Epstein Secrets

elevision. But at the time, very few Israelis even knew who I was, and I felt ’'d done OK. I was surprised, however, when Rabin phoned the next day. “Ehud, I didn’t see it. I was attending some event,” he said. But his wife, Leah, had recorded the program. “I just watched it. I should tell you, I think

my hands — the article accused me of siding with the settlers. If blood was spilled in the weeks and months ahead, the newspaper said, “it will be on Barak’s hands.” Ordinarily, I would have ignored it. But never in my military career had I been similarly attacked on an issue of any importance. I was es

o let the facts get in the way of the “exclusive” it ran in its weekend edition on July 7. Under a banner headline — an undeniably clever Hebrew pun, Ehud Barakh, “Ehud Ran Away” — it accused me of having stood by, paralyzed with shock, when the missiles struck and then, as other officers tended to the wounded

Amir Drori, the head of the northern command. They had set up a rooftop observation post just a few hundred yards in from where I had landed with my Sayeret Matkal team a decade earlier for the Rue Verdun operation. It overlooked a pair of Palestinian refugee camps: Sabra and, a couple of hundred yards closer to

tment to the values of an open, tolerant democracy. But in at least one important way, I approached my new role as if it was one of our operations in Sayeret Matkal, or the need to reshape our armed forces when I was chief-of-staff. My first priority was to put in place the practical foundations for a successful

ion about our enemies, and make sure it got to the commanders and field units that needed it. And while the details of many operations I approved for Sayeret Matkal and other units remain classified, we did succeed in doing that — to take just one example, by finding an entirely new way to get intelligence from i

elevision. But at the time, very few Israelis even knew who I was, and I felt I'd done OK. I was surprised, however, when Rabin phoned the next day. "Ehud, I didn't see it. I was attending some event," he said. But his wife, Leah, had recorded the program. "I just watched it. I should tell you, I think

my hands - the article accused me of siding with the settlers. If blood was spilled in the weeks and months ahead, the newspaper said, "it will be on Barak's hands." Ordinarily, I would have ignored it. But never in my military career had I been similarly attacked on an issue of any importance. I was esp

o let the facts get in the way of the "exclusive" it ran in its weekend edition on July 7. Under a banner headline - an undeniably clever Hebrew pun, Ehud Barakh, "Ehud Ran Away" - it accused me of having stood by, paralyzed with shock, when the missiles struck and then, as other officers tended to the wounded

Amir Drori, the head of the northern command. They had set up a rooftop observation post just a few hundred yards in from where I had landed with my Sayeret Matkal team a decade earlier for the Rue Verdun operation. It overlooked a pair of Palestinian refugee camps: Sabra and, a couple of hundred yards closer to

tment to the values of an open, tolerant democracy. But in at least one important way, I approached my new role as if it was one of our operations in Sayeret Matkal, or the need to reshape our armed forces when I was chief-of-staff. My first priority was to put in place the practical foundations for a successful

ion about our enemies, and make sure it got to the commanders and field units that needed it. And while the details of many operations I approved for Sayeret Matkal and other units remain classified, we did succeed in doing that - to take just one example, by finding an entirely new way to get intelligence from i

time attack after all. Talking to Dado and me, he said: “Since we’re going to such lengths to deceive them, why not just add another layer? Why can’t Ehud’s people take the role of the airport mechanics?” Looking at each other, Dado and I realized it was a stroke of brilliance. Dado went to share the pl

hat before I’d left for Stanford, 146 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011617 they even insisted I change my name. I was no longer Ehud Brog. I’d Hebraicized it: to Barak, which seemed near enough to the original. Among the few dozen outside the unit who did know about my role, however, were paratroopers who’d joined u

advancement in Jerusalem. Though he would eventually return to Israel, he was teaching at Cornell when his sons became officers under my command in Sayeret Matkal. So there was a physical distance between father and sons. But what struck me was how large the father loomed in both of their lives. There was an al

ons within the PLO were ready to step into the breach if Arafat faltered. Israel needed to find an answer for all these threats. Uzi Yairi’s term as Sayeret Matkal commander had by now ended, but his successor was someone I knew well. Menachem Digli was the officer on whom I’d bestowed my stolen Syrian Mercedes

/ BARAK / 15 By November, even his Foreign Minister, David Levy, was making noises about quitting. He said it would be a waste of time to stay in the cabine

ed his no-confidence resolution, he came to see me in my office in the Knesset. He was worried. Not about the vote, but about what would come after. “Ehud, I’m sure we can topple the government,” he told me. “But only you know whether we’re ready — whether you ’re ready — to defeat Bibi in an election.”

he summit’s collapse. My main concern was the possibility of violence. Even before returning home, I’d phoned Shaul Mofaz and Avi Dichter, the former Sayeret Matkal officer who was now head of the Shin Bet. “Let’s hope the violence doesn’t come,” I told them. “But if it does, make sure we are ready.” Though there

eer by training, he was a reserve army general who, when I was chief of staff, had been in charge of the logistics branch of the military. I gave him Sayeret Matkal backup as well, in the person of Danny Yatom, my longtime friend and former sayeret deputy. But all that was process. Winning or losing would come d

time attack after all. Talking to Dado and me, he said: "Since we're going to such lengths to deceive them, why not just add another layer? Why can't Ehud's people take the role of the airport mechanics?" Looking at each other, Dado and I realized it was a stroke of brilliance. Dado went to share the pl

that before I'd left for Stanford, 146 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_027994 they even insisted I change my name. I was no longer Ehud Brog. I'd Hebraicized it: to Barak, which seemed near enough to the original. Among the few dozen outside the unit who did know about my role, however, were paratroopers who'd joined u

c advancement in Jerusalem. Though he would eventually return to Israel, he was teaching at Cornell when his sons became officers under my command in Sayeret Matkal. So there was a physical distance between father and sons. But what struck me was how large the father loomed in both of their lives. There was an al

ions within the PLO were ready to step into the breach if Arafat faltered. Israel needed to find an answer for all these threats. Uzi Yairi's term as Sayeret Matkal commander had by now ended, but his successor was someone I knew well. Menachem Digli was the officer on whom I'd bestowed my stolen Syrian Mercedes

/ BARAK / 15 By November, even his Foreign Minister, David Levy, was making noises about quitting. He said it would be a waste of time to stay in the cabinet

ed his no-confidence resolution, he came to see me in my office in the Knesset. He was worried. Not about the vote, but about what would come after. "Ehud, I'm sure we can topple the government," he told me. "But only you know whether we're ready - whether you're ready - to defeat Bibi in an election."

he summit's collapse. My main concern was the possibility of violence. Even before returning home, I'd phoned Shaul Mofaz and Avi Dichter, the former Sayeret Matkal officer who was now head of the Shin Bet. "Let's hope the violence doesn't come," I told them. "But if it does, make sure we are ready." Though there

eer by training, he was a reserve army general who, when I was chief of staff, had been in charge of the logistics branch of the military. I gave him Sayeret Matkal backup as well, in the person of Danny Yatom, my longtime friend and former sayeret deputy. *** But all that was process. Winning or losing would com

ith considerable approval. Ankle 3. Foreign Affairs Barak's Last Battle: An Israeli Lion in Winter Jonathan Tepperman January/February 2013 -- Ehud Barak is one of Israel's most important leaders -- and also one of its most enigmatic and controversial. As defense minister in the current government, B

ter Jonathan Tepperman January/February 2013 -- Ehud Barak is one of Israel's most important leaders

being called back into service," says Shlomo Avineri, a veteran Israeli analyst. Amir Mizroch, an Israeli journalist and blogger, calls it "a truly Sayeret Matkal-like operation -- uncanny, unpredictable, with little or no chance of success, but if pulled off, extremely brilliant." Mizroch explains: "By exiti

. When she got there, she realized I had gone missing. Retracing her steps, she found me standing in front of a rock in the middle of the dirt path. “Ehud,” she said, “why didn’t you come with us?” I apparently replied: “I’m thinking: which side of the rock should I go around?” Still, important though

awn in Private Benjamin. The main misunderstanding, however, went deeper. The assumption appeared to be that my military achievements, especially in Sayeret Matkal, were down to a mix of brute force and raw courage. Courage, of course, was a requirement: the willingness to take risks, if the rewards for success,

of Ramallah as well. He gazed in that direction, then at the bright lights of the avenues and restaurants and cafés far below us. Smiling, he said: “Ehud, why do you need Ramallah when you’ve got Tel Aviv?” I smiled back. There was no need to reply. He knew my views. Not only didn’t Israel need Ramalla

the generals of our attack plan. There was still a core of ministers opposed: chiefly Dan Meridor and Benny Begin, but also Boogie Ya’alon, a former Sayeret Matkal commander and chief of staff who Minister of Strategic Affairs. But the confidence and detail with which the plan was laid out, and the fact that Bib

. When she got there, she realized I had gone missing. Retracing her steps, she found me standing in front of a rock in the middle of the dirt path. “Ehud,” she said, “why didn’t you come with us?” I apparently replied: “I’m thinking: which side of the rock should I go around?” Still, important though

awn in Private Benjamin. The main misunderstanding, however, went deeper. The assumption appeared to be that my military achievements, especially in Sayeret Matkal, were down to a mix of brute force and raw courage. Courage, of course, was a requirement: the willingness to take risks, if the rewards for success,