Epstein Secrets

ough any resistance and reach the Beirut-Damascus road. But after the Bekaa air battle, and the most serious air losses for an Arab state since 1967, Yanoush and I knew that international pressure for a cease-fire would quickly escalate. Aware we were racing against the clock, we began a co-ordinated push

ct, form of confrontation with the “Zionist enemy.” Arafat had set up camp with nearly a thousand men just across the Jordan River, in a town called Karameh. From early 1968, they had been launching hit- and-run raids, not just on the West Bank but into the Negev. Eshkol’s cabinet was initially divided on

steps removed from what was happening on the ground. But everyone involved shared responsibility for the failures — including the overall commanders: Yanoush, and me as well. That weight felt even heavier because the tragedy occurred only hours before our own force’s involvement in the Lebanon War was ove

ut. My own hope was that the nod would go to any even closer friend of mine: Dan Shomron. I had first got to know Dan well in the late sixties after Karameh, Israel’s costly standoff with Arafat, when Fatah’s influence was in its infancy. We exchanged impressions on what had gone wrong, and why? When I be

ough any resistance and reach the Beirut-Damascus road. But after the Bekaa air battle, and the most serious air losses for an Arab state since 1967, Yanoush and I knew that international pressure for a cease-fire would quickly escalate. Aware we were racing against the clock, we began a co-ordinated push

ect, form of confrontation with the "Zionist enemy." Arafat had set up camp with nearly a thousand men just across the Jordan River, in a town called Karameh. From early 1968, they had been launching hit- and-run raids, not just on the West Bank but into the Negev. Eshkol's cabinet was initially divided on

steps removed from what was happening on the ground. But everyone involved shared responsibility for the failures - including the overall commanders: Yanoush, and me as well. That weight felt even heavier because the tragedy occurred only hours before our own force's involvement in the Lebanon War was over

rut. My own hope was that the nod would go to any even closer friend of mine: Dan Shomron. I had first got to know Dan well in the late sixties after Karameh, Israel's costly standoff with Arafat, when Fatah's influence was in its infancy. We exchanged impressions on what had gone wrong, and why? When I be