Epstein Secrets

t version into the public docket. The Court's decision to adopt the Government's proposed redactions is guided by the three-part test articulated by the Second Circuit in Lugosch v. Pyramid Co. of Onondaga, 435 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2006). Under this test, the Court must: (i) determine whether the documents in questio

inal 2 In the civil context, there is a "strong presumption against the modification of a protective order." hi re Teligent, Inc., 640 F.3d 53, 59 (2d Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). Courts in the Second Circuit have applied the standard for modification of protective orders in the civil context to the c

protective orders in the civil context to the criminal context. See, e.g., United States v. Calderon, No. 3:15-CR-25 (JCH), 2017 WL 6453344, at *2 (D. Conn. Dec. I, 2017) (applying the civil standard for the modification of a protective order in a criminal case); United States v. Kerik, No. 07-CR-1027 (L

AW © 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 7 EFTA00211060 United States v. Stevens, — F.Supp.3d — (2017) 4 Although the Second Circuit has ruled that the CVRA does not require "the Government to seek approval from crime victims before negotiating or entering into a settlement agreem

or sentencing proceeding the government's understanding of the amount of possible restitution based upon consultation with, inter alia, the victim." D. Conn. L. Crim. R. 32(m). Victims do not know the ins•and•outs of the restitution statutes. Prosecutors should. The Government's pre-plea consultation wit

y qualifying as a "judicial document" for purposes of the first element of the Lugosch test. United States v. Amodeo ("Amodeo I"), 44 F.3d 141, 145 (2d Cir. 1995). Second, the Court assumes that the common law presumption of access attaches, thereby satisfying the second element. But in balancing competi

t version into the public docket. The Court's decision to adopt the Government's proposed redactions is guided by the three-part test articulated by the Second Circuit in Lugosch v. Pyramid Co. of Onondaga, 435 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2006). Under this test, the Court must: (i) determine whether the documents in questio

protective orders in the civil context to the criminal context. See, e.g., United States v. Calderon, No. 3:15-CR-25 (JCR), 2017 WL 6453344, at •2 (D. Conn. Dec. I, 2017) (applying the civil standard for the modification of a protective order in a criminal case); United States v. Kerik, No. 07-CR-1027 (L

ed provides the motive for him do so and is another significant factor in assessing the risk of flight. See United States v. Jackson, 823 F.2d 4, 7 (2d Cir. 1987). So too is the strength of the evidence, detailed above and in the Government's Detention Memo. Indeed, that evidence, already robust less th

Dec. 20, 2010); United States v. Bohn, 330 F. Supp. 2d 960, 961 (W.D. Tenn. 2004); United States v. Stroh, No. 396 Cr. 139, 2000 WL 1832956, at *5 (D. Conn. Nov. 3, 2000); United States v. Botero, 604 F. Supp. 1028, 1035 (S.D. Fla. 1985). . The Department of Justice's Office of International Affairs is

n to dozens of victims who were abused in Florida. 2 While beyond the scope of a bail hearing, as discussed further below, it is well-established in the Second Circuit that absent an express provision to the contrary in the agreement, one District is not bound by the terms of an agreement entered into between a def

ant presents a risk of flight.' English, 629 F.3d at 319 (quoting Mercedes, 254 F.3d at 436); see also United States v. Manly., 782 F.2d 1141, 1144 (2d Cir. 1986) ("The government retains the burden of persuasion [in a presumption case]."). Even when "a defendant has met his burden of production," howev

extradition request is pending in Canada and may be subject to withdrawal."); United States v. Stroh, No. 396-CR-139 (AHN), 2000 WL 1832956, at *5 (D. Conn. Nov. 3, 2000) ("[I]t appears that there is a substantial legal question as to whether any country to which he fled would enforce any waiver of extr

y, the Defendant's argument that private security guards could ensure her appearance at future proceedings runs afoul of the Bail Reform Act, which the Second Circuit has held "does not permit a two-tiered bail system in which defendants of lesser means are detained pending trial while wealthy defendants are rele

at *2 (2d Cir. Apr. 26, 2002); United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88, 120 (2d Cir. 1998) (per curiam); United States v. Rivera, 844 F.2d 916, 923 (2d Cir. 1988). The Second Circuit has held that language nearly identical to that in Epstein's NPA is not enough to overcome the presumption in favor of sin

ites change the Court's conclusion that the NPA does not bar the charges against her. As the Court explained in its April 16, 2021 Opinion & Order, the Second Circuit held in United States v. Annabi that "[a] plea agreement binds only the office of the United States Attorney for the district in which the plea is

v. Vickers, No. 13-CR-128-A, 2014 WL 1838255, at *8 (W.D.N.Y. May 8, 2014); United States v. Sensi, No. 3:08-CR-253 (WWE), 2010 WL 2351484, at *3 (D. Conn. June 7, 2010). The sex trafficking charges are therefore not time-barred. Regardless of whether it was the general five-year limitations period in

on, 285 U.S. 518 (1932) 8 United States v. Schneider, 801 F.3d 186 (3d Cir. 2015) 14 United States v. Sensi, No. 08 Cr. 253, 2010 WL 2351484 (D. Conn. June 7, 2010) 5 United States v. Vickers, No. 13 Cr. 128 (RJA) (HKS), 2014 WL 1838255 (W.D.N.Y. May 8, 2014) 15 Vernon v. Cassadaga Valley Cent

uit's acknowledgment that the retroactivity of the 2003 Amendment must be analyzed under Landgraf. Weingarten v. United States, 865 F.3d 48, 54-58 (2d Cir. 2017). 3 No Landgraf analysis was performed, nor was Congress' rejection of the retroactivity provision discussed, in United States v. Brown, 800 F

x, 527 U.S. 343, 355-57 (1999) (examining "structure and legislative history" as part of first Landgraf step). And as the government acknowledges, "the Second Circuit has considered both the text of the statute and the legislative history" at the first Landgraf step. Opp. 28 (citing In re Enterprise Mortgage Acce

Dec. 20, 2010); United States v. Bohn, 330 F. Supp. 2d 960, 961 (W.D. Tenn. 2004); United States v. Stroh, No. 396 Cr. 139, 2000 WL 1832956, at *5 (D. Conn. Nov. 3, 2000); United States v. Botero, 604 F. Supp. 1028, 1035 (S.D. Fla. 1985). This is for very good reason: Any defendant who signs such a purp

) (Bianco, J.) (collecting cases). The Second Circuit has never directly addressed this issue. See United States v. Sabhnani, 493 F.3d 63, 78 n.18 (2d Cir. 2007) ("The government has not argued and, therefore, EFTA00030252 --- PAGE BREAK --- Honorable Richard M. Berman United States District Judge

Dec. 20, 2010); United States v. Bohn, 330 F. Supp. 2d 960, 961 (W.D. Tenn. 2004); United States v. Stroh, No. 396 Cr. 139, 2000 WL 1832956, at *5 (D. Conn. Nov. 3, 2000); United States v. Botero, 604 F. Supp. 1028, 1035 (S.D. Fla. 1985). . The Department of Justice's Office of International Affairs is

elaborately replicate a detention facility without the confidence of security such a facility instills."' United States v. Orena, 986 F.2d 628, 632 (2d Cir. 1993) (quoting United States v. Gotti, 776 F. Supp. 666, 672 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (rejecting private jail proposal)); see also Valerio, 9 F. Supp. 3d at