Epstein Secrets

e the authority, inherent or otherwise, to conduct its own inquiry into the circumstances of Jeffrey Epstein's suicide, or to supervise the ongoing Grand Jury investigation. 1. The Rule of Abatement Requires the Dismissal of the Indictment As the Court is aware, clear Second Circuit precedent requires the

der the "well-settled rule that actions upon penal statutes do not survive the death of the wrongdoer." United States v. Wright, 160 F.3d 905, 908 (2d Cir. 1998) (internal citation omitted). This rule applies with full force here, and requires the dismissal of the Indictment. See Transcript of Aug. 27,

the laws in the Executive. See Art. II, § 2, cl. 1; Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. I, 138 (1976). Indeed, the Second Circuit has emphasized that judicial review and regulation of prosecutorial decisions would place courts in the "injudicious posture of becoming `superpros

use an act of production shield to turning over documents whose existence are known to the government or is a foregone conclusion. See, e.g. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Oct. 29, 1992, 1 F.3d 87, 93 (2d Cir. 1993) (rejecting act of production argument because compliance with subpoena requi

tion for tax returns – as the magistrate judge specifically noted in rejecting Epstein’s argument. See, e.g., Rajah v. Mukasey, 544 F.3d 427, 442 (2nd Cir. 2008) (“. . . a taxpayer’s W-2 forms are required records not subject to the Fifth Amendment because they are a mandatory part of a civil regulatory

his claim is said to be Trudeau v. New York State Consumer Protection Bd., 237 F.R.D. 325 (N.D.N.Y. 2006), which reviews some decisions from within the Second Circuit and Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM Document 485 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/10/2010 Page 15 of 27 CASE NO: 08-CV-80119-MARRA/JOHNSO

ed provides the motive for him do so and is another significant factor in assessing the risk of flight. See United States v. Jackson, 823 F.2d 4, 7 (2d Cir. 1987). So too is the strength of the evidence, detailed above and in the Government's Detention Memo. Indeed, that evidence, already robust less th

n to dozens of victims who were abused in Florida. 2 While beyond the scope of a bail hearing, as discussed further below, it is well-established in the Second Circuit that absent an express provision to the contrary in the agreement, one District is not bound by the terms of an agreement entered into between a def

******************NARRATIvg 1* 42 ********* ***************** Reported By: RECARSY, JOSEPH 4/14/06 Entered By.: ALTOMARO, NICKIE A. 4/18/06 The Grand Jury Subpoenas were personally served to the individuals they were issued to. On April 5, 2006, at approximately 7:30 p.m., I oersonally served the pare

an, 939 F.3d 182 (2d Cir. 2019), for the proposition that "plea agreements differ from commercial contracts" (Opp. 18), the "differ[ence]" to which the Second Circuit was referring was that in construing a plea agreement, 3 Accuser-2 is identified in the Indictment as Minor Victim-2. 5 EFTA00028888 --- PAGE BR

ns omitted), and the government is held "responsible for imprecisions or ambiguities in the agreement." United States v. Padilla, 186 F.3d 136, 142 (2d Cir. 1999). While the government argues that Annabi relieves it of this responsibility where the "imprecisions or ambiguities" relate to the geographic

other offenses" that were the subject of the loint investigation" by the FBI and the USAO-SDFL; and (iii) "any offenses that arose from the Federal Grand Jury investigation." NPA at 2. The government's assertion that the NPA bars prosecution only for "the specific offenses enumerated in the NPA" (Opp. 15-1