Epstein Secrets

might not present a conventional threat. Yet while I’d been with my tank company in the Sinai, they were fighting a full-scale civil war against King Hussein’s army in Jordan. The catalyst: a multiple hijacking in September 1970, a sign that they were turning to non-conventional warfare, and to acts of ter

nments had always calculated that we needed at least some measure of support from foreign allies, especially the US. Under Begin, we'd already bombed Saddam Hussein’s nuclear reactor without telling the Americans beforehand. Shortly after I returned to the kirya, he provoked further anger in Washington by announcin

pecially the US. Under Begin, we'd already bombed Saddam Hussein’s nuclear reactor without telling the Ame

need for a special-forces unit was becoming increasingly hard to ignore. By the summer of 1971, a couple of months after I became sayeret commander, King Hussein’s army had defeated the insurgency of Fatah and a pair of even more militant partners, the Democratic Front and the Popular Front for the Liberation of

0s, he and his fighters had been expelled by King Hussein’s army from Jordan and were re-based in Lebanon.

ter under Shimon Peres. But in the intervening years, Arafat was rarely off of my radar. By the early 1970s, he and his fighters had been expelled by King Hussein’s army from Jordan and were re-based in Lebanon. Arafat was becoming a significant figure on the Arab and world political stage, and an increasingly un

0s, he and his fighters had been expelled by King Hussein’s army from Jordan and were re-based in Lebanon.

ter under Shimon Peres. But in the intervening years, Arafat was rarely off of my radar. By the early 1970s, he and his fighters had been expelled by King Hussein’s army from Jordan and were re-based in Lebanon. Arafat was becoming a significant figure on the Arab and world political stage, and an increasingly un