Epstein Secrets

ect until you are granted leave to depart by the court or by an officer acting on behalf of the court. This subpoena is issued upon application of the United Stairs of America o. Australian venue, West Palm Beach, FL 33401-6235 DATE August 18.2006 S. Attorney Case No. 0 3-8073 • lc not applicable, enter 'none To be

ubpoenaed. The early voluntary turnover date is prior to September 29, 2006. BY: Sincerely, R. ALEXANDER ACOSTA UNITED STATES ATTORNEY ASSISTANT UNITED STATE ATTORNEY Case No. 08-80736-CV-MARRA P-000182 EFTA00227562 CERTIFICATION OF BUSINESS RECORDS I, the undersigned, , declare that I am: employed

the District Attorney is unable to rebut the presumption that the federal grand jury subpoena is reasonable. (41 Regarding the relevancy question, the United States has set forth in some detail, both in its motion papers and in its in camera submission, the reasons underlying the need for the state grand Jury r

and jury than to protect from delay the progress of the trial after an indictment has been found." Id. at 327, 60 &Ct. at 542; see also Di Bella v. United States, 369 U.S. 121, 124, 82 S.Ct. 654, 656-57. 7 L.Ed.2d 614 (1962) ("This insistence on finality and prohibition of piecemeal review discourage undue

on behalf of the court. (BY) DEPUTY CLERK DATEL September I, 2006 This subpoena it issued upon application umber of Assistant U.S Attorney of the Unitod States of America enuc, lute L 33401-6235 Case No. 08-80736-CV-NIARRA EFTA00227522 • •••••••••• United States District Court SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA TO

naed materials are privileged. Specifically, the District Attorney argues that the state grand jury secrecy law creates a federal privilege under Federal Rule of Evidence 501. The Court finds this argument without merit. [8] Evidentiary privileges protect confidential communications between persons in special rela

109, 116 (2d Cir.2005) (emphases The express language of Rule 410 also makes clear that "derivative evidence" is never excluded from a proceeding. See United States v. Ruhkowsi, 814 F.2d 594, 599 (11th Cir. 1987). 8 EFTA00205735 Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 106 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/10/2011 Page 9 of 2

ary of Enclosures" and justified the privilege by characterizing the documents as "attorney-client communication[s]" without explanation.") (citing United States v. Constr. Prods. Research, Inc., 73 F.3d 464, 473 (2d Cir.1996)).8 Once the Government has cataloged the documents in its privilege log, it then bea

(1) Federal Rule of Evidence 410 or (2) a purported "common law privilege" for "plea negotiations" that the attorneys ask the Court to create under Federal Rule of Evidence 501. The defense arguments are meritless for multiple, independent reasons. With regard to Rule 410, the defense attorneys' efforts to invoke Rule 410

he Ten- nessee law of attorney-client privilege. Al- though Federal Rule of Evidence 501 does not apply in the instant case, we follow it by analo- I United States, 449 U.S. 383, 395, 101 S.Ct. 677, 685, 66 LEd.2d 584 (1981). In general, the fact of legal consultation or employment, clients' identities, attor

cted First Amendment rights requires showing that the statutory scheme will re- sult in threats, harassment or reprisals to specific individuals. U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 1. It Constitutional Law 0=82(6) Labor Relations 4=18 Labor-Management Reporting and Dis- closure Act requirements for the filing

cts un- derlying the communication. Upjohn Co. 12. The court below erroneously applied the Ten- nessee law of attorney-client privilege. Al- though Federal Rule of Evidence 501 does not apply in the instant case, we follow it by analo- I United States, 449 U.S. 383, 395, 101 S.Ct. 677, 685, 66 LEd.2d 584 (1981). In genera

ator Feinstein)(explaining that the right to confer was "intended to be expansive," applying to "any critical state or disposition of the case") and United States v. Heaton, 458 F. Supp. 2d 1272 (D. Utah 2006)(government motion to dismiss charge of using facility of interstate commerce to entice minors to enga

ted States of America. (Lee, Dexter) (Entered: 01/26/2012) 01/26/2012 .1.44 RESPONSE in Opposition re_12$ Motion for Miscellaneous Relief filed by United States of America. (Sanchez, Eduardo) (Entered: 01/26/2012) 01/27/2012 145 ENDOR ingitl Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages. Signed by Judge on 1/27/2012. (ir)

ed to obtain those materials in discovery in the first instance. That question must be answered by reference to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26, which refers to Federal Rule of Evidence 501, which "empower[s] the federal courts to `continue the evolutionary development of [evidentiary] privileges." Adkins v. Christie, 488 F.3d 1324, 132

the District Attorney is unable to rebut the presumption that the federal grand jury subpoena is reasonable. [4] Regarding the relevancy question, the United States has set forth in some detail, both in its motion papers and in its in camera submission, the reasons underlying the need for the state grand jury r

ecial relationships from disclosure. By their very nature they impede the search for the truth and are therefore generally disfavored. Tranunel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 50, 100 S.Ct. 906, 912, 63 L.Ed.2d 186 (1980); Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 99 S.Ct. 1635, 60 L.Ed.2d 115 (1979); United States v

naed materials are privileged. Specifically, the District Attorney argues that the state grand jury secrecy law creates a federal privilege under Federal Rule of Evidence 501. The Court finds this argument without merit. [8] Evidentiary privileges protect confidential communications between persons in special rela

privileges in federal court pros. wsings " 1560 shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience." The privilege appellants assert, as stated in their motions to intervene, is based solely on state law. [FN

and jury than to protect from delay the progress of the trial after an indictment has been found." Id. at 327, 60 5.Q. at 542; see also Di Bella v. United States. 369 U.S. 121, 124, 82 S.Q. 654, 656-57, 7 L.P.d.2d 614 (1962) ("This insistence on finality and prohibition of piecemeal review discourage undue

naed materials are privileged. Specifically, the District Attorney argues that the state grand jury secrecy law creates a federal privilege under Federal Rule of Evidence 501. The Court finds this argument without merit. [8] Evidentiary privileges protect confidential communications between persons in special rela

the United States, advised that her January 2001 record was the return from her London, England trip 'The April 2001 CBP record was her return to the United States' ould not recall her travel from advised that her United States March and May 2001 CPB records! Passport was Australia. turned over to the United

d jury than to protect from delay the progress of the trial after an indictment has been found." Id. at 327, 60 S. Cr. at 542; see also Di Bella v. United States. 369 U.S. 121, 124, 82 S.O. 654, 656-57, 7 L.Pd.2d 614 (1962) ("This insistence on finality and prohibition of piecemeal review discourage undue l

naed materials are privileged. Specifically, the District Attorney argues that the state grand jury secrecy law creates a federal privilege under Federal Rule of Evidence 501. The Court finds this argument without merit. [8] Evidentiary privileges protect confidential communications between persons in special rela

enying mandamus where petitioners sought to vacate plea agreement which made no provision for restitution in deference to pending civil litigation); United States v. Aguirre-Gonzalez, 597 F.3d 46 (1st Cir. 2010) (relying on the "strong interest in the finality of criminal sentences" to reject mandamus under th

and trust," and because their confidentiality serves significant public and private ends, they are properly subject to a common law privilege under Federal Rule of Evidence 501. Similar privileges, which are "rooted in the imperative need for confidence and trust" and which serve significant public and private ends, have b

ise must be fulfilled." Santobellol New York, 4O4 U.S. 257 (1971). Failure to enforce the government's side of a plea bargain violates Due Process. United States' Yesil, 991 F.2d 1527, 1532-33 (11th Cir. 1992). The plaintiffs knowingly sat on their CVRA claims for years as Mr. Epstein served a prison sentence

ications, either written or oral, made during the course of a mediation. Our decision whether to apply this mediation privilege .. . is governed by Federal Rule of Evidence 501 [and] Jaffee'. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1 (1996) . . . Recognizing that only those documents prepared for purposes of the confidential mediation are prote

titled to discovery or use of the plea negotiations because plea negotiations enjoy an evidentiary privilege, as recognized by the Supreme Court in United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196 (1995). Additionally, because plea negotiations are rooted in the imperative need for confidence and trust, and because

—and because their continued confidentiality serves significant public and private ends, they are properly subject to a common law privilege under Federal Rule of Evidence 501. Similar privileges, which are rooted in the imperative need for confidence and trust and which serve significant public and private ends, have bee