influence, or [be] capable of influencing, the decision of the decisionmaking body to which it was 121 EFTA00095213 addressed." United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995) (alteration in original) (quotation marks omitted). A statement made in a civil deposition is also material if "a truthful

natural tendency to influence, or [be] capable of influencing, the decision of the decisionmaking body to which it was addressed," United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). Neither of these standards require the jury to determine whet

as a natural tendency to influence the court or if a truthful answer might reasonably lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995); United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 753-54 (2d Cir. 1994). Like knowing falsity, materiality is an element of the offen

nts made in a civil deposition is broad, and evidence on that question is unlikely to bear on the other charges here. See Kross, 14 F.3d at 753-54; Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 509. Although some allegations of sexual abuse are relevant to both sets of charges, many are not. At a minimum, this will expand the s

as a natural tendency to influence the court or if a truthful answer might reasonably lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995); United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 753-54 (2d Cir. 1994). Like knowing falsity, materiality is an element of the offen

nts made in a civil deposition is broad, and evidence on that question is unlikely to bear on the other charges here. See Kross, 14 F.3d at 753-54; Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 509. Although some allegations of sexual abuse are relevant to both sets of charges, many are not. At a minimum, this will expand the s

nts made in a civil deposition is broad, and evidence on that question is unlikely to bear on the other charges here. See Kross, 14 F.3d at 753-54; Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 509. Although some allegations of sexual abuse are relevant to both sets of charges, many are not. At a minimum, this will expand the s

as a natural tendency to influence the court or if a truthful answer might reasonably lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995); United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 753-54 (2d Cir. 1994). Like knowing falsity, materiality is an element of the offen

natural tendency to influence, or [be] capable of influencing, the decision of the decisionmaking body to which it was addressed," United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). Neither of these standards requires the jury to determine whe

natural tendency to influence, or [be] capable of influencing, the decision of the decisionmaking body to which it was addressed." United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995) (alteration in original) (quotation marks omitted). A statement made in a civil deposition is also material if "a truthful

natural tendency to influence, or [be] capable of influencing, the decision of the decisionmaking body to which it was addressed," United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). Neither of these standards requires the jury to determine whe

natural tendency to influence, or [be] capable of influencing, the decision of the decisionmaking body to which it was addressed." United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995) (alteration in original) (quotation marks omitted). A statement made in a civil deposition is also material if "a truthful

natural tendency to influence, or [be] capable of influencing, the decision of the decisionmaking body to which it was addressed," United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). Neither of these standards requires the jury to determine whe

natural tendency to influence, or [be] capable of influencing, the decision of the decisionmaking body to which it was addressed." United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995) (alteration in original) (quotation marks omitted). A statement made in a civil deposition is also material if "a truthful

natural tendency to influence, or [be] capable of influencing, the decision of the decisionmaking body to which it was addressed." United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995) (alteration in original) (quotation marks omitted). A statement made in a civil deposition is also material if "a truthful

natural tendency to influence, or [be] capable of influencing, the decision of the decisionmaking body to which it was addressed," United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). Neither of these standards requires the jury to determine whe

as a natural tendency to influence the court or if a truthful answer might reasonably lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995); United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 753-54 (2d Cir. 1994). Like knowing falsity, materiality is an element of the offen

most extraordinary circumstances justify departure from this general rule. United States v. Forde, 740 F. Supp. 2d 406, 412 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (citing Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 522-23). The charged statements do not fall within this narrow exception. Maxwell contends that the questions did not relate to the se

nts made in a civil deposition is broad, and evidence on that question is unlikely to bear on the other charges here. See Kross, 14 F.3d at 753-54; Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 509. Although some allegations of sexual abuse are relevant to both sets of charges, many are not. At a minimum, this will expand the s

as a natural tendency to influence the court or if a truthful answer might reasonably lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995); United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 753-54 (2d Cir. 1994). Like knowing falsity, materiality is an element of the offen

as a natural tendency to influence the court or if a truthful answer might reasonably lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995); United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 753-54 (2d Cir. 1994). Like knowing falsity, materiality is an element of the offen

nts made in a civil deposition is broad, and evidence on that question is unlikely to bear on the other charges here. See Kross, 14 F.3d at 753-54; Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 509. Although some allegations of sexual abuse are relevant to both sets of charges, many are not. At a minimum, this will expand the s

nts made in a civil deposition is broad, and evidence on that question is unlikely to bear on the other charges here. See Kross, 14 F.3d at 753-54; Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 509. Although some allegations of sexual abuse are relevant to both sets of charges, many are not. At a minimum, this will expand the s

as a natural tendency to influence the court or if a truthful answer might reasonably lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995); United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 753-54 (2d Cir. 1994). Like knowing falsity, materiality is an element of the offen

nts made in a civil deposition is broad, and evidence on that question is unlikely to bear on the other charges here. See Kross, 14 F.3d at 753-54; Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 509. Although some allegations of sexual abuse are relevant to both sets of charges, many are not. At a minimum, this will expand the s

as a natural tendency to influence the court or if a truthful answer might reasonably lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995); United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 753-54 (2d Cir. 1994). Like knowing falsity, materiality is an element of the offen

nts made in a civil deposition is broad, and evidence on that question is unlikely to bear on the other charges here. See Kross, 14 F.3d at 753-54; Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 509. Although some allegations of sexual abuse are relevant to both sets of charges, many are not. At a minimum, this will expand the s

as a natural tendency to influence the court or if a truthful answer might reasonably lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995); United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 753-54 (2d Cir. 1994). Like knowing falsity, materiality is an element of the offen

as a natural tendency to influence the court or if a truthful answer might reasonably lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995); United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 753-54 (2d Cir. 1994). Like knowing falsity, materiality is an element of the offen

nts made in a civil deposition is broad, and evidence on that question is unlikely to bear on the other charges here. See Kross, 14 F.3d at 753-54; Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 509. Although some allegations of sexual abuse are relevant to both sets of charges, many are not. At a minimum, this will expand the s

as a natural tendency to influence the court or if a truthful answer might reasonably lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995); United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 753-54 (2d Cir. 1994). Like knowing falsity, materiality is an element of the offen

nts made in a civil deposition is broad, and evidence on that question is unlikely to bear on the other charges here. See Kross, 14 F.3d at 753-54; Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 509. Although some allegations of sexual abuse are relevant to both sets of charges, many are not. At a minimum, this will expand the s

nts made in a civil deposition is broad, and evidence on that question is unlikely to bear on the other charges here. See Kross, 14 F.3d at 753-54; Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 509. Although some allegations of sexual abuse are relevant to both sets of charges, many are not. At a minimum, this will expand the s

as a natural tendency to influence the court or if a truthful answer might reasonably lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995); United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 753-54 (2d Cir. 1994). Like knowing falsity, materiality is an element of the offen

as a natural tendency to influence the court or if a truthful answer might reasonably lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995); United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 753-54 (2d Cir. 1994). Like knowing falsity, materiality is an element of the offen

No. 98 Cr. (JGK), 1999 WL 9848 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. II, 1999) 275, 281 United States v. Gambino, 838 F. Supp. 744 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) 70 United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506 (1995) 182, 184, 200, 222 United States v. Geaney, 417 F.2d 1116 (2d Cir. 1969) 284 United States v. Gentile, 235 F. Supp. 3d 64

No. 98 Cr. (JGK), 1999 WL 9848 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. II, 1999) 275, 281 United States v. Gambino, 838 F. Supp. 744 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) 70 United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506 (1995) 182, 184, 200, 222 United States v. Geaney, 417 F.2d 1116 (2d Cir. 1969) 284 United States v. Gentile, 235 F. Supp. 3d 64