Epstein Secrets

t in this District as barred by what they claimed was an earlier "plea agreement" in the Eastern District, and the court denied the motion. Id. The Second Circuit, in affirming the denial, stated simply that "[a] plea agreement binds only the office of the United States Attorney for the district in which the p

wever, the government "must bear the burden for any lack of clarity in the agreement and ambiguities should be resolved in favor of the defendant." Innes v. Dalsheim, 864 F.2d 974, 979 (2d Cir. 1988). Here, the NPA unambiguously precludes prosecution of Epstein's potential co- conspirators, and the in

t in this District as barred by what they claimed was an earlier "plea agreement" in the Eastern District, and the court denied the motion. Id. The Second Circuit, in affirming the denial, stated simply that "[I] plea agreement binds only the office of the United States Attorney for the district in which the p

wever, the government "must bear the burden for any lack of clarity in the agreement and ambiguities should be resolved in favor of the defendant." Innes v. Dalsheim, 864 F.2d 974, 979 (2d Cir. 1988). Here, the NPA unambiguously precludes prosecution of Epstein's potential co- conspirators, and the in

t 1313. Hoffenberg suggests that United States v. Leonard, 50 F.3d 1152, 1158 (2d Cir.I995), suggests a high- er standard of proof. In Leonard, the Second Circuit instructed that "the district court should consider any evidence with a significant degree of probative value, and should rest its finding on evid

Second Circuit has stated, Icjomparing a criminal defend- ant to a merchant in the marketplace is an inappro- priate analogy that we have rejected." Innes v. Dalsheitn, 864 F.2d 974, 978 (2d Cir.1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 809, 110 S.Ct. 50, 107 L.Ed.2d 19 (1989). See United States v. Khan, 920 F.2