Epstein Secrets

f power have been handed over at the same t=me to a single man: Xi linping (pictured, centre, above). The decision, re=ealed on November 15th, that Hu Jintao has stepped down not only as the Co=munist Party's general secretary, but also as head of China's army, wa= part of the biggest shake-up of the part

ng the economy. But he might find it difficult =o get his way given the presence of two others in the standing committee w=o are Jiang's men. One is Wang Qishan, who has played a central role in =conomic management for more than four years, and has now acquired a very p=werful role as the party's chief anti-

a. American popular culture has enjoyed worldwide influence for decades and is a key element of the country’s soft power. However, by the end of the Hu Jintao era, China’s leaders had begun calling for their country, too, to become a soft power leader, a theme Xi Jinping has continued to stress. The subsequ

similar to that of the interagency “principals committees” in the US system. Its chairman is Xi Jinping, while Premier Li Keqiang and Vice President Wang Qishan serve as vice chairmen. Other PBSC members Wang Huning and Han Zheng are members. Le Yucheng, a vice minister of Foreign Affairs, is deputy director.

ign is who the people are and how they relate to each other. It’s a group that actually respects traditional norms. » F RLK: There was thought that Wang Qishan, for example, might violate norms by being on the Standing Committee after the traditional retirement age and that’s not the case. There is balance a

W YORK TIMES « Need to consolidate power. Xi was not selected by Deng Xiaoping, the archi- tect of reform, as were his predecessors (Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao), and he was not elected by the people. Conven- tional wisdom had it that Xi would be a weak leader. In order to realize his Chinese Dream, Xi needs

ast one, was presided over by Xi Jinping and attended by all seven members of the politburo standing committee, plus ex-officio member Vice President Wang Qishan, together with all other eighteen members of the regular politburo, in addition to everybody who is anybody in the entire Chinese foreign, security,

gn Affairs. Some began in the two years before then after Xi first became General Secretary in late 2012. And some have their antecedents in the late Hu Jintao period. But my point is that they all either began, were intensified or else were formally publicly legitimised by the conclusions of the last Centra