Epstein Secrets

act. Was the dream of nuclear second-strike capability lost? By no means. In January 1991, the US air force attacked Iraq, and then Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein reacted by firing modified Scud missiles at Tel Aviv and EFTA00712606 Haifa. The bombardment lasted almost six weeks. Gas masks, some of which ca

air force attacked Iraq, and then Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein reacted by firing modified Scud missiles

ce attacked Iraq, and then Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein reacted by firing modified Scud missiles at Tel A

ime, the Israelis had voted a new government into office that was bitterly divided over the investments. 'An Inconceivable Scenario' In particular Moshe Arens, who was appointed defense minister in 1990, fought to stop the agreement -- with success. On Nov. 30, 1990, the Israelis notified the shipyard in

reports in the weeks after the training accident made secrecy impossible. We were planning to infiltrate a Sayeret Matkal unit into Iraq, and to kill Saddam Hussein. The Gulf War had blunted any immediate threat from Iraq. But Saddam had proven he could launch missiles into the heart of Israel. We knew from our

urate at long range. But they could reach Israeli towns and cities, and could carry not just conventional explosives but chemical warheads. Moreover, Saddam had used chemical weapons: during the Iran-Iraq war, and to kill thousands of his own restive Kurdish population in the town of Halabja in the spring

t reminded me of how my father had spoken to me when I was growing up — minus the “well-off family” part. 232 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011703 When we got to Hussein’s country home, we were greeted by an impressively self-assured man in his late 20s who, like Hussein, had studied at Britain’s military academy in S

in government. But I’d failed to factor in the effect of the inquiry recommendations. Within days of the report, Israel had a new Defense Minister: Moshe Arens, who returned from his post as ambassador in Washington. Among his first orders of business was to act on the inquiry’s verdict on Raful and Yehoshua

reports in the weeks after the training accident made secrecy impossible. We were planning to infiltrate a Sayeret Matkal unit into Iraq, and to kill Saddam Hussein. The Gulf War had blunted any immediate threat from Iraq. But Saddam had proven he could launch missiles into the heart of Israel. We knew from our i

urate at long range. But they could reach Israeli towns and cities, and could carry not just conventional explosives but chemical warheads. Moreover, Saddam had used chemical weapons: during the Iran-Iraq war, and to kill thousands of his own restive Kurdish population in the town of Halabja in the spring

t reminded me of how my father had spoken to me when I was growing up - minus the "well-off family" part. 232 HOUSE _OVERSIGHT_028080 When we got to Hussein's country home, we were greeted by an impressively self-assured man in his late 20s who, like Hussein, had studied at Britain's military academy in S

s in government. But I'd failed to factor in the effect of the inquiry recommendations. Within days of the report, Israel had a new Defense Minister: Moshe Arens, who returned from his post as ambassador in Washington. Among his first orders of business was to act on the inquiry's verdict on Raful and Yehoshua