Epstein Secrets

t of Tel Aviv. Rabin had a very low table in his office, with two chairs. We would sit across from each other, each with a ready supply of coffee and Yitzhak smoking an apparently endless supply of cigarettes, and we would just talk. Politics. Strategy. Israel. The PLO. The surrounding Arab states. And the

oth were furious over the obviously pre-arranged seizure of Sinai, Gaza and the canal. It took a while for the message to sink in. In a speech to the Knesset after the conquest was complete, Ben-Gurion declared the post- 1948 armistice null and void, and said Israel would never again allow “foreign forces”

questions and outright criticism of the siege building both internationally and inside Israel, Arik got Rabin to helicopter north with him to Beirut. Yitzhak spent six or seven hours there. His verdict on the siege, at least as reported in the Israeli press, was more than Arik could have hoped for. Lehadek

he pundits were now suggesting that Shimon Peres might bring Labor back to power. There was no prospect he’d win an outright majority in the 120-seat Knesset. No one had ever done that, not even Ben-Gurion in his political heyday. From 1948, Israel’s political landscape had been populated by at least a doz

ber of suggestions Israel could make, with no domestic political risk but with every prospect of improving the atmosphere and accelerating progress. “Yitzhak is one of Israel’s top lawyers,” I said. “He’s struck dozens of deals in his life. But he strikes a deal when that’s what his client wants. You are t

he years, initially when I was in the kirya and both he and another rising Likud politician to whom I became closer, Dan Meridor, were members of the Knesset’s defense committee. But from the day I returned to the Israeli government in June 2007, there was growing tension between us over dealing with the S

t of Tel Aviv. Rabin had a very low table in his office, with two chairs. We would sit across from each other, each with a ready supply of coffee and Yitzhak smoking an apparently endless supply of cigarettes, and we would just talk. Politics. Strategy. Israel. The PLO. The surrounding Arab states. And the

oth were furious over the obviously pre-arranged seizure of Sinai, Gaza and the canal. It took a while for the message to sink in. In a speech to the Knesset after the conquest was complete, Ben-Gurion declared the post- 1948 armistice null and void, and said Israel would never again allow “foreign forces”

questions and outright criticism of the siege building both internationally and inside Israel, Arik got Rabin to helicopter north with him to Beirut. Yitzhak spent six or seven hours there. His verdict on the siege, at least as reported in the Israeli press, was more than Arik could have hoped for. Lehadek

he pundits were now suggesting that Shimon Peres might bring Labor back to power. There was no prospect he'd win an outright majority in the 120-seat Knesset. No one had ever done that, not even Ben-Gurion in his political heyday. From 1948, Israel's political landscape had been populated by at least a doz

ber of suggestions Israel could make, with no domestic political risk but with every prospect of improving the atmosphere and accelerating progress. "Yitzhak is one of Israel's top lawyers," I said. "He's struck dozens of deals in his life. But he strikes a deal when that's what his client wants. You are t

he years, initially when I was in the kirya and both he and another rising Likud politician to whom I became closer, Dan Meridor, were members of the Knesset's defense committee. But from the day I returned to the Israeli government in June 2007, there was growing tension between us over dealing with the S