Epstein Secrets

owledges that she could have, but did not, invoke her Fifth Amendment rights to avoid providing incriminating testimony. See, e.g., Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248, 263-24 & n.24 (1983). However, she contends that she testified only because she believed the protective order in that case would pre

l protective order in the public interest. See Brown, 929 F.3d at 47;= v. Maxwell, 827 F. App'x 144, 145 (2d Cir. 2020); Lugosch v. Pyramid Co. of Onondaga, 435 F.3d 110, 126 (2d Cir. 2006). Civil litigants have neither a reasonable basis nor legal entitlement to rely on a civil protective order against

owledges that she could have, but did not, invoke her Fifth Amendment rights to avoid providing incriminating testimony. See, e.g., Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248, 263-24 & n.24 (1983). However, she contends that she testified only because she believed the protective order in that case would pre

il protective order in the public interest. See Brown, 929 F.3d at 47; v. Marvell, 827 F. App'x 144, 145 (2d Cir. 2020); Lugosch v. Pyramid Co. of Onondaga, 435 F.3d 110, 126 (2d Cir. 2006). Civil litigants have neither a reasonable basis nor legal entitlement to rely on a civil protective order against

owledges that she could have, but did not, invoke her Fifth Amendment rights to avoid providing incriminating testimony. See, e.g., Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248, 263-24 & n.24 (1983). However, she contends that she testified only because she believed the protective order in that case would pre

il protective order in the public interest. See Brown, 929 F.3d at 47; v. Maxwell, 827 F. App'x 144, 145 (2d Cir. 2020); Lugosch v. Pyramid Co. of Onondaga, 435 F.3d 110, 126 (2d Cir. 2006). Civil litigants have neither a reasonable basis nor legal entitlement to rely on a civil protective order against

owledges that she could have, but did not, invoke her Fifth Amendment rights to avoid providing incriminating testimony. See, e.g., Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248, 263-24 & n.24 (1983). However, she contends that she testified only because she believed the protective order in that case would pre

il protective order in the public interest. See Brown, 929 F.3d at 47; v. Maxwell, 827 F. App'x 144, 145 (2d Cir. 2020); Lugosch v. Pyramid Co. of Onondaga, 435 F.3d 110, 126 (2d Cir. 2006). Civil litigants have neither a reasonable basis nor legal entitlement to rely on a civil protective order against

owledges that she could have, but did not, invoke her Fifth Amendment rights to avoid providing incriminating testimony. See, e.g., Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248, 263-24 & n.24 (1983). However, she contends that she testified only because she believed the protective order in that case would pre

il protective order in the public interest. See Brown, 929 F.3d at 47; v. Maxwell, 827 F. App'x 144, 145 (2d Cir. 2020); Lugosch v. Pyramid Co. of Onondaga, 435 F.3d 110, 126 (2d Cir. 2006). Civil litigants have neither a reasonable basis nor legal entitlement to rely on a civil protective order against