Epstein Secrets

ry Matter No. 91-01386 , 969 F.2d 995, 997 (11th Cir. 1992) (citation omitted). In United States v. Legal Servs. for New York City , 249 F.3d 1077 (D.C. Cir. 2001), the D.C. Circuit stated that "[c]ourts have consistently held that the general subject matters of clients' representations are not privilege

m Epstein's home. The Fifth Amendment privilege "protects a person . . . against being incriminated by his own compelled testimonial communication." Fisher v. United States , 425 U.S. 391, 409 (1976). Thus, to receive Fifth Amendment protection, a person's statement or act must be: (1) compelled; (2) t

ney (or his agent) can use the attorney-client privilege to EFTA00211784 assert an act of production immunity on behalf of his client. See, e.g., Fisher , 425 U.S. at 402-04. Those circumstances do not apply here. In Fisher , the Supreme Court determined that a defendant does not suffer a Fifth Amen

ury Matter No. 91-01386 , 969 F.2d 995, 997 (11th Cir. 1992) (citation omitted). In United States I Legal Servs. for New York City , 249 F.3d 1077 (D.C. Cir. 2001), the D.C. Circuit stated that "[c]ourts have consistently held that the general subject matters of clients' representations are not privilege

m Epstein's home. The Fifth Amendment privilege "protects a person . . . against being incriminated by his own compelled testimonial communication." Fisher I United States , 425 U.S. 391, 409 (1976). Thus, to receive Fifth Amendment protection, a person's statement or act must be: (1) compelled; (2) te

ney (or his agent) can use the attorney-client privilege to EFTA00223000 assert an act of production immunity on behalf of his client. See, e.g., Fisher , 425 U.S. at 402-04. Those circumstances do not apply here. In Fisher , the Supreme Court determined that a defendant does not suffer a Fifth Amen

Jury Matter No. 91-01386, 969 F.2d 995, 997 (11th Cir. 1992) (citation omitted). In United States v. Legal Servs. for New York City, 249 F.3d 1077 (D.C. Cir. 2001), the D.C. Circuit stated that "[c]ourts have consistently held that the general subject matters of clients' representations are not privileg

rom Epstein's home. The Fifth Amendment privilege "protects a person ... against being incriminated by his own compelled testimonial communication." Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 409 (1976). Thus, to receive Fifth Amendment protection, a person's statement or act must be: (1) compelled; (2) te

ances, an attorney (or his agent) can use the attorney-client privilege to assert an act of production immunity on behalf of his client. See, e.g., Fisher, 425 U.S. at 402-04. Those circumstances do not apply here. In Fisher, the Supreme Court determined that a defendant does not suffer a Fifth Amendme

non-prosecution agreement or a related and similar mechanism, a deferred prosecution agreement. United States v. Fokker Servs. B.V., 818 F.3d 733 (D.C. Cir. 2016). These agreements “afford a middle-ground option to the prosecution when, for example, it believes that a criminal conviction may be diffic

d left a message that he was calling regarding Epstein.151 At Fisher’s request, Lourie, who in late September 2007 had begun serving his detail as Fisher’s Principal Deputy and Chief of Staff, returned the call. Fisher told OPR that she had no recollection of this call, and Lourie also could

led the office of Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division Alice Fisher and left a message that he was calling regarding Epstein.151 At Fisher’s request, Lourie, who in late September 2007 had begun serving his detail as Fisher’s Principal Deputy and Chief of Staff, returned the call. Fis

Circuit has recently refused to extend the act of production doctrine to facts very similar to those here. In United States v. Ponds, 454 F.3d 313 (D.C. Cir. 2006), federal prosecutors sought information about possible crimes committed by a defense attorney in the course of representing a defendant in a

vers situations where the act of producing documents has "communicative aspects of its own, wholly aside from the contents of the papers produced." Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 410 (1976). But this "act of production" doctrine has stringent limits. It does not extend, for example, to a claim

or is a foregone conclusion. Fisher, 425 U.S. at 410; United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 44 (2000); United States v. Ponds, 454 F.3d 313, 325 (D.C. Cir. 2006). Thus, while the Fifth Amendment covers situations where the act of producing documents has "communicative aspects of its own wholly aside fr

sive documents is considered testimonial and is protected by the Fifth Amendment. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 1 F.3d 87, 93 (2d Cir. 1993); see also Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 410 (1976)(issue expressed as whether compliance with a document request or subpoena "tacitly conceded" the item's

that Wal- Mart provided the basis for a renewed class certification motion); DL v. District of Columbia, 713 F.3d 120, 126, 404 U.S. App. D.C. 316 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (surveying how Wal-Mart has changed the class action landscape); Elizabeth Tippett, Robbing A Barren Vault: The Implications of Dukes v. Wal

tible to mistaken perception, leading to erroneous conclusions r135] -- especially when collections of stories are treated as quasi-statistics. See Fisher v. Vassar Coll., 70 F.3d 1420, 1444-45 (2d Cir. 1995). And bias can skew anecdotal evidence, as when only those who feel most strongly about an issu