Epstein Secrets

eace deal with Syria’s then-dying dictator, Hafez al-Assad, a few months earlier. Yet these three dedicated men — Gili, who was by training a lawyer; Shlomo, an academic; and Danny, a former Mossad chief — had just been through dozens of hours of intricately detailed talks with each of Arafat’s top negoti

en born, where I’d grown up, and which I’d spent the early part of my adult life defending. This was no less true of the biblical sites of Judaea and Samaria — the West Bank of the Jordan river. 92 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011563 Places like Bet El, Shiloh, or Hebron. They represented the historic wellspring not

assumed a kind of historical inevitability of Israeli trtumph. Though we’d ending up prevailing in 1973, it was impossible not to wonder whether, as Shlomo suggested, we had missed the signs of a possible peace beforehand. Now, however, we were facing an escalating challenge from an enemy with no intere

retreat from our control of a united Jerusalem or the creation of a Palestinian state on the West Bank of the Jordan: for Begin, biblical Judaea and Samaria. On our territorial dispute with Egypt, I did believe a deal was possible. I didn’t expect us to return all of the Sinai, if only because I couldn’t

hen I left the army. Also, Shlomo Ben-Ami, the Moroccan-born, Oxford-educated historian and diplomat who had run against me for the Labor leadership. Shlomo had a gift for systematic analysis and keen judgement, especially on security issues, which I highly valued. It did not escape the attention of Isra

l terms of peace. They knew it would mean concessions. There would be a Palestinian state. We would give up the great majority of Biblical Judaea and Samaria. While most of the settlers would remain, since they lived in the major blocs, those in more isolated settlements around the West Bank would have to

eace deal with Syria’s then-dying dictator, Hafez al-Assad, a few months earlier. Yet these three dedicated men — Gili, who was by training a lawyer; Shlomo, an academic; and Danny, a former Mossad chief — had just been through dozens of hours of intricately detailed talks with each of Arafat’s top negoti

en born, where I'd grown up, and which I'd spent the early part of my adult life defending. This was no less true of the biblical sites of Judaea and Samaria - the West Bank of the Jordan river. 92 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_027940 Places like Bet El, Shiloh, or Hebron. They represented the historic wellspring not j

assumed a kind of historical inevitability of Israeli triumph. Though we'd ending up prevailing in 1973, it was impossible not to wonder whether, as Shlomo suggested, we had missed the signs of a possible peace beforehand. Now, however, we were facing an escalating challenge from an enemy with no interes

retreat from our control of a united Jerusalem or the creation of a Palestinian state on the West Bank of the Jordan: for Begin, biblical Judaea and Samaria. On our territorial dispute with Egypt, I did believe a deal was possible. I didn't expect us to return all of the Sinai, if only because I couldn't

hen I left the army. Also, Shlomo Ben-Ami, the Moroccan-born, Oxford-educated historian and diplomat who had run against me for the Labor leadership. Shlomo had a gift for systematic analysis and keen judgement, especially on security issues, which I highly valued. It did not escape the attention of Israe

l terms of peace. They knew it would mean concessions. There would be a Palestinian state. We would give up the great majority of Biblical Judaea and Samaria. While most of the settlers would remain, since they lived in the major blocs, those in more isolated settlements around the West Bank would have to