Epstein Secrets

m Epstein's home. The Fifth Amendment privilege "protects a person . . . against being incriminated by his own compelled testimonial communication." Fisher v. United States , 425 U.S. 391, 409 (1976). Thus, to receive Fifth Amendment protection, a person's statement or act must be: (1) compelled; (2) t

ney (or his agent) can use the attorney-client privilege to EFTA00211784 assert an act of production immunity on behalf of his client. See, e.g., Fisher , 425 U.S. at 402-04. Those circumstances do not apply here. In Fisher , the Supreme Court determined that a defendant does not suffer a Fifth Amen

, instead, the contents were voluntarily created by the persons who used them. F15 See, e.g., United States v. Doe , 465 U.S. 605, 612 (1984); In re Grand Jury Proceedings , 393 F.3d 905, 909 (9th Cir. 2004); In re Foster , 188 F.3d 1259, 1269 (10th Cir. 1999). This reasoning applies even when the documents or informa

m Epstein's home. The Fifth Amendment privilege "protects a person . . . against being incriminated by his own compelled testimonial communication." Fisher I United States , 425 U.S. 391, 409 (1976). Thus, to receive Fifth Amendment protection, a person's statement or act must be: (1) compelled; (2) te

ney (or his agent) can use the attorney-client privilege to EFTA00223000 assert an act of production immunity on behalf of his client. See, e.g., Fisher , 425 U.S. at 402-04. Those circumstances do not apply here. In Fisher , the Supreme Court determined that a defendant does not suffer a Fifth Amen

ed, instead, the contents were voluntarily created by the persons who used them. F15 See, e.g., United States' Doe , 465 U.S. 605, 612 (1984); In re Grand Jury Proceedings , 393 F.3d 905, 909 (9th Cir. 2004); In re Foster , 188 F.3d 1259, 1269 (10th Cir. 1999). This reasoning applies even when the documents or informa

rom Epstein's home. The Fifth Amendment privilege "protects a person ... against being incriminated by his own compelled testimonial communication." Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 409 (1976). Thus, to receive Fifth Amendment protection, a person's statement or act must be: (1) compelled; (2) te

ances, an attorney (or his agent) can use the attorney-client privilege to assert an act of production immunity on behalf of his client. See, e.g., Fisher, 425 U.S. at 402-04. Those circumstances do not apply here. In Fisher, the Supreme Court determined that a defendant does not suffer a Fifth Amendme

lled, instead, the contents were voluntarily created by the persons who used them.15 See, e.g., United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 612 (1984); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 393 F.3d 905, 909 (9th Cir. 2004); In re Foster, 188 F.3d 1259, 1269 (10th Cir. 1999). This reasoning applies even when the documents or informati

nsive documents is considered testimonial and is protected by the Fifth Amendment. In re Grand Jury Subpoena 1 F.3d 87, 93 (2d Cir. 1993); see also Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 410 (1976)(issue expressed as whether compliance with a document request or subpoena "tacitly conceded" the item's

prepared in anticipation of litigation by or for a party or by or for that party's attorney acting for his client, Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3)'; In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 601 F.2d 162, 171 (5th Cir. 1979), is also not implicated as the subject documents were not created by Epstein's attorneys. Id. Finally, Epstein

Amendment privilege against self-incrimination does not extend to documents whose existence is known to the government or is a foregone conclusion. Fisher, 425 U.S. at 410; United States 1. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 44 (2000); United States I. Ponds, 454 F.3d 313, 325 (D.C. Cir. 2006). Thus, while the Fif

prepared in anticipation of litigation by or for a party or by or for that party's attorney acting for his client, Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3)'; In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 601 F.2d 162, 171 (5th Cir. 1979), is also not implicated as the subject documents were not created by Epstein's attorneys. Id. Finally, Epstein

from the EFTA00222987 Fifth Amendment, which "protects a person . . . again being incriminated by his own compelled testimonial communication." Fisher I United States , 425 U.S. 391, 409 (1976). Thus, to receive Fifth Amendment protection, the person's statement or act must be: (1) compelled; (2) t

, the contents were voluntarily created by the persons who used them. EFTA00222988 See, e.g., United States' Doe , 465 U.S. 605, 612 (1984); In re Grand Jury Proceedings , 393 F.3d 905, 909 (9th Cir. 2004); In re Foster , 188 F.3d 1259, 1269 (10th Cir. 1999). This reasoning applies even when the documents or informa