Epstein Secrets

( citations omitted). FN2D FN20. See Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 513-514, 109 S.Ct. 706, 732, 102

stitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. The New York Court stated that "looking to the plain language of §2

restraining arbitrary and potentially vindictive legislation." Id., at 28-29, 101 S.Ct., at 963-964 (citations omitted). " 42° FN20. See Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 513-514, 109 S.Ct. 706, 732, 102 L.Ed.2d 854 (1989) ("Legislatures are primarily policymaking bodies that promulgate rules to govern

07743 addressed the issue of whether §2255 is a civil or criminal statute for purposes of the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. The New York Court stated that "looking to the plain language of §2255(a), it is clear that the statutory intent was to provide a civil remedy. This is exemplified by

restraining arbitrary and potentially vindictive legislation." Id., at 28-29, 101 S.Ct., at 963-964 (citations omitted). " 42° FN20. See Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 513-514, 109 S.Ct. 706, 732, 102 L.Ed.2d 854 (1989) ("Legislatures are primarily policymaking bodies that promulgate rules to govern

13267 addressed the issue of whether §2255 is a civil or criminal statute for purposes of the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. The New York Court stated that "looking to the plain language of §2255(a), it is clear that the statutory intent was to provide a civil remedy. This is exemplified by

restraining arbitrary and potentially vindictive legislation." Id., at 28-29, 101 S.Ct., at 963-964 (citations omitted). "a° F1420. See Richmond'. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 513-514, 109 5.O. 706, 732, 102 L.Ed.2d 854 (1989) ("Legislatures are primarily policymaking bodies that promulgate rules to govern

94814 addressed the issue of whether §2255 is a civil or criminal statute for purposes of the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. The New York Court stated that "looking to the plain language of §2255(a), it is clear that the statutory intent was to provide a civil remedy. This is exemplified by

y restraining arbitrary and potentially vindictive legislation." Id., at 28-29, 101 S.Ct., at 963-964 (citations omitted). Fm° FN20. See Richmond'. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 513-514, 109 S.Ct. 706, 732, 102 L.Ed.2d 854 (1989) ("Legislatures are primarily policymaking bodies that promulgate rules to govern

83860 addressed the issue of whether §2255 is a civil or criminal statute for purposes of the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. The New York Court stated that "looking to the plain language of §2255(a), it is clear that the statutory intent was to provide a civil remedy. This is exemplified by