Epstein Secrets

SANBORN, and THOMAS, Circuit Judges. STONE, Circuit Judge- This is an appeal from a conviction for violation of the White Slave Traffic Act, IS U.S.C.A. § 397 ct seq. Appellant urges here three claimed er- rors: (1) Improper restriction of cross- examination of a witness; (2) error in the charge to

ses the emotional and psychic harm suffered by the child"). New York I Ferber. 458 U.S. 747. 758-59 & trtr9-1011982) (citations omitted); see also United Slates Yuknavich. 419 F.3d 1302. 1310 (11th Cir.2005) ("possession of child pornography is not a victimless crime")• Goff. 501 F.3d at 259 ("Consum

tside the Guidelines, the judge will explain why he has done so." 127 S.Ct. at 2468. The Supreme urt most recently addressed sentencing in Gall United Stases. 128 S.Ct. 586 (2007), and Kimbroushi United States. 128 S.Ct. 558 (2007). F" Gall reviewed the reasonableness of a sentence falling far below the

ssed; (4) submit to searches based on reasonable suspicion; and (5) register with the state sex-offender registry. After the district court denied the United States's motion to reconsider the sentence and impose either a sentence within the Guidelines, or a sentence of at least one day in prison followed by a li

f § 2423(c). Adopted in 2003 as part of the PROTECT Act, § 2423(c) provides as follows: (c) Engaging in illicit sexual conduct in foreign places. Any United States citizen or alien admitted for permanent residence who travels in foreign commerce, and engages in any illicit sexual con- duct with another person

1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3258-59. "411 11. Notably, this notion of "just deserts" or retribution is a distinct consideration from general deterrence. See United States' Foss. 501 F.2d 522. 527 (1st Cir.1974) (cited with approval in the legislative history of Section 3553(a)) ("[T]he @ 2008 Thomson/West. No Claim t

immoral purposes, such act is not causing such trip within the meaning of section 2 but is, if any crime, the one stated in section 3 of the Act, U.S.C.A. Title 18, § 399. The pertinent language in the two sec- tions is: Section 2. "Any person who shall knowingly • • • cause to be transport- ed • •

view would still "tend to iron out sentencing differences." Id. C 2008 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. EFTA00192128 Page 6 ' F.3d --, 2008 WL 253040 (C.A.11 (Ala.)) (Cite as: — F.3d —) Booker further held that in performing this review, we must measure "reasonableness" agains

performing its part of the bargain, due process prevents the government from making this determination and nullifying the agreement unilaterally. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 5. 131 Criminal Law 4C=042.5(3) 110k42.5(3) Most Cited Cases (Formerly I 1 Ok42) 131 Criminal Law €=.42.7(2) I I 0k42.7(2) Most Cit

review Castaneda's claim of breach of a nonprosecution agreement de novo. [FN241 FNI7. United States v. Moulder, 141 F.3d 568, 571 (5th Cir.1998); United Slates v. Rallis, 28 F.3d 1399, 1409 (5th Cir.1994); United States v. Fitch, 964 F.2d 571, 574 (6th Cir.1992); United Stales v. Brown, 801 F.2d 352, 354

each by clear and convincing evid- ence). F1122. See Packwood, 848 F.2d at 1011; Tarrant, 730 F.Supp. at 32. F1423. Packwood, 848 F.2d at 1011; United Stales v. Calabrese, 645 F.2d 1379, 1390(10th Cir.I981). FN24. Moulder, 141 F.3d at 571; Price, 95 F.3d at 367; United States v. Laday, 56 F.3d 24, 26 (

nited States Attorney's Office (USAO), along with Defendant, has strongly opposed making the NPA public. Attached as Exhibit C hereto is Respondent United States of America's Opposition To Victims' Motion To Unseal Non- Prosecution Agreement, dated October 8, 2008, [DE 29], also filed in In Re: Jane Does 1 and 2,

further. Petitioners have no legal right to disclose the Agreement to third parties, or standing to challenge the confidentiality provision. After the United States' response, Exhibit C, this Court entered its Order, Exhibit B, agreeing with the United States' position and maintaining the confidentiality of the N

ks. Page 4 haps://web2.westlaw.com/print/printstream.aspx?sv-Split&prft=HTMLE&ifm=NotSet&mt... 6/8/2009 EFTA00182793 Page 2 of 11 Westlaw. 162 F.3d 832 162 F.3d 832 (Cite as: 162 F.3d 832) C United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit. UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ra

the defendant acted with the intent to facilitate it. United States v. Cartwright, 359 F.3d 281, 287 (3d Cir.2004) (citations omitted); see also United Stales' New- man, 490 1"2d 139, 143 (3d Cir.I974) (in order to be liable as an aider or abettor, the defendant must have participated in the substantive c

ple listed statu- tory offenses, diocesan defendants did not know the offenses were being committed and act with the intent to facilitate them. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2(a), 2241(c), 2242, 2243, 2251, 225IA, 2252, 2252A, 2255, 2260, 2421, 2422, 2423. 5. Federal Courts e=.15 District court could exercise suppl

ngage in sexual relations with him. Id. at 414. Af- ter a jury found that a fiduciary relation- ship existed between the plaintiff and the diocese, the United States Court of Ap- peals for the Second Circuit upheld this verdict on appeal, finding that the relation- ship between the plaintiff and the diocese was fiduci

he law of nations or a treaty of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1350. Ms. Cisneros is not alleging that Mr. Aragon's conduct violated a treaty of the United States. Our inquiry thus focuses exclusively on whether Ms. Cisneros has sufficiently alleged a violation of the law of nations, as that term is used in

rsonal injuries caused by stepfather's sexual exploitation. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14; 18 U.S.C.A. § 2255; Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 12(b)(2), 28 U.S.C.A.; West's V.C.A. § 8.01-328.1. 8. Courts e=12(2.1, 2.15) If defendant transacts any business or has an interest in, uses, or possesses real lib in

why the district court erred in denying the motion. uii Conseq tly, we consider the issue waived. See Wilburn Mid-South Health Dev., Inc., 343 F.3d 1274, 1 1 (10th Cir.2003) ("We ... will not ( consider issues that are raised n appeal but not adequately addressed"); Adler Wal-Mart Stores, In

ction 2422(b) expressly requires that the crime be committed "knowingly," and that requisite mental element applies as to each element of the crime. United Slates v, XCitement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 68.69 (1994); United States v. Meek, 366 F.3d 705, 718 (9lh Cir. 2004); United States v. Root, 296 F.3d 1222,

imited to sex trafficking that involves children or is accomplished by force, fraud, or coercion." United States v. Evans 476 F.3d at 1179 n. 1. Sec aho United States v, Sims, 171 Fed. 3505-019 Page 19 of 63 SUBJECT TO PROTECTIVE ORDER PARAGRAPHS 7, 8, 9, 10, 15, and 17 EFTA_00003291 EFTA00157673 ALLEN GUTHR

a result of the federal investigation], or acquittal on the merits shall be a bar to any subsequent federal prosecution for the same act or acts." U.S.A.M. § 9-2.031A (emphasis added). Consistent with that principle, and of particular relevance to this case, the Department itself just recently observed

ically underscore these principles and help to highlight why federal prosecution in this case would be improper as a matter of both law and policy. See United States v. Santos, No. 06-1005 (June 2, 2008); Cuellar v. United States, No. 06-1456 (June 2, 2008). Though they both address the interpretation and applica

is house if they were under the age of 18. See United States v. Kennard, 472 F.3d 851, 857-858 (1 3'Cir. 2006), quoting, United States v Puche, 350 F.3d t 137, 1149 (11th Cir. 2003) (An instruction on deliberate ignorance is appropriate only if it is shown [among other things] ... that the defendant

.. . it defines the basic elements of a fair trial largely through the several provisions of the Sixth Amendment."' Cap/in & Drysdale, Chartered v. UnitedStates, 491 U.S. 617, 633 (1989) (citations omitted). 'The right of an accused in a criminal trial to due process is, in essence, the right to a fair oppor

tation omitted). "It has been clear for a generation that 'Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights ... [that] may not be vicariously asserted.'" United States v. Haqq, 278 F.3d 44, 47 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Rakers v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133-34 (1978)). Accordingly, a defendant's Fourth Amendment right

nt may violate the Fifth Amendment (or another right). In certain circumstances, a private entity may be deemed to be acting as a government agent. See United States v. Stein, 541 F.3d 130, 146 (2d Cir. 2008) ("Actions of a private entity are attributable to the State if there is a sufficiently close nexus betwe

of fairness and decency would be offended were judicial processes invoked to obtain a conviction against the accused." United States v. Schmidt, 105 F.3d 82,91 (2d Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). "Such outrageous or conscience shocking behavior involves egregious invasion

lculation of the offense levels under United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual (USSG) §§ 2G2.I and 2G2.2 (1998).FNI I FNI I. The 1998 edition of the United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual was applied in this case due to concerns about possible ex post facto problems that might arise from subsequent amend

prft—H... 12/18/2007 EFTA00191996 Page 13 of 13 77 Fed.Appx. 371 77 Fed.Appx. 371, 2003 WL 22331999 (C.A.6 (Ohio)) (Cite as: 77 Fed.Appx. 371) United States' Lyckman, 235 F.3d 234, 237-40 (5th Cir.2000). The term "sadism," which is the most relevant to this case, is defined as the " infliction of pain u

ent when it is based on consent from a third party whom the agents reasonably believed (even if erroneously) to have common rt.over the premises. United Stater 979 F.2)77, 79 (6th Cir.1992) (quoting Illinois Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 110 S.Ct. 93, III L.Ed.2d 148 (1990)). B. Attempted Enticement of A M

No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. hups://web2.westlaw.com/print/printstream.aspx?sv=Full&prit=HTMLE&mt=FederalGov... 2/27/2008 EFTA00192004 504 F.3d 737 504 F.3d 737, 07 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 11,330, 2007 Daily Journal D.A.R. 14,672 (Cite as: 504 F.3d 737) use," "sexual abuse," or "abusive sexua

"United States"); United States v. Bruno, 159 F. Supp. 3d 311, 321 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) ("The Court disagrees with Defendant's argument that the phrase `United States' shows an intent to bind all United States Attorney's Offices. Rather, the plea agreement covers only Defendant's liability in the SDFL."). As the S

Cir. Apr. 26, 2002) (summary order) (plea agreement does not bind other districts "even if the plea agreement purports to bind `the Government' or the "United States"); United States v. Bruno, 159 F. Supp. 3d 311, 321 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) ("The Court disagrees with Defendant's argument that the phrase `United States'

r v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990) 56 Thom v. Ashcroft, 369 F.3d 158 (2d Cir. 2004) 47 Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112 (1970) 48 United State v. Nader, 425 F. Supp. 3d 619 (E.D. Va. 2019) passim United States v. Ahmed, 992 F. Supp. 682 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) 166 United States v. Ahmed, No.

run.") (citing Falter, 23 F.3d at 425-26). And other circuits have emphasized this distinction in the context of Section 3283. Leo Sure Chief, 438 F.3d, at 922-25; Jeffries, 405 F.3d 685. Read together, the Second Circuit's decisions in Weingarten, Vernon, Enterprise, and Falter establish that Cong

109, 116 (2d Cir.2005) (emphases The express language of Rule 410 also makes clear that "derivative evidence" is never excluded from a proceeding. See United States v. Ruhkowsi, 814 F.2d 594, 599 (11th Cir. 1987). 8 EFTA00205735 Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 106 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/10/2011 Page 9 of 2

ary of Enclosures" and justified the privilege by characterizing the documents as "attorney-client communication[s]" without explanation.") (citing United States v. Constr. Prods. Research, Inc., 73 F.3d 464, 473 (2d Cir.1996)).8 Once the Government has cataloged the documents in its privilege log, it then bea

f 27 claiming the protection has voluntarily disclosed work product to a party not covered by the work-product doctrine." United States v. Ary, 518 F.3d 775, 783 (10th Cir. 2008). Perhaps recognizing the difficulty inherent in its position under these well-recognized general principles, the Governme

motion misstated the right-to-access law. To the contrary the Opinion correctly summarized the law, and properly identified the leading cases from the United States Supreme Court and this Court. See, e.g., Sp.App. 16-26. The gravamen of the appellants' argument centered on—and many of the panel's questions were

able one. As Lugosch holds, it can be overcome by "specific, on-the- record findings that higher values necessitate a narrowly tailored sealing." 435 F.3d at 126. The Order to Show Cause is improperly dismissive both of the rebuttal of the presumption Ms. Maxwell is entitled to make and the procedure