Epstein Secrets

351 F. Supp. 121 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) 243 United States v. Butler, No. 04 Cr. 340, 2004 WL 2274751 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 7, 2004) 208, 211 United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974) 110 United States v. Caming, 968 F.2d 232 (2d Cir. 1992) 165 xi EFTA00077617 United States v. Campo Flores, No. 15 Cr.

. 2003) 259 United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116 (1966) 80 EFTA00077619 United States v. Falso, 544 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2008) United States v. Fanner, 137 F.3d 1265 (10th Cir. 1998) United States v. Feldman, 939 F.3d 182 (2d Cir. 2019) United States v. Fennell, 166, 169 179, 180 8, 20, 27 4

it may compel the production of documentary evidence or the testimony of witnesses, as it deems necessary." Id. at 421-22 (citing United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343 (1974)). "Wide latitude in gathering evidence is vital to the grand jury's investigative function." Id. at 422; see Branzburg v.

mental ambiguity," however, "is the exception, not the rule." United States v. Sarwari, 669 F.3d 401, 407 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Fanner, 137 F.3d 1265, 1269 (10th Cir. 1998)). A defendant cannot demonstrate fundamental ambiguity simply by showing that words used in a question are ame

351 F. Supp. 121 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) 243 United States v. Butler, No. 04 Cr. 340, 2004 WL 2274751 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 7, 2004) 208, 211 United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974) 110 United States v. Caming, 968 F.2d 232 (2d Cir. 1992) 165 xi EFTA00039432 United States v. Campo Flores, No. 15 Cr.

. 2003) 259 United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116 (1966) 80 EFTA00039434 United States v. Falso, 544 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2008) United States v. Fanner, 137 F.3d 1265 (10th Cir. 1998) United States v. Feldman, 939 F.3d 182 (2d Cir. 2019) United States v. Fennell, 166, 169 179, 180 8, 20, 27 4

it may compel the production of documentary evidence or the testimony of witnesses, as it deems necessary." Id. at 421-22 (citing United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343 (1974)). "Wide latitude in gathering evidence is vital to the grand jury's investigative function." Id. at 422; see Branzburg v.

mental ambiguity," however, "is the exception, not the rule." United States v. Sarwari, 669 F.3d 401, 407 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Fanner, 137 F.3d 1265, 1269 (10th Cir. 1998)). A defendant cannot demonstrate fundamental ambiguity simply by showing that words used in a question are ame

21 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) 160 EFTA00095077 United States v. Butler, No. 04 Cr. 340, 2004 WL 2274751 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 7, 2004) 139, 141 United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974) 78 United States v. Caming, 968 F.2d 232 (2d Cir. 1992) 112 United States v. Campo Flores, 15 Cr. 765 (PAC), 2016 WL 5946

nited States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116 (1966) 54 xii EFTA00095079 United States v. Falso, 544 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2008) 113, 114 United States v. Fanner, 137 F.3d 1265 (10th Cir. 1998) 120, 121 United States v. Feldman, 939 F.3d 182 (2d Cir. 2019) 6, 18, 22 United States v. Fennell, 496 F. Supp

it may compel the production of documentary evidence or the testimony of witnesses, as it deems necessary." Id. at 421-22 (citing United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343 (1974)). "Wide latitude in gathering evidence is vital to the grand jury's investigative function." Id. at 422; see Branzburg v.

mental ambiguity," however, "is the exception, not the rule." United States v. Sarwari, 669 F.3d 401, 407 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Fanner, 137 F.3d 1265, 1269 (10th Cir. 1998)). A defendant cannot demonstrate fundamental ambiguity simply by showing that words used in a question are am

it may compel the production of documentary evidence or the testimony of witnesses, as it deems necessary." Id. at 421-22 (citing United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343 (1974)). "Wide latitude in gathering evidence is vital to the grand jury's investigative function." Id. at 422; see Branzburg v.

mental ambiguity," however, "is the exception, not the rule." United States v. Sanvari, 669 F.3d 401, 407 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Fanner, 137 F.3d 1265, 1269 (10th Cir. 1998)). A defendant cannot demonstrate fundamental ambiguity simply by showing that words used in a question are ame