Epstein Secrets

pecially the US. Under Begin, we'd already bombed Saddam Hussein's nuclear reactor without telling the Ame

ady to carry out. Several of the most complex centered on the new threat posed by Palestinian groups in Lebanon. Before the civil war in Jordan, King Hussein had accused Fatah, the PFLP and the equally militant Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine of trying to create "a state within a state" an

nments had always calculated that we needed at least some measure of support from foreign allies, especially the US. Under Begin, we'd already bombed Saddam Hussein's nuclear reactor without telling the Americans beforehand. Shortly after I returned to the kirya, he provoked further anger in Washington by announcin

rces, it was critical to keep him in the picture. I told them all that we'd be working through the night, and that I had to be able to tell Motta and Shimon by the morning whether we really could mount a rescue mission. I still thought I'd end up having to tell them no. However difficult the obstacles we'

inly Ben-Zion and Bibi, would expect me to say. Not only was Yoni being mourned across Israel after Entebbe. He was being elevated - in the spirit of Shimon's words at the funeral -to something approaching sainthood. I did not want to detract from his evolving status as national hero, or his importance as

reports in the weeks after the training accident made secrecy impossible. We were planning to infiltrate a Sayeret Matkal unit into Iraq, and to kill Saddam Hussein. The Gulf War had blunted any immediate threat from Iraq. But Saddam had proven he could launch missiles into the heart of Israel. We knew from our

urate at long range. But they could reach Israeli towns and cities, and could carry not just conventional explosives but chemical warheads. Moreover, Saddam had used chemical weapons: during the Iran-Iraq war, and to kill thousands of his own restive Kurdish population in the town of Halabja in the spring

t reminded me of how my father had spoken to me when I was growing up — minus the “well-off family” part. 232 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011703 When we got to Hussein’s country home, we were greeted by an impressively self-assured man in his late 20s who, like Hussein, had studied at Britain’s military academy in S

HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011754 votes: one for a party list and one for a directly elected Prime Minister. This would be a personal test, an opportunity for Shimon to build on the still-tenuous achievement of Oslo and finally secure the endorsement of the Israeli people. It seemed, for a while, I might even hav

had made Foreign Minister, Shimon Peres. Though the two men had grown to respect each another over the years, Rabin neither trusted, nor much liked, Shimon. In fact, though Peres’s support inside Labor had secured him the foreign ministry, Rabin had stipulated that all peace talks would remain under his

reports in the weeks after the training accident made secrecy impossible. We were planning to infiltrate a Sayeret Matkal unit into Iraq, and to kill Saddam Hussein. The Gulf War had blunted any immediate threat from Iraq. But Saddam had proven he could launch missiles into the heart of Israel. We knew from our i

urate at long range. But they could reach Israeli towns and cities, and could carry not just conventional explosives but chemical warheads. Moreover, Saddam had used chemical weapons: during the Iran-Iraq war, and to kill thousands of his own restive Kurdish population in the town of Halabja in the spring

t reminded me of how my father had spoken to me when I was growing up - minus the "well-off family" part. 232 HOUSE _OVERSIGHT_028080 When we got to Hussein's country home, we were greeted by an impressively self-assured man in his late 20s who, like Hussein, had studied at Britain's military academy in S

HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_028131 votes: one for a party list and one for a directly elected Prime Minister. This would be a personal test, an opportunity for Shimon to build on the still-tenuous achievement of Oslo and finally secure the endorsement of the Israeli people. It seemed, for a while, I might even have

had made Foreign Minister, Shimon Peres. Though the two men had grown to respect each another over the years, Rabin neither trusted, nor much liked, Shimon. In fact, though Peres's support inside Labor had secured him the foreign ministry, Rabin had stipulated that all peace talks would remain under his

1981, when we'd launched our preemptive strike on Saddam Hussein's 402 HOUSE _OVERSIGHT_028250 / BARAK /

hen we'd launched our preemptive strike on Saddam Hussein's 402 HOUSE _OVERSIGHT_028250 / BARAK / 117 reac

s arrived on site and it could begin producing bomb-ready material. Just as under Menachem Begin in 1981, when we'd launched our preemptive strike on Saddam Hussein's 402 HOUSE _OVERSIGHT_028250 / BARAK / 117 reactor near Baghdad, there was never any question that we would take any and all possible measures to pre

I told a television interviewer that the government had every right to respond and was doing so effectively. Olmert phoned to thank me. When he, like Shimon, asked what I thought the government should do next, I was straightforward: "Do your best to bring things to an end as soon as you can." I said that

might not present a conventional threat. Yet while I’d been with my tank company in the Sinai, they were fighting a full-scale civil war against King Hussein’s army in Jordan. The catalyst: a multiple hijacking in September 1970, a sign that they were turning to non-conventional warfare, and to acts of ter

nments had always calculated that we needed at least some measure of support from foreign allies, especially the US. Under Begin, we'd already bombed Saddam Hussein’s nuclear reactor without telling the Americans beforehand. Shortly after I returned to the kirya, he provoked further anger in Washington by announcin

pecially the US. Under Begin, we'd already bombed Saddam Hussein’s nuclear reactor without telling the Ame

inly Ben-Zion and Bibi, would expect me to say. Not only was Yoni being mourned across Israel after Entebbe. He was being elevated — in the spirit of Shimon’s words at the funeral —to something approaching sainthood. I did not want to detract from his evolving status as national hero, or his importance as

s arrived on site and it could begin producing bomb-ready material. Just as under Menachem Begin in 1981, when we’d launched our preemptive strike on Saddam Hussein’s 402 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011873 / BARAK / 117 reactor near Baghdad, there was never any question that we would take any and all possible measures to pr

1981, when we’d launched our preemptive strike on Saddam Hussein’s 402 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011873 / BARAK /

hen we’d launched our preemptive strike on Saddam Hussein’s 402 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011873 / BARAK / 117 rea

I told a television interviewer that the government had every right to respond and was doing so effectively. Olmert phoned to thank me. When he, like Shimon, asked what I thought the government should do next, I was straightforward: “Do your best to bring things to an end as soon as you can.” I said that

ayel. 17 September 1982 UN Security Council Resolution 520 (Lebanon). 17 May 1983 Israel and Lebanon sign a peace agreement. 19 February 1986 King Hussein of Jordan severs ties with the PLO. 11 April 1987 London Agreement. 21 May 1987 Lebanon’s parliament abrogates the 1969 Cairo agreement with the PL

Casablanca Declaration. 30 November 1994 Establishment of the LACC. 10 December 1994 Official ceremony to present Nobel Peace Prize to Yizhak Rabin, Shimon Peres, and Yasir Arafat. 28 September 1995 — Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip: Oslo II. 31 October 1995 Beilin-

he PLO had been financially dependent on the states of the Arab Gulf and the Communist bloc. The collapse of the Soviet Union and Arafat’s support of Saddam Hussein during the Gulf War of 1991 resulted in the collapse of funding for the PLO and an end to remittances to Palestinian families in Gaza and the West Ba

lapse of the Soviet Union and Arafat’s support of Saddam Hussein during the Gulf War of 1991 resulted in t

hed his consultations with the country's political parties and charged Benjamin Netanyahu with forming a new coalition, Israel's respected President, Shimon Peres, is once again very much in the news. In his speech inviting Netanyahu to form the next government, the President spoke forcefully about peace a

990. When faced with a build-up of Iraqi forces along its border, Kuwait decided not to mobilize its military out of fear that the move would provoke Saddam Hussein. The incentives for Gulf states to make similar strategic calculations in the future will be greater when Iran has an inventory of nuclear we

en faced with a build-up of Iraqi forces along its border, Kuwait decided not to mobilize its military out of fear that the move would provoke Saddam Hussein. The incentives for Gulf states to make similar strategic calculations in the future will be greater when Iran has an inventory of nuclear weapons to

. One of the great strategic lessons drawn from the long history of conflict in the Middle East is this: Do not go to war without nuclear weapons, as Saddam Hussein did when he invaded Kuwait. The corollary is: Do not allow the United States to methodically build-up forces in the Gulf prior to invading, as Saddam

hed his consultations with the country's political parties and charged Benjamin Netanyahu with forming a new coalition, Israel's respected President, Shimon Peres, is once again very much in the news. In his speech inviting Netanyahu to form the next government, the President spoke forcefully about peace a

990. When faced with a build-up of Iraqi forces along its border, Kuwait decided not to mobilize its military out of fear that the move would provoke Saddam Hussein. The incentives for Gulf states to make similar strategic calculations in the future will be greater when Iran has an inventory of nuclear we

en faced with a build-up of Iraqi forces along its border, Kuwait decided not to mobilize its military out of fear that the move would provoke Saddam Hussein. The incentives for Gulf states to make similar strategic calculations in the future will be greater when Iran has an inventory of nuclear weapons to

. One of the great strategic lessons drawn from the long history of conflict in the Middle East is this: Do not go to war without nuclear weapons, as Saddam Hussein did when he invaded Kuwait. The corollary is: Do not allow the United States to methodically build-up forces in the Gulf prior to invading, as Saddam