Epstein Secrets

itical fortune, the mere prospect of Arik further expanding the 202 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011673 invasion had the effect of persuading Washington to send Philip Habib back into the diplomatic fray. With no early sign, however, of Arafat agreeing to leave, Arik now steadily tightened what amounted to a siege on west

HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011754 votes: one for a party list and one for a directly elected Prime Minister. This would be a personal test, an opportunity for Shimon to build on the still-tenuous achievement of Oslo and finally secure the endorsement of the Israeli people. It seemed, for a while, I might even hav

had made Foreign Minister, Shimon Peres. Though the two men had grown to respect each another over the years, Rabin neither trusted, nor much liked, Shimon. In fact, though Peres’s support inside Labor had secured him the foreign ministry, Rabin had stipulated that all peace talks would remain under his

en brought in as the core of a peacekeeping force. But in the summer of 1981, new US President Ronald Reagan's Mideast envoy, Undersecretary of State Philip Habib, had 193 HOUSE _OVERSIGHT_028041 brokered a cease-fire to halt Palestinian Katyusha rocket fire into Israel. It was generally holding. But fundament

rces, it was critical to keep him in the picture. I told them all that we'd be working through the night, and that I had to be able to tell Motta and Shimon by the morning whether we really could mount a rescue mission. I still thought I'd end up having to tell them no. However difficult the obstacles we'

inly Ben-Zion and Bibi, would expect me to say. Not only was Yoni being mourned across Israel after Entebbe. He was being elevated - in the spirit of Shimon's words at the funeral -to something approaching sainthood. I did not want to detract from his evolving status as national hero, or his importance as

itical fortune, the mere prospect of Arik further expanding the 202 HOUSE _OVERSIGHT_028050 invasion had the effect of persuading Washington to send Philip Habib back into the diplomatic fray. With no early sign, however, of Arafat agreeing to leave, Arik now steadily tightened what amounted to a siege on west

HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_028131 votes: one for a party list and one for a directly elected Prime Minister. This would be a personal test, an opportunity for Shimon to build on the still-tenuous achievement of Oslo and finally secure the endorsement of the Israeli people. It seemed, for a while, I might even have

had made Foreign Minister, Shimon Peres. Though the two men had grown to respect each another over the years, Rabin neither trusted, nor much liked, Shimon. In fact, though Peres's support inside Labor had secured him the foreign ministry, Rabin had stipulated that all peace talks would remain under his

en brought in as the core of a peacekeeping force. But in the summer of 1981, new US President Ronald Reagan’s Mideast envoy, Undersecretary of State Philip Habib, had 193 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011664 brokered a cease-fire to halt Palestinian Katyusha rocket fire into Israel. It was generally holding. But fundamen

inly Ben-Zion and Bibi, would expect me to say. Not only was Yoni being mourned across Israel after Entebbe. He was being elevated — in the spirit of Shimon’s words at the funeral —to something approaching sainthood. I did not want to detract from his evolving status as national hero, or his importance as