Epstein Secrets

means to assimilate Sinai's society into national structures. The second factor was the spread of extremist thought in a religious guise during the Sadat and Mubarak eras. Almost intrinsically hostile to many domestic and foreign policy orientations, that type of thought inevitably spread to Sinai. A

Jewish state as a means of diplomatically isolating it, limiting its military and economic options, and pressuring it to unilaterally withdraw from the West Bank (which, for some, would be a first step toward Israel's elimination). While such efforts have not garnered widespread support in the United States a

r 2011. It is a great deceit to deny an entire nation's right to exist. Let me narrate a strange story of American deceit. When Henry Kissinger met Sadat and introduced his six-point plan as a `Kissinger plan,' Sadat told him: "Never forget, Dr. Kissinger, I am making this agreement with the United S

ntly the issue of Palestine has been pushed aside, so Israel continues to promote its policy of building new Jewish settlements in Jerusalem and in the West Bank. Gingrich, who was supported by the neoconservatives, the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, and many other pro-Israel lobby groups in Amer

in an unprecedented phase of strong bilateral cooperation between the two former enemies, but it was also a major cause of the unpopularity of both Sadat and Mubarak. Israel benefited from the cold peace by neutralizing the most powerful conventional force in the Arab world. It even coordinated close

nd judiciary branch, so long as Hamas did not control the recipient. It also permitted funding to nongovernmental organizations that provide aid to the West Bank and Gaza relating to humanitarian needs and democracy promotion. Ultimately, the dilemma over funding the PA resolved itself in 2007, when Hamas b

gh. In 1977 Egyptian President Anwar Sadat visited Jerusalem in a gesture of peace. Seeing positive developments, US President Jimmy Carter invited Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin to Camp David in 1978 to negotiate peace. One agreement, A Framework for Peace in the Middle East, addre

ly bad terms. The Israelis refused to acquiesce to certain preconditions, including the cessation of all settlement building in East Jerusalem and the West Bank, enraging Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas. Negotiations this time around will likely pick up where the 2010 conference left off, and

hter jets, Golda contacted the Americans to propose a cease-fire in the south. But having retaken the Suez Canal and pushed into the Sinai, President Sadat was in no mood to call a halt to the fighting. The only way we were going to end the war was to retake the canal and defeat the even larger Egyptian

early a thousand men just across the Jordan River, in a town called Karameh. From early 1968, they had been launching hit- and-run raids, not just on the West Bank but into the Negev. Eshkol’s cabinet was initially divided on whether to attack his base in Jordan, in both an act of retaliation and a signal to Kin

ithout an air force capable of breaching our defences and striking towns and cities deep inside Israel. No one pressed the alternative scenario: that Sadat might strike with more limited territorial objectives and, under cover of his SAM batteries on the other side of the Suez Canal, advance into the Sin

would be in charge of one of Israel’s three regional military commands, and we were based on the edge of Jerusalem, with security responsibility for the West Bank. This was my first direct exposure to the combustible mix of restive Palestinians and the growing number of Jewish settlers. Our main brief was to p

were not willing or ready to make peace. We might, initially at least, have to settle for a more incremental step. “Right here in Camp David, Begin, Sadat and Carter couldn’t complete the process,” I pointed out. “They signed a “framework agreement’ and it took months of further diplomacy to reach a pea

and smaller Israeli towns and cities in the interior, Jerusalem as well, not to mention 312 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011783 / BARAK / 27 the settlements on the West Bank. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, hundreds of thousands of Russians had also flowed into Israel. Most were Jewish in culture more than religious o

hter jets, Golda contacted the Americans to propose a cease-fire in the south. But having retaken the Suez Canal and pushed into the Sinai, President Sadat was in no mood to call a halt to the fighting. The only way we were going to end the war was to retake the canal and defeat the even larger Egyptian

early a thousand men just across the Jordan River, in a town called Karameh. From early 1968, they had been launching hit- and-run raids, not just on the West Bank but into the Negev. Eshkol's cabinet was initially divided on whether to attack his base in Jordan, in both an act of retaliation and a signal to Kin

ithout an air force capable of breaching our defences and striking towns and cities deep inside Israel. No one pressed the alternative scenario: that Sadat might strike with more limited territorial objectives and, under cover of his SAM batteries on the other side of the Suez Canal, advance into the Sin

would be in charge of one of Israel's three regional military commands, and we were based on the edge of Jerusalem, with security responsibility for the West Bank. This was my first direct exposure to the combustible mix of restive Palestinians and the growing number of Jewish settlers. Our main brief was to pr

were not willing or ready to make peace. We might, initially at least, have to settle for a more incremental step. "Right here in Camp David, Begin, Sadat and Carter couldn't complete the process," I pointed out. "They signed a "framework agreement' and it took months of further diplomacy to reach a pea

and smaller Israeli towns and cities in the interior, Jerusalem as well, not to mention 312 HOUSE _OVERSIGHT_028160 / BARAK / 27 the settlements on the West Bank. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, hundreds of thousands of Russians had also flowed into Israel. Most were Jewish in culture more than religious o