Epstein Secrets

80); United States v. Landof, , 591 F.2d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 1978); In re Grand flay Proceedings , 73 F.R.D. 647, 651 (M.D. Fl. 1977)). In Blackburn , the Middle District of Florida applied the act of production privilege under the premise that Boyd was still binding precedent. Even applying Boyd , the court found tha

s or that the computers contain attorney-client communications, nor were the computers or their contents produced in anticipation of litigation. In Upjohn v. United States , 449 U.S. 383 (1981), the Supreme Court made clear that an attorney cannot create a "zone of silence" over factual matters. The Co

980); United States I Landof, , 591 F.2d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 1978); In re Grand flay Proceedings , 73 F.R.D. 647, 651 (M.D. Fl. 1977)). In Blackburn , the Middle District of Florida applied the act of production privilege under the premise that Boyd was still binding precedent. Even applying Boyd , the court found tha

s or that the computers contain attorney-client communications, nor were the computers or their contents produced in anticipation of litigation. In Upjohn I United States , 449 U.S. 383 (1981), the Supreme Court made clear that an attorney cannot create a "zone of silence" over factual matters. The Cou

. 1980); United States v. Landof, 591 F.2d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 1978); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 73 F.R.D. 647, 651 (M.D. Fl. 1977)). In Blackburn, the Middle District of Florida applied the act of production privilege under the premise that Boyd was still binding precedent. Even applying Boyd, the court found that

or that the computers contain attorney-client communications, nor were the computers or their contents produced in anticipation of litigation. In Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981), the Supreme Court made clear that an -18- EFTA00179117 attorney cannot create a "zone of silence" over fact