Epstein Secrets

1:26:17 +0000 23 April, 2012 Article 1. The Washington Post Nuclear weapon reductions must be part of strategic analysis Henry A. Kissinger and Brent Scowcroft Article 2. The National Interest The Fantasy of Zero Nukes Amitai Etzioni Article 3. The Weekly Standard Negotiations That Matter Reuel Marc

? [Quray] No, no, in Camp David we said there can be amendments to the borders. Let me be frank, neither Abu-Ammar (Yasser Arafat), nor Abu- Mazin (Mahmud Abbas) agreed that settlements could stay. [Asharq Al-Awsat] Then, you are in favor of announcing a categorical stance toward the settlements and going t

Naturally, "the U.S. has a long overdue responsibility" to forge that peace. Writing in the Financial Times, former U.S. National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft intoned: "The nature of the new Middle East cannot be known until the festering sore of the occupied territories is removed." Read: The fate of dem

xpected, the matter will be brought to a vote at the UN General Assembly. Many observers in the West seem to regard this campaign, masterminded by Mahmoud Abbas and Salam Fayyad, respectively the Palestinian Authority's president and prime minister, as an innovative breakthrough, a reversal of the strategy

d the Oval Office on the evening of February 11, Bush was flanked by Secretary of State Baker, Defense Secretary Cheney and national security adviser Brent Scowcroft. Also there was Colin Powell, a general whom I had got to know well, and to like, over the past few years and who was now head of the joint chiefs-of

me from two men who were not there: on our side, Yossi Beilin, and for the Palestinians, Arafat’s trusted diplomatic adviser, and eventual successor, Mahmoud Abbas, or Abu Mazen. Since Rabin knew I was following the ostensibly secret talks, we discussed them often. For quite a while, he remained dismissive. He

d the Oval Office on the evening of February 11, Bush was flanked by Secretary of State Baker, Defense Secretary Cheney and national security adviser Brent Scoweroft. Also there was Colin Powell, a general whom I had got to know well, and to like, over the past few years and who was now head of the joint chiefs-of

me from two men who were not there: on our side, Yossi Beilin, and for the Palestinians, Arafat's trusted diplomatic adviser, and eventual successor, Mahmoud Abbas, or Abu Mazen. Since Rabin knew I was following the ostensibly secret talks, we discussed them often. For quite a while, he remained dismissive. He b