Epstein Secrets

owledges that she could have, but did not, invoke her Fifth Amendment rights to avoid providing incriminating testimony. See, e.g., Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248, 263-24 & n.24 (1983). However, she contends that she testified only because she believed the protective order in that case would pre

to a court's ruling, Second Circuit precedent creates a strong presumption that they will be made public notwithstanding any protective order. See Lugosch, 435 F.3d at 126. These are not remote or theoretical possibilities. Each of them predictably came to pass in this case. See Brown, 929 F.3d at 48

owledges that she could have, but did not, invoke her Fifth Amendment rights to avoid providing incriminating testimony. See, e.g., Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248, 263-24 & n.24 (1983). However, she contends that she testified only because she believed the protective order in that case would pre

to a court's ruling, Second Circuit precedent creates a strong presumption that they will be made public notwithstanding any protective order. See Lugosch, 435 F.3d at 126. These are not remote or theoretical possibilities. Each of them predictably came to pass in this case. See Brown, 929 F.3d at 48

owledges that she could have, but did not, invoke her Fifth Amendment rights to avoid providing incriminating testimony. See, e.g., Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248, 263-24 & n.24 (1983). However, she contends that she testified only because she believed the protective order in that case would pre

to a court's ruling, Second Circuit precedent creates a strong presumption that they will be made public notwithstanding any protective order. See Lugosch, 435 F.3d at 126. These are not remote or theoretical possibilities. Each of them predictably came to pass in this case. See Brown, 929 F.3d at 48

owledges that she could have, but did not, invoke her Fifth Amendment rights to avoid providing incriminating testimony. See, e.g., Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248, 263-24 & n.24 (1983). However, she contends that she testified only because she believed the protective order in that case would pre

to a court's ruling, Second Circuit precedent creates a strong presumption that they will be made public notwithstanding any protective order. See Lugosch, 435 F.3d at 126. These are not remote or theoretical possibilities. Each of them predictably came to pass in this case. See Brown, 929 F.3d at 48

owledges that she could have, but did not, invoke her Fifth Amendment rights to avoid providing incriminating testimony. See, e.g., Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248, 263-24 & n.24 (1983). However, she contends that she testified only because she believed the protective order in that case would pre

to a court's ruling, Second Circuit precedent creates a strong presumption that they will be made public notwithstanding any protective order. See Lugosch, 435 F.3d at 126. These are not remote or theoretical possibilities. Each of them predictably came to pass in this case. See Brown, 929 F.3d at 48