Epstein Secrets

was intolerable." After six days of war, a cease-fire was agreed. However, at that time our troops had not yet succeeded in surrounding Beirut. So Sharon broke the cease-fire to cut the vital Beirut-Damascus highway. The present crisis in the "peace process" was caused by the Israeli government's br

ry day. It was intolerable." After six days of war, a cease-fire was agreed. However, at that time our troops had not yet succeeded in surrounding Beirut. So Sharon broke the cease-fire to cut the vital Beirut-Damascus highway. The present crisis in the "peace process" was caused by the Israeli gove

r chief of Preventive Security in the Palestinian National Authority (PNA). Let us round up the usual suspects in Arafat's death. One obviously is Sharon, who often lamented publicly that he did not eliminate Arafat when he had the chance to do so in Beirut in 1982. In early 2004, he talked about Ara

uspects in Arafat's death. One obviously is Sharon, who often lamented publicly that he did not eliminate Arafat when he had the chance to do so in Beirut in 1982. In early 2004, he talked about Arafat having "no insurance policy". The Israelis have done it before, notably in 1997 when they almost kil

r chief of Preventive Security in the Palestinian National Authority (PNA). Let us round up the usual suspects in Arafat's death. One obviously is Sharon, who often lamented publicly that he did not eliminate Arafat when he had the chance to do so in Beirut in 1982. In early 2004, he talked about Ara

uspects in Arafat's death. One obviously is Sharon, who often lamented publicly that he did not eliminate Arafat when he had the chance to do so in Beirut in 1982. In early 2004, he talked about Arafat having "no insurance policy". The Israelis have done it before, notably in 1997 when EFTA_R1_022097

decade later, the idea would suddenly resurface. In my first meeting, as a newly promoted Major General, with our then Defence Minister Ariel Sharon, Sharon turned to me and the army’s Chief of Staff, Rafael Eitan, and said: “Tell me. Why the hell is Arafat still alive?” He looked first at Raful, then at

ted plan — a raid by helicopter into a Fatah-dominated area in southeastern Lebanon, during one of Arafat’s intermittent, morale-boosting visits from Beirut — to assassinate him. My immediate superior, the army’s head of operations, was all for our doing it. But the chief of military intelligence said no.

7. So during the last, decisive 10 days of the war, I would witness first-hand the tension among our top commanders in the Sinai, especially between Sharon and Gorodish, since Arik wasted few opportunities to suggest, rightly but not always helpfully, that his successor was woefully out of his depth. I w

te within a state” and deliberately weakening his government. Now, they were doing much the same in Lebanon. Their headquarters buildings in southern Beirut were spawning hiyackings or terror attacks. From bases in southern Lebanon, the Palestinians were also firing Katyusha rockets into Israel. One of t

med to agree. Notably, Yitzhak Rabin. He was no longer in government, nor even in charge of Labor. But he had always had a soft spot for Arik, as did Sharon for him. With uneasiness, questions and outright criticism of the siege building both internationally and inside Israel, Arik got Rabin to helicopter

d itself in a fierce firefight with the Syrians, and lost eleven men. We were now just three hours from the cease-fire. We did advance nearer to the Beirut-Damascus road. An hour before noon, our dedicated anti-tank unit destroyed 20 of Assad’s top-tier tanks, Soviet-made T-72s. Under different circumsta

decade later, the idea would suddenly resurface. In my first meeting, as a newly promoted Major General, with our then Defence Minister Ariel Sharon, Sharon turned to me and the army’s Chief of Staff, Rafael Eitan, and said: “Tell me. Why the hell is Arafat still alive?” He looked first at Raful, then at

ted plan — a raid by helicopter into a Fatah-dominated area in southeastern Lebanon, during one of Arafat’s intermittent, morale-boosting visits from Beirut — to assassinate him. My immediate superior, the army’s head of operations, was all for our doing it. But the chief of military intelligence said no.

67. So during the last, decisive 10 days of the war, I would witness first-hand the tension among our top commanders in the Sinai, especially between Sharon and Gorodish, since Arik wasted few opportunities to suggest, rightly but not always helpfully, that his successor was woefully out of his depth. I w

te within a state" and deliberately weakening his government. Now, they were doing much the same in Lebanon. Their headquarters buildings in southern Beirut were spawning hijackings or terror attacks. From bases in southern Lebanon, the Palestinians were also firing Katyusha rockets into Israel. One of th

med to agree. Notably, Yitzhak Rabin. He was no longer in government, nor even in charge of Labor. But he had always had a soft spot for Arik, as did Sharon for him. With uneasiness, questions and outright criticism of the siege building both internationally and inside Israel, Arik got Rabin to helicopter

nd itself in a fierce firefight with the Syrians, and lost eleven men. We were now just three hours from the cease-fire. We did advance nearer to the Beirut-Damascus road. An hour before noon, our dedicated anti-tank unit destroyed 20 of Assad's top-tier tanks, Soviet-made T-72s. Under different circumsta

r 1998) 356 Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum (4 September 1999) 358 Protocol Concerning Safe Passage between West Bank and Gaza Strip (5 October 1999) 363 Sharon Address at Fourth Herzliya Conference (18 December 2003) 371 Exchange of Letters between PM Sharon and President Bush (14 April 2004) 376 Disengage

graphic Definition of the Shebaa Farms Area. 27 November 2007 Annapolis Joint Understanding. 7 May 2008 Hezbollah militants take control of areas of Beirut. 21 May 2008 Doha agreement between Lebanese leaders brokered by Qatar. 21 May 2008 Israel and Syria announce holding indirect talks through Turkis