Epstein Secrets

means to assimilate Sinai's society into national structures. The second factor was the spread of extremist thought in a religious guise during the Sadat and Mubarak eras. Almost intrinsically hostile to many domestic and foreign policy orientations, that type of thought inevitably spread to Sinai. A

United States in terms of its standing in Arab and Muslim states. The 1973 October War nearly led to a confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union, while the emergency resupply of Israeli forces during the war prompted an Arab oil embargo. The 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon led to an ill-fate

r 2011. It is a great deceit to deny an entire nation's right to exist. Let me narrate a strange story of American deceit. When Henry Kissinger met Sadat and introduced his six-point plan as a `Kissinger plan,' Sadat told him: "Never forget, Dr. Kissinger, I am making this agreement with the United S

; they happen because political, economic and security conditions make them possible. The nuclear freeze movement failed in the early 1980s because the Soviet Union still presented a tangible and inescapable threat to the West. A Syrian peace conference could not succeed now because the Assad regime is in no im

gh. In 1977 Egyptian President Anwar Sadat visited Jerusalem in a gesture of peace. Seeing positive developments, US President Jimmy Carter invited Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin to Camp David in 1978 to negotiate peace. One agreement, A Framework for Peace in the Middle East, addre

pan during the Second World War still remain in their constitutions, especially in relation to the manufacture and deployment of weapons. Although the Soviet Union collapsed two decades ago, some of the sanctions imposed on it, mostly related to dual-use technology and equipment, affected Russia for many years

kers within the Arab Socialist Union (ASU) -- the party created in 1962 to administer the state and serve as a source of power for Nasser -- forced Sadat to accept limits on his own presidential authority. The most important of these was a stipulation that he rule collectively, which meant that he w

tern security alliance. And for its part, the Eisenhower administration regarded Egypt's new leaders as potentially important allies in confronting the Soviet Union. The U.S. embassy in Cairo cultivated both Nasser and Muhammad Naguib, who had been the Free Officers' front man. At the same time, Washington beg

hter jets, Golda contacted the Americans to propose a cease-fire in the south. But having retaken the Suez Canal and pushed into the Sinai, President Sadat was in no mood to call a halt to the fighting. The only way we were going to end the war was to retake the canal and defeat the even larger Egyptian

sands of tanks. Hundreds of fighter jets. Other, much larger nations had endured months, even years, of hell before prevailing in such circumstances: the Soviet Union, for instance, with its huge strategic depth, or France, rescued by its American-led allies, during World War Two. But any pride in having prevailed

ithout an air force capable of breaching our defences and striking towns and cities deep inside Israel. No one pressed the alternative scenario: that Sadat might strike with more limited territorial objectives and, under cover of his SAM batteries on the other side of the Suez Canal, advance into the Sin

I began by welcoming the constellation of changes which seemed to offer at least an opportunity for stability, security and peace: the unravelling of the Soviet Union; the Oslo Agreement; the peace treaty with Jordan and the continuing talks with the Syrians. As long as we had partners committed to reaching an agre

were not willing or ready to make peace. We might, initially at least, have to settle for a more incremental step. “Right here in Camp David, Begin, Sadat and Carter couldn’t complete the process,” I pointed out. “They signed a “framework agreement’ and it took months of further diplomacy to reach a pea

ies in the interior, Jerusalem as well, not to mention 312 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011783 / BARAK / 27 the settlements on the West Bank. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, hundreds of thousands of Russians had also flowed into Israel. Most were Jewish in culture more than religious observance, but they were instinctive

hter jets, Golda contacted the Americans to propose a cease-fire in the south. But having retaken the Suez Canal and pushed into the Sinai, President Sadat was in no mood to call a halt to the fighting. The only way we were going to end the war was to retake the canal and defeat the even larger Egyptian

sands of tanks. Hundreds of fighter jets. Other, much larger nations had endured months, even years, of hell before prevailing in such circumstances: the Soviet Union, for instance, with its huge strategic depth, or France, rescued by its American-led allies, during World War Two. But any pride in having prevailed

ithout an air force capable of breaching our defences and striking towns and cities deep inside Israel. No one pressed the alternative scenario: that Sadat might strike with more limited territorial objectives and, under cover of his SAM batteries on the other side of the Suez Canal, advance into the Sin

I began by welcoming the constellation of changes which seemed to offer at least an opportunity for stability, security and peace: the unravelling of the Soviet Union; the Oslo Agreement; the peace treaty with Jordan and the continuing talks with the Syrians. As long as we had partners committed to reaching an agre

were not willing or ready to make peace. We might, initially at least, have to settle for a more incremental step. "Right here in Camp David, Begin, Sadat and Carter couldn't complete the process," I pointed out. "They signed a "framework agreement' and it took months of further diplomacy to reach a pea

ties in the interior, Jerusalem as well, not to mention 312 HOUSE _OVERSIGHT_028160 / BARAK / 27 the settlements on the West Bank. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, hundreds of thousands of Russians had also flowed into Israel. Most were Jewish in culture more than religious observance, but they were instinctive