Epstein Secrets

.g., Lopez v. Davis, 531 U.S. 230, 241 (2001) (noting Congress' use of a mandatory `shall' to impose discretionless obligations") (emphasis added); Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 35 (1998) (explaining that "the mandatory `shall' . . . normally creates an obligation imperv

ively by the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the USAO would not be entitled to compel pm-trial production of any of this information. See Fed. R. Cr. P. 16(bX1)(A), (C), and 16(bX2); United States v. Argomaniz, 925 F.2d 1349, 1355-56 (11th Cir. 1991) (explaining act-of-production privilege). Th

g., Lopez v. Davis, 531 U.S. 230, 241 (2001) (noting Congress' "use of a mandatory 'shall' to impose discretionless obligations") (emphasis added); Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 35 (1998) (explaining that "the mandatory 'shall' . . . normally creates an obligation imperv

ively by the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the USAO would not be entitled to compel pre-trial production of any of this information. See Fed. R. Cr. P. 16(b)(1)(A), (C), and 16(bX2); United States v. Argomaniz, 925 F.2d 1349, 1355-56 (11th Cir. 1991) (explaining act-of-production privilege). T

e.g., Lopez' Davis, 531 U.S. 230, 241 (2001) (noting Congress' "use of a mandatory `shall' to impose discretionless obligations") (emphasis added); Lexecon Inc. I. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 35 (1998) (explaining that "the mandatory `shall' . . . normally creates an obligation imperv

ively by the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the USAO would not be entitled to compel pre-trial production of any of this information. See Fed. R. Cr. P. 16(b)(1)(A), (C), and 16(b)(2); United States I Argomaniz, 925 F.2d 1349, 1355-56 (11th Cir. 1991) (explaining act-of-production privilege). T