Epstein Secrets

hing similar. Inside was a note from the chief of staff. “For the success of the operation,” General Tzur had written. “Minus two bottles... to teach Ehud Brog not to shut off his field radio.” I assumed that his reprimand was tongue-in-cheek, for the same reason I’d escaped being locked up on General Yoffe

point in shooting back. We didn’t need to fight, and it was clear that the Egyptians didn’t really want to. Shortly before dark, Lieutenant-Colonel Eitan brought our column to halt. The road we were on cut through tall sandunes on either side. We knew there 90 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011561 were still Egypti

sh were the army security people that before I’d left for Stanford, 146 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011617 they even insisted I change my name. I was no longer Ehud Brog. I’d Hebraicized it: to Barak, which seemed near enough to the original. Among the few dozen outside the unit who did know about my role, however, we

hem agreed Israel needed a specially trained commando force. But not everyone felt Sayeret Matkal could, or should, take on that role. Rafael “Raful” Eitan was perhaps the most strident. He had fought with the Palmach in 1948. He was an officer in Unit 101 and a commander of the parachutists’ Battalion 8

hing similar. Inside was a note from the chief of staff. "For the success of the operation," General Tzur had written. "Minus two bottles... to teach Ehud Brog not to shut off his field radio." I assumed that his reprimand was tongue-in-cheek, for the same reason I'd escaped being locked up on General Yoffe'

e point in shooting back. We didn't need to fight, and it was clear that the Egyptians didn't really want to. Shortly before dark, Lieutenant-Colonel Eitan brought our column to halt. The road we were on cut through tall sandunes on either side. We knew there 90 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_027938 were still Egyptia

ish were the army security people that before I'd left for Stanford, 146 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_027994 they even insisted I change my name. I was no longer Ehud Brog. I'd Hebraicized it: to Barak, which seemed near enough to the original. Among the few dozen outside the unit who did know about my role, however, we

hem agreed Israel needed a specially trained commando force. But not everyone felt Sayeret Matkal could, or should, take on that role. Rafael "Raful" Eitan was perhaps the most strident. He had fought with the Palmach in 1948. He was an officer in Unit 101 and a commander of the parachutists' Battalion 8