Epstein Secrets

i exiles who told President George W. Bush that divisions among country's Sunni, Shiite and Kurdish communities could be easily overcome in a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq either underestimated or deliberately downplayed the salience of these ethno-sectarian identities. Moreover, reassuring statements made to We

h communities could be easily overcome in a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq either underestimated or deliberate

nities could be easily overcome in a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq either underestimated or deliberately downp

now even willing to carry out attacks on U.S. soil. In his unclassified statement submitted to the U.S. Senate's Select Committee on Intelligence, Clapper said: "Iran's willingness to sponsor future attacks in the United States or against our interests abroad probably will be shaped by Tehran's evalu

ran is bluffing — that it wouldn't dare. But on Tuesday, U.S. Director of National Intelligence James R. Clapper Jr. powerfully rebutted this view. Clapper argued not only that Iran would retaliate, but that some Iranian officials are now even willing to carry out attacks on U.S. soil. In his unclassi

qi exiles who told President George W. Bush that divisions among country's Sunni, Shiite and Kurdish communities could be easily overcome in a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq either underestimated or deliberately downplayed the salience of these ethno-sectarian identities. Moreover, reassuring statements made to Wes

h communities could be easily overcome in a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq either underestimated or deliberate

nities could be easily overcome in a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq either underestimated or deliberately downp

an is bluffing — that it wouldn't dare. But on Tuesday, U.S. Director of National Intelligence James R. Clapper Jr. powerfully rebutted this view. Clapper argued not only that Iran would retaliate, but that some Iranian officials are now even willing to carry out attacks on U.S. soil. In his unclassi

now even willing to carry out attacks on U.S. soil. In his unclassified statement submitted to the U.S. Senate's Select Committee on Intelligence, Clapper said: "Iran's willingness to sponsor future attacks in the United States or against our interests abroad probably will be shaped by Tehran's evalua

the Tuwaitha complex in Iraq. Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin and Defense Minister Ariel Sharon saw the reactor as central to Iraqi President Saddam Hussein's quest to build nuclear weapons, and they believed that it posed an existential threat to Israel. The timing of the strike was justified by intelli

nts and warnings of military action. For Israelis considering a strike on Iran, Osirak seems like a model for effective preventive war. After all, Hussein never got the bomb, and if Israel was able to brush back one enemy hell-bent on its destruction, it can do so again. But a closer look at the Osira

on saw the reactor as central to Iraqi President Saddam Hussein's quest to build nuclear weapons, and th

bility to produce a testable nuclear device in about a year and a missile-capable device in several years. But as Director of National Intelligence James Clapper told the Senate Arms Services EFTA00719598 Committee on Feb. 16, it does not appear that Khamenei has made this decision. Moreover, Khamenei is

the regime." Pillar says the theory has some historical evidence on its side. "The big data point in support of this concept is the Iran-Iraq war: Saddam Hussein's Iraq attacking Iran," he says. "Iraq was the aggressor, and the attack [had] a big rally-around-the-flag effect and it had a positive effect in bol

in support of this concept is the Iran-Iraq war: Saddam Hussein's Iraq attacking Iran," he says. "Iraq w

ort of this concept is the Iran-Iraq war: Saddam Hussein's Iraq attacking Iran," he says. "Iraq was the ag

ranian bomb are not the only alternatives. The judgment of the U.S. intelligence community, as voiced publicly by Director of National Intelligence James Clapper, is that Iran is retaining the option to build nuclear weapons but has not yet decided to do so. Much diplomatic ground has yet to be explored in s

the Tuwaitha complex in Iraq. Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin and Defense Minister Arid Sharon saw the reactor as central to Iraqi President Saddam Hussein's quest to build nuclear weapons, and they believed that it posed an existential threat to Israel. The timing of the strike was justified by intellig

ents and warnings of military action. For Israelis considering a strike on Iran, Osirak seems like a model for effective preventive war. After all, Hussein never got the bomb, and if Israel was able to brush back one enemy hell- bent on its destruction, it can do so again. But a closer look at the Osir

on saw the reactor as central to Iraqi President Saddam Hussein's quest to build nuclear weapons, and th

bility to produce a testable nuclear device in about a year and a missile-capable device in several years. But as Director of National Intelligence James Clapper told the Senate Arms Services Committee on Feb. 16, it does not appear that Khamenei has made this decision. Moreover, Khamenei is unlikely to das

q War. Then, the primary concern was that Saddam Hussein's regime would use weapons against another count

ia if the opportunity arose. This threat is not analogous to concerns expressed in the run-up to the Iraq War. Then, the primary concern was that Saddam Hussein's regime would use weapons against another country or deliberately transfer them to a terrorist group. Further, it was suspected that Iraq might hav

the Iraq War. Then, the primary concern was that Saddam Hussein's regime would use weapons against anoth

.S. officials believe that there are at least 50 chemical weapon production and storage facilities inside Syria. Director of National Intelligence James Clapper testified before Congress last week that the Syrian regime has maintained security at these sites, many of which are located in rural areas separa

ump insiders as Uday and Qusay, after the sons of Saddam Hussein—wondered if there couldn’t somehow be two

iders as Uday and Qusay, after the sons of Saddam Hussein—wondered if there couldn’t somehow be two paralle

e or other performance measures. His sons, Don Jr. and Eric—jokingly behind their backs known to Trump insiders as Uday and Qusay, after the sons of Saddam Hussein—wondered if there couldn’t somehow be two parallel White House structures, one dedicated to their father’s big-picture views, personal appearances, a

of the Breitbart lexicon, became the Trump team term of art: he’s poked the deep state bear. Names were put to this: John Brennan, the CIA director; James Clapper, the director of national intelligence; Susan Rice, the outgoing National Security Advisor; and Ben Rhodes, Rice’s deputy and an Obama favorite. Mov

r, 219 Hubbell, Webster, 97 Hull, Cordell, 105 Hussein, Saddam, 27 Hutchison, Kay Bailey, 81 IBM, 88

_OVERSIGHT_020127 Homeland Security Department, 63, 86, 133, 218, 285, 288 Hoover, J. Edgar, 219 Hubbell, Webster, 97 Hull, Cordell, 105 Hussein, Saddam, 27 Hutchison, Kay Bailey, 81 IBM, 88 Icahn, Carl, 20, 141, 211 Iger, Bob, 88, 238 immigration and travel ban, 36, 62-65, 68, 70, 78, 95, 113, 1

9-70, 297 Chopra, Deepak, 80 Christie, Chris, 16, 24-25, 30-31, 210, 242, 279 Christoff, Niki, 78 Churchill, Winston, 50 Circa news website, 159, 257 Clapper, James, 41, 214-15 Clinton, Bill, 23, 27, 54, 58, 90, 116, 123, 128, 158, 225, 228 impeachment of, 201, 233, 280 Clinton, Hillary, 3, 11-12, 18, 35,