Epstein Secrets

rri Ackerman, 444 U.S. 193, 202-03 (1979). The Constitution places the power to prosecute crimes in the hands of disinterested public officials in the Executive Branch. See U.S. Const. art. II, § 3 (duty to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed"); United States'. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 467 (1996) ("powe

construed. Center for Biological Diversity I. Hamilton, 453 F.3d 1331, 1334 (11th Cir. 2006), citing Spannaus I. Dept. of Justice 824 F.2d 52, 55 (D.C. Cir. 1987). "[A] waiver of the Government's sovereign immunity will be strictly construed, in terms of its scope, in favor of the sovereign." Lane'. Pe

owers of the [United States attorneys] in their control over criminal prosecutions."). The decision whether to prosecute Epstein lies solely within the Executive Branch, and any order today, by this Court, as to what the government must do in the future would be wholly inappropriate. 26 EFTA00085734 Case 9:08-c

ed, but simply forgot, to provide additional remedies beyond those already specified. Courts agree. See United States v. Monzel, 641 F.3d 528, 542 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (holding that the CVRA's "carefully crafted and detailed enforcement scheme," provides "strong evidence that Congress did not intend to auth

orney General were consulted, received legal submissions, and fully approved the exercise of discretion by the heads of the USAO-SDFL. In the end, the Executive Branch exercised, in good faith, the unreviewable prosecutorial discretion afforded to it by Article II of the Constitution, as even recognized by Congres

Furthermore, "a district judge must be careful not to exceed his or her constitutional role." United States v. Microsoft Corp., 56 F.3d 1448, 1462 (D.C. Cir. 1995). "When a judge assumes the power to prosecute, the number [of branches] shrinks to two." In re United States, 345 F.3d 450, 454 (7th Cir. 20