Epstein Secrets

ction with prosecution by one sovereign do not carry over to prosecution by another sovereign. In Cobb , the Supreme Court clarified its holding in McNeil. Wisconsin , 501 U.S. 171 (1991) that the "Sixth Amendment right to counsel is offense specific. It cannot be invoked once for all future prosecutio

(1991) that the "Sixth Amendment right to counsel is offense specific. It cannot be invoked once for all future prosecutions." Id. at 167 (quoting McNeil at 175). The Cobb Court noted that some other courts: have read into McNeil 's offense-specific definition an exception for crimes that are `factual

The district court addressed the cases of Clutchette I Rushen , 770 F.2d 1469 (9th Cir. 1985), and People I Meredith , 631 P.2d 46 (Cal. 1981). In Clutchette , the defendant's attorney had sent an investigator to collect incriminating evidence from a shopkeeper, and the trial court had allowed that eviden

(1991) that the "Sixth Amendment right to counsel is offense specific. It cannot be invoked once for all future prosecutions." Id. at 167 (quoting McNeil at 175). The Cobb Court noted that some -34- EFTA00179133 other courts: have read into McNeil's offense-specific definition an exception for crim

tion of criminal evidence that forecloses [the defendant's] attorney-client privilege argument . . ." Id. The district court addressed the cases of Clutchette v. Rushen, 770 F.2d 1469 (9th Cir. 1985), and People v. Meredith, 631 P.2d 46 (Cal. 1981). In Clutchette, the defendant's attorney had sent an inve

ry to the ability of Epstein's counsel to evaluate their significance; copies of the hard drives could have been made. Of course, unlike counsel in Clutchette and Meredith, Epstein's counsel never provided the evidence to law enforcement and, instead, tries to aver that the items may not exist. If that is

(1991) that the "Sixth Amendment right to counsel is offense specific. It cannot be invoked once for all future prosecutions." Id. at 167 (quoting McNeil at 175). The Cobb Court noted that some other courts: have read into McNeil 's offense-specific definition an exception for crimes that are `factual

tion of criminal evidence that forecloses [the defendant's] attorney-client privilege argument . . ." Id. The district court addressed the cases of Clutchette v. Rushen , 770 F.2d 1469 (9th Cir. 1985), and People v. Meredith , 631 P.2d 46 (Cal. 1981). In Clutchette , the defendant's attorney had sent an in