Epstein Secrets

But Israel also has a short-term objective — and that is to play for time. Israel notes that its 1981 bombing of a nuclear reactor in Iraq set back Saddam Hussein's program — and did not result in some sort of massive retaliation. Something similar happened with the 2007 bombing of a Syrian installation. Neithe

e modest number of outside ground troops. They could be partly modeled on the protection we afforded Kurds in Iraq throughout the 1990s, even while Saddam was still in power. Alas, this task would be harder here. There is no natural geographic or demographic logic to any particular possible safe zone

ing of a nuclear reactor in Iraq set back Saddam Hussein's program — and did not result in some sort of ma

hen Israel's finance minister, made an official visit to Uganda. For Netanyahu, visits to Uganda are weighted with sadness. It was at the airport in Entebbe that his older brother, Yonatan Netanyahu, was shot dead by a Ugandan soldier. Yonatan was the leader of an Israeli commando team dispatched by Pri

pecially the US. Under Begin, we'd already bombed Saddam Hussein's nuclear reactor without telling the Ame

ady to carry out. Several of the most complex centered on the new threat posed by Palestinian groups in Lebanon. Before the civil war in Jordan, King Hussein had accused Fatah, the PFLP and the equally militant Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine of trying to create "a state within a state" an

nments had always calculated that we needed at least some measure of support from foreign allies, especially the US. Under Begin, we'd already bombed Saddam Hussein's nuclear reactor without telling the Americans beforehand. Shortly after I returned to the kirya, he provoked further anger in Washington by announcin

r Front for the Liberation of Palestine launched an even more audacious operation. It became known by the name of the airport where the ordeal ended. Entebbe. And when it began I, like Uzi Yairi, was sitting at my desk. 164 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_028012 Chapter Ten Sunday is an ordinary working day in Israel, an

might not present a conventional threat. Yet while I’d been with my tank company in the Sinai, they were fighting a full-scale civil war against King Hussein’s army in Jordan. The catalyst: a multiple hijacking in September 1970, a sign that they were turning to non-conventional warfare, and to acts of ter

nments had always calculated that we needed at least some measure of support from foreign allies, especially the US. Under Begin, we'd already bombed Saddam Hussein’s nuclear reactor without telling the Americans beforehand. Shortly after I returned to the kirya, he provoked further anger in Washington by announcin

pecially the US. Under Begin, we'd already bombed Saddam Hussein’s nuclear reactor without telling the Ame

Front for the Liberation of Palestine launched an even more audacious operation. It became known by the name of the airport where the ordeal ended. Entebbe. And when it began I, like Uzi Yairi, was sitting at my desk. 164 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011635 Chapter Ten Sunday is an ordinary working day in Israel,

reports in the weeks after the training accident made secrecy impossible. We were planning to infiltrate a Sayeret Matkal unit into Iraq, and to kill Saddam Hussein. The Gulf War had blunted any immediate threat from Iraq. But Saddam had proven he could launch missiles into the heart of Israel. We knew from our

urate at long range. But they could reach Israeli towns and cities, and could carry not just conventional explosives but chemical warheads. Moreover, Saddam had used chemical weapons: during the Iran-Iraq war, and to kill thousands of his own restive Kurdish population in the town of Halabja in the spring

t reminded me of how my father had spoken to me when I was growing up — minus the “well-off family” part. 232 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011703 When we got to Hussein’s country home, we were greeted by an impressively self-assured man in his late 20s who, like Hussein, had studied at Britain’s military academy in S

Matkal might be called in, and my instincts told me we should proceed with caution. The situation we were facing felt nothing like Sabena, much less Entebbe. Here, we had a single bus. Our troops, and in fact everyone from ministers and officials to reporters and photographers, were in a loose cordon a co

reports in the weeks after the training accident made secrecy impossible. We were planning to infiltrate a Sayeret Matkal unit into Iraq, and to kill Saddam Hussein. The Gulf War had blunted any immediate threat from Iraq. But Saddam had proven he could launch missiles into the heart of Israel. We knew from our i

urate at long range. But they could reach Israeli towns and cities, and could carry not just conventional explosives but chemical warheads. Moreover, Saddam had used chemical weapons: during the Iran-Iraq war, and to kill thousands of his own restive Kurdish population in the town of Halabja in the spring

t reminded me of how my father had spoken to me when I was growing up - minus the "well-off family" part. 232 HOUSE _OVERSIGHT_028080 When we got to Hussein's country home, we were greeted by an impressively self-assured man in his late 20s who, like Hussein, had studied at Britain's military academy in S

Matkal might be called in, and my instincts told me we should proceed with caution. The situation we were facing felt nothing like Sabena, much less Entebbe. Here, we had a single bus. Our troops, and in fact everyone from ministers and officials to reporters and photographers, were in a loose cordon a co

AIRPOWER By Martin van Creveld Illustrated. 498 pp. PublicAffairs. $35. April 22, 2011 -- When President George W. Bush launched his war against Saddam Hussein's Iraq with an incandescent burst of "shock and awe," political commentators marveled at the seemingly magical impact of modern air power. Some forec

resident George W. Bush launched his war against Saddam Hussein's Iraq with an incandescent burst of "sho

t George W. Bush launched his war against Saddam Hussein's Iraq with an incandescent burst of "shock and

ix-Day War of 1967; the surprise attack of Yom Kippur 1973 by Egypt and Syria that gravely jeopardized the Jewish state; the 1976 hostage rescue at Entebbe, Uganda; the 1981 raid against Iraqi nuclear facilities at Osirak; and the similar raid against Syria in 2007. Van Creveld traces aerial fighting

Of equal significance was the roll call of certain Arab countries (excluding Saudi Arabia) and H l [ th ft especially the emotional speech of King Hussein e a one, a e me, of Jordan. His words referring to Yitzhak and e Leah Rabin as “my brother" and "my sister," h d th fi which Muslims usually reserv

own bible, their own culture. This self-reliance is a matter of great pride. Jews could look after their own family. When the Jews were kidnapped in Entebbe, Uganda, it was the Israelis who took care of it. A Jewish majority could eliminate Jewish vulnerability, and with their own state, the Israelis coul