Epstein Secrets

e a prima fade showing of materiality and must offer more than the conclusory allegation that the requested evidence is material." United States v. Urena, 989 F. Supp. 2d 253, 261 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (citations omitted). Here, the defendant has offered nothing more than her conjecture that some unspecifie

Judge McMahon found that because Maxwell's reliance on the protective order in that case as a "shield [. . .] from the court-ordered disclosure of Confidential Materials pursuant to a grand jury subpoena was unreasonable, the Court may exercise its discretion to grant the Government's application." (Id. at 22). The C

e a prima fade showing of materiality and must offer more than the conclusory allegation that the requested evidence is material." United States v. Urena, 989 F. Supp. 2d 253, 261 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (citations omitted). Here, the defendant has offered nothing more than her conjecture that some unspecifie

Judge McMahon found that because Maxwell's reliance on the protective order in that case as a "shield [. . .] from the court-ordered disclosure of Confidential Materials pursuant to a grand jury subpoena was unreasonable, the Court may exercise its discretion to grant the Government's application." (Id. at 22). The C

e a prima fade showing of materiality and must offer more than the conclusory allegation that the requested evidence is material." United States v. Urena, 989 F. Supp. 2d 253, 261 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (citations omitted). Here, the defendant has offered nothing more than her conjecture that some unspecifie

Judge McMahon found that because Maxwell's relianTI on the protective order in that case as a "shield [. . .] from the court-ordered disclosure of Confidential Materials pursuant to a grand jury subpoena was unreasonable, the Court may exercise its discretion to grant the Government's application." (Id. at 22). The C

a prima facie showing of materiality and must offer more than the conclusory allegation that the requested evidence is material." United States v. Urena, 989 F. Supp. 2d 253, 261 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (citations omitted). Here, the defendant has offered nothing more than her conjecture that some unspecifie

Judge McMahon found that because Maxwell's reliance on the protective order in that case as a "shield [. . .] from the court-ordered disclosure of Confidential Materials pursuant to a grand jury subpoena was unreasonable, the Court may exercise its discretion to grant the Government's application." (Id. at 22). The C