtunity the regime once possessed is being jeopardised by its actions. Brutal repression has overshadowed belated, half-hearted reform suggestions; Bashar has squandered credibility; his regime has lost much of the legitimacy derived from its foreign policy. The international community, largely from

t did not have to be so. The protest movement is strong and getting stronger but yet to reach critical mass. Unlike toppled Arab leaders, President Bashar Assad enjoyed some genuine popularity. Many Syrians dread chaos and their nation's fragmentation. But whatever opportunity the regime once possessed is

ss. Unlike toppled Arab leaders, President Bashar Assad enjoyed some genuine popularity. Many Syrians dr

the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps' elite Qods Force, who have been advising and supporting the Assad regime. Zarif and Syrian foreign minister Walid Mouallem's recent collective visits to Moscow indicate that Tehran's diplomatic maneuver was a coordinated attempt to change the framework of the Geneva Comm

Another Syria Peace Conference Editorial I NYT WikiLeaks, Drought and Syria Thomas L. Friedman Article 3. The Washington Institute Avoiding Assad's Forced Solution to the Syria Crisis Andrew J. Tabler Article 4. Now Lebanon Does the US seek an Arab-Iranian "equilibrium?" Hussein Ibish Ar

to this week's Syria peace talks in Montreux, Switzerland, does little if anything to change the Assad regime's approach to those talks. President Bashar al-Assad's statements in recent days indicate that he and his backers are attempting to pressure the United States and the rest of the "London 11" countries s

ld act as a multiplier on social and economic pressures already at play and undermine stability." ■ "Yehia does not believe that the [government of Bashar al- Assad] will allow any Syrian citizen to starve. ... However, Yehia told us that the Syrian minister of agriculture ... stated publicly that eco

tinction he believes the opposition failed to make when they called for Assad's removal instead of regime change. In the meantime, Foreign Minister Walid al-Muallem wrote to the Secretary-General of the United Nations arguing that Syria is fighting terrorists and that a Security Council resolution against Syria

their kinsmen instead. In some other cases, residents spoke of infighting among the security forces. International pressure is increasing against Assad's regime. The Jordanian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood has escalated its rhetoric against the regime, calling the ongoing events a "crime against

s that I meet with a Syrian representative, and President Assad agreed. Later that month, I was sent to Washington for talks with Syria’s ambassador, Walid Muallem. With the Americans’ Mideast envoy, Dennis Ross, as host, we met in Blair House across the street from the White House. I began by explaining the se

three hours from the cease-fire. We did advance nearer to the Beirut-Damascus road. An hour before noon, our dedicated anti-tank unit destroyed 20 of Assad’s top-tier tanks, Soviet-made T-72s. Under different circumstances, those successes might have been a cause for consolation. Yet it was hard to dwell

s that I meet with a Syrian representative, and President Assad agreed. Later that month, I was sent to Washington for talks with Syria's ambassador, Walid Muallem. With the Americans' Mideast envoy, Dennis Ross, as host, we met in Blair House across the street from the White House. I began by explaining the sec

three hours from the cease-fire. We did advance nearer to the Beirut-Damascus road. An hour before noon, our dedicated anti-tank unit destroyed 20 of Assad's top-tier tanks, Soviet-made T-72s. Under different circumstances, those successes might have been a cause for consolation. Yet it was hard to dwell