Epstein Secrets

, instead, the contents were voluntarily created by the persons who used them. F15 See, e.g., United States v. Doe , 465 U.S. 605, 612 (1984); In re Grand Jury Proceedings , 393 F.3d 905, 909 (9th Cir. 2004); In re Foster , 188 F.3d 1259, 1269 (10th Cir. 1999). This reasoning applies even when the documents or informa

s that are `factually related' to a charged offense. Several of these courts have interpreted Brewer v. Williams , 430 U.S. 387 (1977) and Maine v. Moulton , 474 U.S. 159 — both of which were decided well before McNeil — to support this view, which respondent now invites us to approve. We decline to do

ed, instead, the contents were voluntarily created by the persons who used them. F15 See, e.g., United States' Doe , 465 U.S. 605, 612 (1984); In re Grand Jury Proceedings , 393 F.3d 905, 909 (9th Cir. 2004); In re Foster , 188 F.3d 1259, 1269 (10th Cir. 1999). This reasoning applies even when the documents or informa

rimes that are `factually related' to a charged offense. Several of these courts have interpreted Brewer. Williams , 430 U.S. 387 (1977) and Maine. Moulton , 474 U.S. 159 — both of which were decided well before McNeil — to support this view, which respondent now invites us to approve. We decline to do

lled, instead, the contents were voluntarily created by the persons who used them.15 See, e.g., United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 612 (1984); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 393 F.3d 905, 909 (9th Cir. 2004); In re Foster, 188 F.3d 1259, 1269 (10th Cir. 1999). This reasoning applies even when the documents or informati

es that are 'factually related' to a charged offense. Several of these courts have interpreted Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977) and Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159 —both of which were decided well before McNeil — to support this view, which respondent now invites us to approve. We decline to do s