Epstein Secrets

secutorial overreach. It is no mystery what happened here. The Palm Beach FBI and the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida ("USAO-SDFL") conducted a thorough investigation of Jeffrey Epstein from 2006-2008 (the "Florida Investigation"), but decided not to prosecute him or his "pote

79) 13, 14 United States v. Carter, 454 F.2d 426 (4th Cir. 1972) 10 United States v. Dionisio, 503 F.3d 78 (2d Cir. 2007) 12 United States v. Gebbie, 294 F.3d 540 (3d Cir. 2002) 6, 7, 10 United States v. Gonzalez, 93 F. App'x 268 (2d Cir. 2004) 7 United States v. Korfant, 771 F.2d 660 (2d C

t because Annabi did not address the circumstances of this case; it is also consistent with fundamental fairness. As the Third Circuit cautioned in Gebbie, individual U.S. Attorney's Offices should not view themselves as "sovereigns of autonomous fiefdoms" with the ability to charge a defendant with t

st levied her accusations more than a decade ago. The Palm Beach FBI and the United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida ("USAO-SDFL") interviewed Accuser-4 in or around 2007 during their three- year investigation of Epstein's alleged sexual abuse (the "Florida Investigation"). And

20 United States v. Carter, 454 F.2d 426 (4th Cir. 1972) 17 United States v. Garcia-Gonzalez, 714 F.3d 306 (5th Cir. 2013) 21 United States v. Gebbie, 294 F.3d 540 (3rd Cir. 2002) 14, 15, 16, 17 United States v. Gonzalez, 93 F. App'x 268 (2d Cir. 2004) 14, 16 United States v. Harvey, 791 F.2

squarely refutes the government's position. The co-conspirator immunity provision does not prohibit merely prosecutions by the USAO for the SDFL ("USAO-SDFL"), but by "the United States." This broad prohibition was intentional, as demonstrated by the express references elsewhere in the NPA to the United

82 (2d Cir. 2019) 13, 26, 29, 30 United States v. Florida West Intl Airways, Inc., 853 F. Supp. 2d 1209 (S.D. Fla. 2012) 16, 17 United States v. Gebbie, 294 F.3d 540 (3d Cir. 2002) 24, 25 United States v. Gonzalez, 93 F. App'x 268 (2d Cir. 2004) 14, 22, 27, 29 United States v. Harvey, 791 F.2d

squarely refutes the government's position. The co-conspirator immunity provision does not prohibit merely prosecutions by the USAO for the SDFL ("USAO-SDFL"), but by "the United States." This broad prohibition was intentional, as demonstrated by the express references elsewhere in the NPA to the United

82 (2d Cir. 2019) 13, 26, 29, 30 United States v. Florida West Intl Airways, Inc., 853 F. Supp. 2d 1209 (S.D. Fla. 2012) 16, 17 United States v. Gebbie, 294 F.3d 540 (3d Cir. 2002) 24, 25 United States v. Gonzalez, 93 F. App'x 268 (2d Cir. 2004) 14, 22, 27, 29 United States v. Harvey, 791 F.2d

182 (2d Cir. 2019) 5, 6, 10, 17 United States v. Florida West Intl Airways, Inc., 853 F. Supp. 2d 1209 (S.D. Fla. 2012) 3, 4, 6 United States v. Gebbie, 294 F.3d 540 (3d Cir. 2002) 12 United States v. Gonzalez, 93 F. App'x 268 (2d Cir. 2004) 8 United States v. Harvey, 791 F.2d 294 (4th Cir. 19

ision in the NPA is intended to refer only to the USAO-SDFL, it does so explicitly. See Mem. at 8-9 (citing examples of NPA's explicit references to USAO-SDFL). While the government is correct that the use of the term "the United States" in a plea agreement, without snore, is insufficient under Annabi and