Epstein Secrets

o other officers, whom I knew less well at first but who would become key members of my team. In their case, it was the younger one who joined first. Binyamin Netanyahu — Bibi, as everyone called him — had been a member of Amiram Levin’s team when I was Digli’s deputy. He’d also been a part of one of our several — th

m I knew less well at first but who would become key members of my team. In their case, it was the younger one who joined first. Binyamin Netanyahu — Bibi, as everyone called him — had been a member of Amiram Levin’s team when I was Digli’s deputy. He’d also been a part of one of our several — thankfull

training teams. When Danny Yatom left the following year to train as an armored officer, I made Yoni my deputy. However different in some ways, the Netanyahu brothers were close. They seemed almost driven, to excel and to succeed. As I got to know them both, I sensed that the drive did not come merely from

come up through the unit and was one of our most experienced team leaders. And Danny Yatom. Born not far from Mishmar Hasharon, but a city boy, from Netanya, he was smart, level-headed and a sure-handed organizer, and with whom I’d somehow clicked from time he arrived in the sayeret. I made him my deputy

rael’s finest sons, one of its most courageous warriors, one of its most promising commanders.” The first evening I was back, however, I visited the Netanyahus at their family home in Jerusalem: Ben-Zion and Tzila, the parents; Ido, the youngest of the three children, and Bibi, who was still at MIT. It was a

advancement in Jerusalem. Though he would eventually return to Israel, he was teaching at Cornell when his sons became officers under my command in Sayeret Matkal. So there was a physical distance between father and sons. But what struck me was how large the father loomed in both of their lives. There was an al

ons within the PLO were ready to step into the breach if Arafat faltered. Israel needed to find an answer for all these threats. Uzi Yairi’s term as Sayeret Matkal commander had by now ended, but his successor was someone I knew well. Menachem Digli was the officer on whom I’d bestowed my stolen Syrian Mercedes

oats held together by nylon cord, with the assistance of Shayetet 13, Israel's 112 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_027960 equivalent of the American navy SEALs. But Bibi's dinghy got tangled up, and he found himself in the canal, being tugged down by the current. Only the SEALs, and Bibi's mix of calm and endurance, a

r training teams. When Danny Yatom left the following year to train as an armored officer, I made Yoni my deputy. However different in some ways, the Netanyahu brothers were close. They seemed almost driven, to excel and to succeed. As I got to know them both, I sensed that the drive did not come merely from

come up through the unit and was one of our most experienced team leaders. And Danny Yatom. Born not far from Mishmar Hasharon, but a city boy, from Netanya, he was smart, level-headed and a sure-handed organizer, and with whom I'd somehow clicked from time he arrived in the sayeret. I made him my deputy

srael's finest sons, one of its most courageous warriors, one of its most promising commanders." The first evening I was back, however, I visited the Netanyahus at their family home in Jerusalem: Ben-Zion and Tzila, the parents; Ido, the youngest of the three children, and Bibi, who was still at MIT. It was a

c advancement in Jerusalem. Though he would eventually return to Israel, he was teaching at Cornell when his sons became officers under my command in Sayeret Matkal. So there was a physical distance between father and sons. But what struck me was how large the father loomed in both of their lives. There was an al

ions within the PLO were ready to step into the breach if Arafat faltered. Israel needed to find an answer for all these threats. Uzi Yairi's term as Sayeret Matkal commander had by now ended, but his successor was someone I knew well. Menachem Digli was the officer on whom I'd bestowed my stolen Syrian Mercedes

was the small matter of the article in Hadashot several years earlier, imagining me as a Labor leader going head-to-head in a future election against Bibi Netanyahu for the Likud. Yossi was assumed to be more of a Likudnik, and a few weeks before Dan left office, I learned how Misha had rebutted the su

he small matter of the article in Hadashot several years earlier, imagining me as a Labor leader going head-to-head in a future election against Bibi Netanyahu for the Likud. Yossi was assumed to be more of a Likudnik, and a few weeks before Dan left office, I learned how Misha had rebutted the suggestion I

Amir Drori, the head of the northern command. They had set up a rooftop observation post just a few hundred yards in from where I had landed with my Sayeret Matkal team a decade earlier for the Rue Verdun operation. It overlooked a pair of Palestinian refugee camps: Sabra and, a couple of hundred yards closer to

tment to the values of an open, tolerant democracy. But in at least one important way, I approached my new role as if it was one of our operations in Sayeret Matkal, or the need to reshape our armed forces when I was chief-of-staff. My first priority was to put in place the practical foundations for a successful

ion about our enemies, and make sure it got to the commanders and field units that needed it. And while the details of many operations I approved for Sayeret Matkal and other units remain classified, we did succeed in doing that — to take just one example, by finding an entirely new way to get intelligence from i

king noises about quitting. He said it would be a waste of time to stay in the cabinet if it was going to bring the peace process to a halt. I warned Bibi, both in the Knesset and in a series of speeches, about the alternative on the Palestinian side if those who wanted a negotiated peace had nothing bu

ak, I don’t get it. You’re a known public figure, with a great mind and a great military record. It’s already been a year-and-a-half since Israel got Netanyahu. What have you done to go after him? Why haven’t you gone on the attack?” He said it was time for me to wake up, and change tack. “Can you run throug

cene. In March 2002, suicide bombers murdered 30 people, mostly elderly, as they were celebrating the annual Passover Seder in a hotel dining room in Netanya. Arik hit back two days later with Israel’s largest military operation on the West Bank since 1967. Israeli forces retook major Palestinian towns, pl

he summit’s collapse. My main concern was the possibility of violence. Even before returning home, I’d phoned Shaul Mofaz and Avi Dichter, the former Sayeret Matkal officer who was now head of the Shin Bet. “Let’s hope the violence doesn’t come,” I told them. “But if it does, make sure we are ready.” Though there

eer by training, he was a reserve army general who, when I was chief of staff, had been in charge of the logistics branch of the military. I gave him Sayeret Matkal backup as well, in the person of Danny Yatom, my longtime friend and former sayeret deputy. But all that was process. Winning or losing would come d

was the small matter of the article in Hadashot several years earlier, imagining me as a Labor leader going head-to-head in a future election against Bibi Netanyahu for the Likud Yossi was assumed to be more of a Likudnik, and a few weeks before Dan left office, I learned how Misha had rebutted the sugg

he small matter of the article in Hadashot several years earlier, imagining me as a Labor leader going head-to-head in a future election against Bibi Netanyahu for the Likud Yossi was assumed to be more of a Likudnik, and a few weeks before Dan left office, I learned how Misha had rebutted the suggestion I w

Amir Drori, the head of the northern command. They had set up a rooftop observation post just a few hundred yards in from where I had landed with my Sayeret Matkal team a decade earlier for the Rue Verdun operation. It overlooked a pair of Palestinian refugee camps: Sabra and, a couple of hundred yards closer to

tment to the values of an open, tolerant democracy. But in at least one important way, I approached my new role as if it was one of our operations in Sayeret Matkal, or the need to reshape our armed forces when I was chief-of-staff. My first priority was to put in place the practical foundations for a successful

ion about our enemies, and make sure it got to the commanders and field units that needed it. And while the details of many operations I approved for Sayeret Matkal and other units remain classified, we did succeed in doing that - to take just one example, by finding an entirely new way to get intelligence from i

king noises about quitting. He said it would be a waste of time to stay in the cabinet if it was going to bring the peace process to a halt. I warned Bibi, both in the Knesset and in a series of speeches, about the alternative on the Palestinian side if those who wanted a negotiated peace had nothing bu

ak, I don't get it. You're a known public figure, with a great mind and a great military record. It's already been a year-and-a-half since Israel got Netanyahu. What have you done to go after him? Why haven't you gone on the attack?" He said it was time for me to wake up, and change tack. "Can you run throug

cene. In March 2002, suicide bombers murdered 30 people, mostly elderly, as they were celebrating the annual Passover Seder in a hotel dining room in Netanya. Arik hit back two days later with Israel's largest military operation on the West Bank since 1967. Israeli forces retook major Palestinian towns, pl

he summit's collapse. My main concern was the possibility of violence. Even before returning home, I'd phoned Shaul Mofaz and Avi Dichter, the former Sayeret Matkal officer who was now head of the Shin Bet. "Let's hope the violence doesn't come," I told them. "But if it does, make sure we are ready." Though there

eer by training, he was a reserve army general who, when I was chief of staff, had been in charge of the logistics branch of the military. I gave him Sayeret Matkal backup as well, in the person of Danny Yatom, my longtime friend and former sayeret deputy. *** But all that was process. Winning or losing would com

n and Rene Pfister Article 3. Foreign Affairs Barak's Last Battle: An Israeli Lion in Winter Jonathan Tepperman Article 4. The Financial Times Netanyahu: tactical genius, strategic idiot Gideon Rachman Article 5. The New York Times Hypochondria: An Inside Look Woody Allen Anicic I. Project Synd

cic 4. The Financial Times Netanyahu: tactical genius, strategic idiot Gideon Rachman January 14, 2013 -- In a normal time, in a normal country, Benjamin Netanyahu would be a political giant. He is already the second-longest serving prime minister in Israel's history. Next week, when the country goes to the po

arak's eyes light up with real affection when he speaks about his former lieutenant; he describes Netanyahu (known in Israel almost exclusively as "Bibi") as "capable of deep thought and possessing a deep sense of history," explaining their relationship this way: Israel is not a nation of 300 millio

being called back into service," says Shlomo Avineri, a veteran Israeli analyst. Amir Mizroch, an Israeli journalist and blogger, calls it "a truly Sayeret Matkal-like operation -- uncanny, unpredictable, with little or no chance of success, but if pulled off, extremely brilliant." Mizroch explains: "By exiti

igence and a sardonic sense of humor. Both had tested the patience of our teachers to breaking point. Ido had been sent off to a vocational school in Netanya. Moshe was moved to Mikveh Israel, a school which focused mostly on agriculture. On Friday evenings and Saturdays in the kibbutz, however, they fille

e, Bibi Netanyahu. Much of what I say in this book about war and peace, security and Israel’s future challenges, will make uncomfortable reading for Bibi. But very little of it will surprise him, or his own Likud rivals further to the right, like Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman and the Economy Minis

ures and chart a way forward. So what is that way? It begins with the mindset. On more than one occasion in the past few years, after Prime Minister Netanyahu had warned our country of a nuclear Iran or the spread of Al Qaeda-style hatred and violence, as if prophesying the coming of Armageddon, I would say

awn in Private Benjamin. The main misunderstanding, however, went deeper. The assumption appeared to be that my military achievements, especially in Sayeret Matkal, were down to a mix of brute force and raw courage. Courage, of course, was a requirement: the willingness to take risks, if the rewards for success,

igence and a sardonic sense of humor. Both had tested the patience of our teachers to breaking point. Ido had been sent off to a vocational school in Netanya. Moshe was moved to Mikveh Israel, a school which focused mostly on agriculture. On Friday evenings and Saturdays in the kibbutz, however, they fille

e, Bibi Netanyahu. Much of what I say in this book about war and peace, security and Israel’s future challenges, will make uncomfortable reading for Bibi. But very little of it will surprise him, or his own Likud rivals further to the right, like Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman and the Economy Minis

ures and chart a way forward. So what is that way? It begins with the mindset. On more than one occasion in the past few years, after Prime Minister Netanyahu had warned our country of a nuclear Iran or the spread of Al Qaeda-style hatred and violence, as if prophesying the coming of Armageddon, I would say

awn in Private Benjamin. The main misunderstanding, however, went deeper. The assumption appeared to be that my military achievements, especially in Sayeret Matkal, were down to a mix of brute force and raw courage. Courage, of course, was a requirement: the willingness to take risks, if the rewards for success,

. She won the election, in a photo finish, with opinion polls suggesting she’d been effective in shaping the campaign as a choice “between Tzipi and Bibi.” Kadima got 28 Knesset seats, to 27 for Bibi and the Likud, which gave her the first crack at forming a government. There’s no way of disguising the

ary, and in intelligence. We make a point of listening to them before taking action,” I said. “But here’s the difference. When they look up, they see Netanyahu, or me. When Bibi and I look up, we see heaven. Whoever is up there, we clearly can’t go to them for advice. We are responsible for Israel’s security

the generals of our attack plan. There was still a core of ministers opposed: chiefly Dan Meridor and Benny Begin, but also Boogie Ya’alon, a former Sayeret Matkal commander and chief of staff who Minister of Strategic Affairs. But the confidence and detail with which the plan was laid out, and the fact that Bib