Epstein Secrets

. Secular and religious. Rich and poor. Center and periphery. Old and new. This is dangerous. The late Tunisian President Bourguiba (and later on Sadat in his debates with Assad just before the peace treaty with Israel) made the argument that there's no need to defeat Israel by force. Give them t

he settlement blocs, a number of strategic sites on mountain ridge, a security zone east of Ben Gurion Airport and long-term military presence on the Jordan River. EFTA00683736 The real threat to the future of the • Zionist Project — is not the security constraints of the "two-state solution" but rather

hter jets, Golda contacted the Americans to propose a cease-fire in the south. But having retaken the Suez Canal and pushed into the Sinai, President Sadat was in no mood to call a halt to the fighting. The only way we were going to end the war was to retake the canal and defeat the even larger Egyptian

assignment was to block the southern entrance to Karameh as the Israeli armored force advanced. But we got bogged down in mud as we made our way from the Jordan River. By the time we arrived, hundreds of Arafat’s men had already fled the area. Arafat, too, had escaped, on the back of a motorcycle. By the time the

ithout an air force capable of breaching our defences and striking towns and cities deep inside Israel. No one pressed the alternative scenario: that Sadat might strike with more limited territorial objectives and, under cover of his SAM batteries on the other side of the Suez Canal, advance into the Sin

f fire in the late 1950s were provoked by Israel.” I didn’t respond directly, though I did note it was the Syrians who had tried to divert water from the Jordan River in the early fifties. “You did it first,” he retorted. So it continued. Only later did we learn that while Muallem had sent back a generally encourag

were not willing or ready to make peace. We might, initially at least, have to settle for a more incremental step. “Right here in Camp David, Begin, Sadat and Carter couldn’t complete the process,” I pointed out. “They signed a “framework agreement’ and it took months of further diplomacy to reach a pea

st Jerusalem, I expected to be able to retain Israeli sovereignty over the city. The third principle was that there would be “no foreign army west of the Jordan River.” In other words, if we did hand back at least the major part of the West Bank, it would be demilitarized and we would have security control over the

hter jets, Golda contacted the Americans to propose a cease-fire in the south. But having retaken the Suez Canal and pushed into the Sinai, President Sadat was in no mood to call a halt to the fighting. The only way we were going to end the war was to retake the canal and defeat the even larger Egyptian

assignment was to block the southern entrance to Karameh as the Israeli armored force advanced. But we got bogged down in mud as we made our way from the Jordan River. By the time we arrived, hundreds of Arafat's men had already fled the area. Arafat, too, had escaped, on the back of a motorcycle. By the time the f

ithout an air force capable of breaching our defences and striking towns and cities deep inside Israel. No one pressed the alternative scenario: that Sadat might strike with more limited territorial objectives and, under cover of his SAM batteries on the other side of the Suez Canal, advance into the Sin

f fire in the late 1950s were provoked by Israel." I didn't respond directly, though I did note it was the Syrians who had tried to divert water from the Jordan River in the early fifties. "You did it first," he retorted. So it continued. Only later did we learn that while Muallem had sent back a generally encourag

were not willing or ready to make peace. We might, initially at least, have to settle for a more incremental step. "Right here in Camp David, Begin, Sadat and Carter couldn't complete the process," I pointed out. "They signed a "framework agreement' and it took months of further diplomacy to reach a pea

st Jerusalem, I expected to be able to retain Israeli sovereignty over the city. The third principle was that there would be "no foreign army west of the Jordan River." In other words, if we did hand back at least the major part of the West Bank, it would be demilitarized and we would have security control over the

rabs. Secular and religious. Rich and poor. Center and periphery. Old and new. This is dangerous. The late Tunisian President Bourguiba (and later on Sadat in his debates with Assad just before the peace treaty with Israel) made the argument that there's no need to defeat Israel by force. Give them the o

es the settlement blocs, a number of strategic sites on mountain ridge, a security zone east of Ben Gurion Airport and long-term military presence on the Jordan River. • The real threat to the future of the HOUSE _OVERSIGHT_028915 --- PAGE BREAK --- Zionist Project - is not the security constraints of the "two-st

rabs. Secular and religious. Rich and poor. Center and periphery. Old and new. This is dangerous. The late Tunisian President Bourguiba (and later on Sadat in his debates with Assad just before the peace treaty with Israel) made the argument that there's no need to defeat Israel by force. Give them the o

es the settlement blocs, a number of strategic sites on mountain ridge, a security zone east of Ben Gurion Airport and long-term military presence on the Jordan River. • The real threat to the future of the Zionist Project - is not the security constraints of the "two-state solution" but rather a slippery slope lea