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as a natural tendency to influence the court or if a truthful answer might reasonably lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995); United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 753-54 (2d Cir. 1994). Like knowing falsity, materiality is an element of the offen
nts made in a civil deposition is broad, and evidence on that question is unlikely to bear on the other charges here. See Kross, 14 F.3d at 753-54; Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 509. Although some allegations of sexual abuse are relevant to both sets of charges, many are not. At a minimum, this will expand the s
allegations related to one of the alleged victims from the S I superseding indictment as surplusage. The Court declines to do so at this juncture. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(d) allows a court to strike surplusage from an indictment on a defendant's motion. "Motions to strike surplusage from an indictment will
as a natural tendency to influence the court or if a truthful answer might reasonably lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995); United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 753-54 (2d Cir. 1994). Like knowing falsity, materiality is an element of the offen
nts made in a civil deposition is broad, and evidence on that question is unlikely to bear on the other charges here. See Kross, 14 F.3d at 753-54; Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 509. Although some allegations of sexual abuse are relevant to both sets of charges, many are not. At a minimum, this will expand the s
allegations related to one of the alleged victims from the S I superseding indictment as surplusage. The Court declines to do so at this juncture. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(d) allows a court to strike surplusage from an indictment on a defendant's motion. "Motions to strike surplusage from an indictment will
as a natural tendency to influence the court or if a truthful answer might reasonably lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995); United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 753-54 (2d Cir. 1994). Like knowing falsity, materiality is an element of the offen
nts made in a civil deposition is broad, and evidence on that question is unlikely to bear on the other charges here. See Kross, 14 F.3d at 753-54; Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 509. Although some allegations of sexual abuse are relevant to both sets of charges, many are not. At a minimum, this will expand the s
allegations related to one of the alleged victims from the S I superseding indictment as surplusage. The Court declines to do so at this juncture. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(d) allows a court to strike surplusage from an indictment on a defendant's motion. "Motions to strike surplusage from an indictment will
as a natural tendency to influence the court or if a truthful answer might reasonably lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995); United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 753-54 (2d Cir. 1994). Like knowing falsity, materiality is an element of the offen
nts made in a civil deposition is broad, and evidence on that question is unlikely to bear on the other charges here. See Kross, 14 F.3d at 753-54; Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 509. Although some allegations of sexual abuse are relevant to both sets of charges, many are not. At a minimum, this will expand the s
allegations related to one of the alleged victims from the S I superseding indictment as surplusage. The Court declines to do so at this juncture. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(d) allows a court to strike surplusage from an indictment on a defendant's motion. "Motions to strike surplusage from an indictment will
as a natural tendency to influence the court or if a truthful answer might reasonably lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995); United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 753-54 (2d Cir. 1994). Like knowing falsity, materiality is an element of the offen
nts made in a civil deposition is broad, and evidence on that question is unlikely to bear on the other charges here. See Kross, 14 F.3d at 753-54; Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 509. Although some allegations of sexual abuse are relevant to both sets of charges, many are not. At a minimum, this will expand the s
allegations related to one of the alleged victims from the S I superseding indictment as surplusage. The Court declines to do so at this juncture. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(d) allows a court to strike surplusage from an indictment on a defendant's motion. "Motions to strike surplusage from an indictment will
as a natural tendency to influence the court or if a truthful answer might reasonably lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995); United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 753-54 (2d Cir. 1994). Like knowing falsity, materiality is an element of the offen
nts made in a civil deposition is broad, and evidence on that question is unlikely to bear on the other charges here. See Kross, 14 F.3d at 753-54; Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 509. Although some allegations of sexual abuse are relevant to both sets of charges, many are not. At a minimum, this will expand the s
allegations related to one of the alleged victims from the S I superseding indictment as surplusage. The Court declines to do so at this juncture. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(d) allows a court to strike surplusage from an indictment on a defendant's motion. "Motions to strike surplusage from an indictment will
as a natural tendency to influence the court or if a truthful answer might reasonably lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995); United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 753-54 (2d Cir. 1994). Like knowing falsity, materiality is an element of the offen
nts made in a civil deposition is broad, and evidence on that question is unlikely to bear on the other charges here. See Kross, 14 F.3d at 753-54; Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 509. Although some allegations of sexual abuse are relevant to both sets of charges, many are not. At a minimum, this will expand the s
allegations related to one of the alleged victims from the S I superseding indictment as surplusage. The Court declines to do so at this juncture. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(d) allows a court to strike surplusage from an indictment on a defendant's motion. "Motions to strike surplusage from an indictment will
as a natural tendency to influence the court or if a truthful answer might reasonably lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995); United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 753-54 (2d Cir. 1994). Like knowing falsity, materiality is an element of the offen
nts made in a civil deposition is broad, and evidence on that question is unlikely to bear on the other charges here. See Kross, 14 F.3d at 753-54; Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 509. Although some allegations of sexual abuse are relevant to both sets of charges, many are not. At a minimum, this will expand the s
allegations related to one of the alleged victims from the S I superseding indictment as surplusage. The Court declines to do so at this juncture. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(d) allows a court to strike surplusage from an indictment on a defendant's motion. "Motions to strike surplusage from an indictment will
as a natural tendency to influence the court or if a truthful answer might reasonably lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995); United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 753-54 (2d Cir. 1994). Like knowing falsity, materiality is an element of the offen
nts made in a civil deposition is broad, and evidence on that question is unlikely to bear on the other charges here. See Kross, 14 F.3d at 753-54; Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 509. Although some allegations of sexual abuse are relevant to both sets of charges, many are not. At a minimum, this will expand the s
allegations related to one of the alleged victims from the S I superseding indictment as surplusage. The Court declines to do so at this juncture. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(d) allows a court to strike surplusage from an indictment on a defendant's motion. "Motions to strike surplusage from an indictment will
as a natural tendency to influence the court or if a truthful answer might reasonably lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995); United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 753-54 (2d Cir. 1994). Like knowing falsity, materiality is an element of the offen
nts made in a civil deposition is broad, and evidence on that question is unlikely to bear on the other charges here. See Kross, 14 F.3d at 753-54; Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 509. Although some allegations of sexual abuse are relevant to both sets of charges, many are not. At a minimum, this will expand the s
allegations related to one of the alleged victims from the S I superseding indictment as surplusage. The Court declines to do so at this juncture. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(d) allows a court to strike surplusage from an indictment on a defendant's motion. "Motions to strike surplusage from an indictment will
Entities connected to both Gaudin and Federal Rule of Criminal

Jeffrey Epstein
PERSON
United States
LOCATIONthe Southern District
LOCATION
Ghislaine Maxwell
PERSON
Supreme Court
ORGANIZATIONFBI
ORGANIZATION
Scarlett Johansson
PERSON
Southern District of New York
ORGANIZATIONMarkiewicz
PERSONSampson
PERSONNejad
PERSONForde
ORGANIZATIONChacko
PERSONEmmy Taylor
PERSONThompson
PERSON
Medina
PERSON
Adriana Ross
PERSON
Napolitano
PERSONWerner
PERSONSantobello
PERSON